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My dissertation consists of three papers on business cycles in developing
countries. All the papers are different from each other and emphasize different
aspects of understanding economic fluctuations in developing countries.
The first paper is titled ‘Medium Term Business Cycles in Developing
Countries’ (with Diego Comin, Norman Loayza and Luis Serven). This paper
models the link between business cycle fluctuations in developed countries with
fluctuations in developing countries. Business cycle fluctuations in developed
economies tend to have large and persistent effects on developing countries.
We study the transmission of business cycle fluctuations from developed to
developing economies with a two-country asymmetric DSGE model with two
important features: (i) endogenous and slow diffusion of technologies from the
developed to the developing country, and (ii) adjustment costs to investment
flows. Consistent with the model, we observe that the flow of technologies
from developed to developing economies co-moves positively with output in
both developed and developing countries. After calibrating the model to Mex-
ico and the U.S., it can explain the following stylized facts: (i) U.S. and Mex-
ican output co-move more than consumption; (ii) U.S. shocks have a larger
effect on Mexico than in the U.S.; (iii) U.S. business cycles lead over medium
term fluctuations in Mexico; (iv) Mexican consumption is more volatile than
output.
The second paper of my dissertation is based on a price setting survey
conducted by the State Bank of Pakistan (Central Bank). The paper is titled
‘Price-Setting Discoveries: Results from a Developing Country’ (with M. Ali
Choudhary, Abdul Faheem, Nadeem Hanif, and Saima Naeem) present the
results of 1189 structured face-to-face interviews about price-setting behavior
of the formal firms in the manufacturing and services sector of Pakistan. The
key findings of the survey are:the frequency of price change is high in Pak-
istan, lowering the real impact of monetary policy. Price rigidity is mainly
explained by firms caring about relative prices and the persistence of shocks.
The exchange-rate and cost shocks are more important than financial and de-
mand shocks for both setting prices and also the readiness with which these
shocks pass-through to the economy. Formal sector firms with connections
to the informal sector, especially through demand, have a lower probability
of price adjustment. The lack of taxes and compliance with tax regime, i.e.
enforcement are held responsible for existence of the informal sector by formal
sector firms. The results from this paper provided motivation for the last pa-
per of my dissertation about understanding and modeling the business cycle
fluctuations in a developing economy like Pakistan.
The last paper of my dissertation is titled ‘Modeling Business Cycles in
Pakistan: A First Step’. In this paper, I establish the nature of short-run
fluctuations of the Pakistani economy over the period of 1960-2010. There
have been significant changes in the nature of the Pakistani economy over
the last few decades. Therefore, I focus my detailed analysis on the last few
decades where it seems more appropriate to investigate the nature and causes
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of business cycles in Pakistan. Furthermore, I evaluate the performance of a
typical RBC and an augmented RBC model with an exogenous FDI shock in
explaining cyclical fluctuations experienced by the Pakistani economy. I find
that a simple RBC model does badly in terms of matching relevant second
order moments of short run fluctuations as depicted by the data. However,
augmented RBC model performs better compared to the simple RBC model.
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Chapter 1
Medium Term Business Cycles
in Developing Countries
1.1 Introduction
”Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States.”
Attributed to Dictator Porfirio Diaz, 1910.
This paper explores the transmission of business cycle fluctuations for de-
veloped to developing economies. Business cycle fluctuations in developed
economies tend to have strong effects on developing countries as has become
clear during the great recession of 2008. When studying more generally the
co-movement patterns, we observe evidence that the effects of business cycles
in developed economies (N) on developing (S) ones are not only large but also
quite persistent. In particular, they affect output in developing countries over
the medium term and not only at business cycle frequencies.
A natural channel for the transmission of shocks fromN to S is throughN ’s
demand for S ′ exports. Below we show, however, that this mechanism is unable
to propagate shocks to S with the strength and persistence we observe in the
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data. We explore a different channel: the cyclicality of the speed of diffusion
of new technologies embodied in new capital goods from N to S. Following
Broda and Weinstein (2006) we measure technology diffusion by the number of
different (durable-manufacturing) SIC categories in which N exports to S. We
uncover two main facts. First, the number of technologies exported from N
to S co-moves positively with N ′s cycle, both at high frequency and at lower
frequencies. Second, at low frequencies, the range of technologies imported
from N leads S productivity measures.
To explore the quantitative implications of these regularities for business
cycles in developing economies, we build a real business cycle model. Our
model has two asymmetric countries with endogenous productivity growth
and adjustment costs to investment. Investment adjustment costs allow us
to capture the extensive micro evidence on investment frictions in developing
countries (e.g. Gelos and Isgut, 2001; Iscan, 2000; Warner 1992, 1994). To
endogenize productivity dynamics, we use a variation of Comin and Gertler’s
(2006) model of R&D and technology diffusion. As in Comin and Gertler
(2006) we have endogenous development of new technologies in N , but we
expand their framework to a two-country setting and introduce endogenous
international diffusion of technologies. In particular, exporters from N need to
incur a sunk cost before starting to sell the intermediate goods that embody the
technology in S. By making productivity endogenous in this way, we provide a
unified account of the dynamics of productivity in N and S over high and low
frequencies.1 To close the lifecycle of intermediate goods, we introduce foreign
direct investment (FDI) from N to S. This allows us to capture realistically
1Another reason for this strategy is that many authors have questioned the importance of
high frequency technology shocks and argued that short term fluctuations in the Solow resid-
ual reflect unmeasured input utilization and imperfect competition as opposed to true tech-
nology shifts (e.g. Burnside et al., 1995; Basu, 1996). Endogenous productivity, however,
provides an avenue through which transitory non-technological shocks induce low frequency
fluctuations in productivity without having to rely on exogenous shifts in technology.
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the nature of capital flows to developing countries, of which, since 1990, 70%
have been in the form of FDI (Loayza and Serven, 2006).2
It is well known (e.g. Comin and Hobijn, 2010) that developing countries
adopt new technologies with significant time lags relative to their invention
date. In our model these lags vary endogenously with the cycle. Contrac-
tionary shocks to either N and to S reduce the present discounted value
of transferring a new technology to S, inducing pro-cyclical fluctuations in
the speed of technology diffusion. Because technology is a state variable and
changes slowly, the fluctuations in S ′ stock of technologies occur only at low
frequencies. Realistically, technologies in the model are embodied in new capi-
tal. As the number of technologies in S (relative to the balanced growth path)
declines, the cost of producing new investment goods in S slowly increases. In
the presence of adjustment costs, these prospects about the cost of investment
induce companies in S to start cutting investment when N starts contracting.
As a result, a recessionary shock to N generates a contemporaneous collapse
of investment and output in S.
In section 4, we calibrate the model to match key moments of the U.S.
and Mexican economies over the last two decades. The simulations show that
our model does a reasonably good job in characterizing the key features of the
short and medium term fluctuations in Mexico. In doing so, it sheds light on
several important open questions in international macroeconomics.
First, unlike many RBC models (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992)
our model generates a higher cross-country correlation of output than that
of consumption. It does so because what drives the short term cross-country
co-movement in output is the pro-cyclical response of Mexico’s investment
to U.S. shocks. Mexico’s consumption, on the other hand, does not respond
2The FDI share is even larger when restricting attention to private capital flows and
when focusing in Latin America and Asia.
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much contemporaneously to U.S. shocks. Second, our model also generates a
large initial response of S GDP to N shocks, which helps explain why business
cycle fluctuations are larger in developing than in developed economies. Third,
consistent with the data, short term fluctuations in N produce cycles in S at
frequencies lower than those of the conventional business cycle. This occurs
as the initial shock in N triggers a persistent slowdown in the flow of new
technologies to S.
Fourth, the model generates counter-cyclical interest rates in S endoge-
nously in response to domestic shocks. As shown by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), an important feature of business cycles in developing countries is the
counter-cyclicality of real interest rates. Based on this evidence, numerous
authors have used shocks to interest rates in developing countries as a source
of business cycles. In our model, the procyclical diffusion of technologies gen-
erates counter-cyclical fluctuations in the relative price of capital. These result
in counter-cyclical capital gains from holding a unit of capital that dominate
the pro-cyclical response of the marginal product of capital (i.e. the dividend),
thus inducing interest rates in S (as well as the interest differential with re-
spect to N) to be counter-cyclical. Finally, the counter-cyclical response of
domestic real interest rates to S’ shocks is key for our model to rationalize
a key regularity about business cycles in developing countries, namely that
consumption is more volatile than output (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007).
The endogenous international diffusion of technologies emphasized in our
framework is a different phenomenon from production sharing (e.g. Bergin et
al. 2009; Zlate, 2010). Production sharing models generate large fluctuations
in output in S in response to a shock in N by assuming strong cyclicality
of wages.3 Firms in N compare wages domestically and abroad and expand
3Another important assumption of production sharing models, though more plausible, is
that the share of manufacturing is larger in S than in N.
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and contract their offshoring arrangements by increasing the extent of traded
intermediates. An implication of these models is that the flow of interme-
diate exports from N to S should be pro-cyclical with respect to N ′s cycle
but counter-cyclical with respect to S. In contrast, in our framework both
recessions in N and S reduce the present discounted value of future profits
from exporting a new intermediate good to S. As a result, the flow of new
technologies from N to S is pro-cyclical with respect to both countries, and
in particular to S. The data examined here shows strong evidence of the pro-
cyclicality of the flow of new technologies with respect to S. A related issue is
that it is unlikely that production-sharing models or models of entry and trade
in varieties (e.g. Ghironi and Melitz, 2005) can account for the low-frequency
effects of N ′s business cycle on S ′s productivity and output we observe in the
data.4 However, we show that endogenous technology diffusion dynamics can
generate the low-frequency international propagation that characterizes the
data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
some basic stylized facts. Section 3 develops the model. Section 4 evaluates the
model through some simulations and provides intuition about the role of the
different mechanisms. Section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 concludes.
4As we show in section 5, a key difference with trade in variety models is that the costs of
affecting the extensive margin are fixed but not sunk. Modeling the transfer of technology
as a sunk investment introduces a new state variable that changes the propagation and
amplification of the shocks very significantly.
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1.2 The cyclicality of international technology
diffusion
In this section, we explore the role of technology diffusion in the propagation
of business cycles from developed (N) to developing (S) countries. We focus
on the two largest developed economies as N -countries: the U.S. and Japan.5
We then select the S-countries based on the concentration of their (durable
goods) imports from N .6 That is, for each developing country without missing
data and with a population of more than 2 million people, we construct an
index of concentration of imports from each of the two N -countries. The index
is just equal to the durable manufacturing imports from N over total imports
of durable manufacturing. For each country N, we select the 10 developing
countries with the highest concentration.7
We collect data on three variables. First GDP per working age person
as a measure of output both in N and S. Next, following Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), we measure
the level of embodied productivity in S by ratio of the GDP deflator over
the investment deflator. Finally, following Broda and Weinstein (2006), we
measure the range of technologies that diffuse internationally from N to S
by the number of 6-digit SIC codes within durable manufacturing that have
exports from N to S that are worth at least $1 million.
Our data are annual and cover the period 1960-2008. We use the full sam-
5We do not include the EU because it has a lower syncronization of the business cycles
betwen its members than U.S. states or Japanese prefactures.
6The emphasis on durable manufacturing goods is driven by the model and because
durable manufacturing goods surely embody more productive technologies than the average
non-durable good. Having said that, the list of developing countries would be very similar
if we ranked countries by concentration in imports or trade.
7The developing countries linked to the U.S. are Mexico, Dominican Republic, Costa
Rica, Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The
countries linked to Japan are Panama, Thailand, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, China,
Pakistan, Indonesia, South Africa and Malaysia.
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ple period to obtain the filtered series. However, as we explain below, we
explore the properties of the filtered series over the period 1990-2008. Because
we want to allow for the possibility that shocks to N have a very persistent
effect in S, we analyze fluctuations at medium term frequencies in addition to
conventional business cycles. Following Comin and Gertler (2006), we define
the medium term cycle as fluctuations with periods smaller than 50 years. The
medium term cycle can be decomposed into a high frequency component and
a medium term component. The high frequency component captures fluctu-
ations with periods smaller than 8 years while the medium term component
captures fluctuations with periods between 8 and 50 years. We use a Hodrick-
Prescott filter to isolate fluctuations at the high frequency.8 We isolate the
medium term component and the medium term cycle using a band pass filter.
Two points are worth keeping in mind. First, it is important to be careful
about the mapping between the frequency domain and the time domain. In
principle, our measure of the cycle includes frequencies up to 50 years. How-
ever, Comin and Gertler (2006) have shown that its representation in the time
domain leads to cycles on the order of a decade, reflecting the distribution of
the mass of the filtered data over the frequency domain. For example, in the
U.S. postwar period there are ten peaks and throughs in the medium term
component of the cycle.9 Second, despite their frequency, medium term cycles
identified with macro series of conventional length are statistically significant
(Comin and Gertler, 2006). We investigate the significance of the medium
term component of per capita income in the countries in our sample by con-
structing confidence intervals using a bootstrap procedure.10 We find that
8The HP-filtered series are very similar to the series that result from using a Band-Pass
filter that keeps fluctuations with periodicity smaller than eight years (Comin and Gertler,
2006). We use the HP filter to isolate high-frequency fluctuations to make our findings more
comparable to the literature.
9There are 22 peaks and throughs at conventional frequencies.
10Specifically, we use the bootsrap method described in Comin and Gertler (2006). Es-
7
52% of annual observations of the filtered series are statistically significant at
95% level. By way of comparison, we find that 80% of the HP-filtered annual
observations are significant. Therefore, we consider that inferences based on
series filtered to isolate medium term fluctuations are statistically informative.
After filtering the macro variables, we study their co-movement patterns
for the period 1990-2008. We focus on this period for two reasons. First,
the volume of trade and FDI inflows to developing countries increased very
significantly during this period, making the mechanisms emphasized by our
model more relevant than before. Second, after 1990, FDI became the most
significant source of capital inflows from developed to developing economies,
making our model’s assumptions about the nature of international capital flows
most appropriate for this period (Loayza and Serven, 2006).
Before analyzing the data, an example can be useful to illustrate the co-
movement patterns between developed and developing countries. Figure 1A
plots the series of HP-filtered GDP in the U.S. and Mexico. The contempora-
neous cross-country correlation is 0.42 (with a p-value of 7%). U.S. business
fluctuations such as the internet-driven expansion during the second half of the
1990s, the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the 2002-2007 expansion and
the 2008 financial crisis are accompanied by similar fluctuations in Mexico.
Arguably, none of the shocks that caused these U.S. fluctuations originated
in Mexico. Therefore, it is natural to think that the co-movement between
Mexico and U.S. GDP resulted from the international transmission of U.S.
business cycles.11
The effects of U.S. business cycles on Mexico’s GDP are very persistent
sentially, the method consists in padding the time series at both ends, and filtering the
extended series. Then, for each period in the original series, we build a 95% confidence
interval.
11The only important Mexican shock over this period was the 1995 recession which, despite
its virulence, was relatively short-lived.
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and go beyond conventional business cycle frequencies. Figure 1B plots the
medium term component of Mexico’s GDP together with HP-filtered U.S.
GDP. The lead-lag relationship between these variables can be most notably
seen during the post 1995 expansion, the 2001 recession and the post-2001
expansion. Despite the severity of the effect of the Tequila crisis on the medium
term component of Mexico’s GDP, the latter strongly recovered with the U.S.
post-1995 expansion. The Mexican medium term recovery lagged the U.S.
boom by about two years. The end of Mexico’s expansion also lagged the
end of the U.S. expansion by one year. Finally, the post-2001 U.S. expansion
also coincided with a boom in the medium term component of Mexico’s GDP
which continued to expand as late as 2008.
Table 1A explores more generally these co-movement patterns using our
panel of countries. The first row reports the coefficient β from the following
regression:
HPySct = α + β ∗HPyNct−k + ct
where HPySct is HP-filtered output in developing country c, and HPyNct−k
is HP-filtered output in the developed economy associated with c lagged k
years. We find that an increase by 1% in N ′s output is associated with an
increase by 0.42% in S ′ output. This effect declines monotonically and becomes
insignificant when k = 2.
The second row of Table 1A reports the coefficient β from the following
regression:
MTCySct = α + β ∗HPyNct−k + ct
where MTCySct is the medium term component of the medium term cycle of
output in developing country c. High frequency fluctuations in output in N
are associated with even larger fluctuations in the medium term component of
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output in S. A 1% higher level of HP-output in N is associated with a 0.63%
higher medium term component of output in S. This association increases
when we lag the impulse in N by one year and remains the same when we lag
it by two years. Note that, if the medium term cycle in S was just an average of
the short term fluctuations, we would tend to find smaller β′s in the second row
than in the first one. Hence, Table 1A suggests that short term fluctuations
in N affect mechanisms that induce fluctuations in S at frequencies below the
conventional business cycle. What are those mechanisms?
Table 1B shows that business cycle fluctuations in N are positively associ-
ated with fluctuations in the number of durable manufacturing goods exported
from N to S. Since many new technologies are embodied in new durable man-
ufacturing goods, this correlation suggests that the speed of diffusion of new
technologies from N to S co-moves with N ’s cycle. Table 1B also shows a
strong co-movement between the flow of these technologies and the cycle in S.
Table 1C then explores the potential impact of fluctuations in the range of
technologies imported on S’ output and productivity over the medium term.
Specifically, it shows that when looking at the medium term component of the
medium term cycle, the range of durable manufacturing goods exported from
N to S is significantly correlated with output in S. One reason for this finding
is that, at relatively low frequencies, the range of capital goods imported from
N is a key driver of productivity in S. The second row of Table 1C presents
further evidence on this hypothesis. An increase in the range of durable man-
ufacturing goods imported from N leads to a lower price of investment goods
in S. This association becomes more negative as we increase the lag in the
range of intermediate goods. This may reflect the fact that newly adopted
technologies by S do not diffuse immediately among producers in S.
It is important to remark that, even if statistical agencies do not do a good
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job in adjusting their price deflators for gains from variety, one would expect
the relative price of investment to reflect the gains from variety if the imported
intermediate goods are used to produce new investment. This will occur not
because statisticians recognize the productivity enhancing benefits from the
goods at the border but because (capital goods) producers that use the new
technologies will experience lower production costs that should be reflected in
lower capital goods prices.
The picture that emerges from this simple exploration of the data is that
the persistent effect of business cycles in developed economies on their devel-
oping partners may be mediated by the pro-cyclical fluctuation in the speed of
international technology diffusion, which affects the productivity in developing
economies over the medium term. Next, we explore the effects of introducing
this transmission mechanism into a real business cycle model.
1.3 Model
We now develop a two-country model of medium term business fluctuations.
We denote the countries by North, N , and South, S. The model is annual as
opposed to quarterly because, as noted earlier, we are interested in captur-
ing fluctuations over a longer horizon than is typically studied. To this end,
we abstract from a number of factors that may be important to understand
quarterly dynamics such as money and nominal rigidities.
Our model is a version of a conventional real business cycle model modified
to allow for endogenous productivity and relative price of capital. To capture
the short-term counter-cyclicality of the relative price of capital, we introduce
two sectors and endogenous entry and exit. An alternative approach, with
similar results, would be to allow for counter-cyclical markups as in Rotemberg
11
and Woodford (1995).
We endogenize productivity by introducing endogenous R&D and inter-
national diffusion of technologies. Technologies are embodied in intermediate
goods. Productivity depends on the number of intermediate goods available
for production. As in the product cycle literature (e.g. Vernon, 1966; Wells,
1972; and Stokey, 1991), intermediate goods are invented in N as a result of
R&D investments. After the producer incurs a stochastic (sunk) investment,
the good can be exported to S (i.e. it diffuses to S). After a final stochastic
investment, which we interpret as FDI, the production of the intermediate
good is transferred to S and the good is exported from S to N.
Households are conventional. Exogenous shocks to the disutility from work-
ing drive fluctuations. Following Hall (1997) and others, we interpret these
disturbances as a reduced form of more fundamental forces that affect the
degree of rigidities in labor markets (i.e. wage markups).
We first describe the endogenous evolution of technology. We then discuss
the production of capital and output and the household’s problem. Finally,
we characterize the complete equilibrium.
1.3.1 Technology
The sophistication of the production process in country c depends on the num-
ber of intermediate goods available for production, Act. There are three types
of intermediate goods. There are Alt local intermediate goods that are only
available for production in N . There are Agt global intermediate goods that
have successfully diffused to S. These goods are produced in N and exported
to S, and are available for production in both N and S. There are ATt inter-
mediate goods whose production has been transferred to S. These goods are
exported from S to N and are available for production in both N and S. The
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total number of intermediate goods in each country is therefore given by
ANt = Alt + A
g
t + ATt , and (1.1)
ASt = Agt + ATt . (1.2)
Next, we present the conditions that characterize the technology dynamics
in each economy.
Creation of New Intermediate Goods.– Innovators in N engage in R&D by
investing final output to develop new intermediate goods. Each innovator, p,
has access to the following technology:
ANt+1 (p)− ANt (p) = ϕtSt(p)− (1− φ)ANt(p), (1.3)
where ANt(p) denotes her stock of invented goods, St(p) are her expenditures in
R&D, (1−φ) is the per-period probability that an intermediate good becomes
obsolete, and ϕt represents the productivity of the R&D technology, which is
taken as given by the innovator.
We assume that ϕt depends on the aggregate stock of intermediate goods
in N , ANt, the medium term wholesale value of the capital stock, P
k
Nt KNt, –
to be defined below12 – and aggregate R&D expenses, St, as follows:
ϕt = χANt
 St
P
k
NtKNt
ρ−1 (P kNtKNt)−1, (1.4)
with 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and where χ is a scale parameter. This formulation is borrowed
from Comin and Gertler (2006) and allows us to calibrate the elasticity of
innovations with respect to R&D expenditures to match the data. In addition,
it ensures the existence of a balanced growth path without scale effects.
12Roughly speaking it corresponds to the value of the capital stock priced at the cost of
production faced by individual producers of investment goods.
13
After developing a new technology, the innovator is granted a patent that
protects her rights to the monopolistic rents from selling the good that em-
bodies it. These rents have a market value of vt. In equilibrium, agents engage
in R&D activities until the cost of developing a new intermediate good (LHS)
equalizes its expected market value (RHS):
1/ϕt = φEt [ΛNt+1vt+1] , (1.5)
where ΛNt+1 is the innovator’s stochastic discount factor for returns between
t and t+ 1.
Equation (1.5) strongly hints at how the framework generates pro-cyclical
R&D. When N experiences a recession, the expected value of a new local
intermediate good, Etvt+1, declines. That is, since the profit flow for local
goods declines, the benefit to creating new varieties of intermediate goods
goes down. R&D spending will decline in response.
International Diffusion.– Producers of local intermediate goods have the
option of engaging in a stochastic investment that, if successful, permits the
diffusion of the intermediate good to S. The probability of succeeding in this
investment is λ(Γgtxgt ), where the function λ(.) satisfies λ′ > 0, λ′′ < 0, xgt is
the amount of final output invested, and Γgt is a scaling factor.13 We model Γgt
so that it adjusts slowly to guarantee balanced growth.
Γgt =
bg
(P kNtKNt/Alt)
, with the constant bg > 0. (1.6)
The market value of a local intermediate good reflects both the present
13We do not have to take a strong stand on who engages in the investments in exporting
and in transferring the production of the goods to S. For expositional purposes, we assume
it is the innovator, but the model is isomorphic to one where he auctions the patent and
somebody else is in charge of making these investments afterwards.
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discounted value of local profits as well as the value of the option to become
global as shown in the following Bellman equation:
vt = max
xgt
pit − xgt + φEt {ΛNt+1 [λ (Γgtxgt ) vgt+1 + (1− λ (Γgtxgt )) vt+1]} , (1.7)
where pit denotes the per period profits of a local intermediate goods producer
and vg is the market value of a global intermediate good. At any given period,
vg is greater than v because global goods producers enjoy a profit stream from
selling goods at both N and S. Shipping the goods internationally involves an
iceberg transport cost. In particular, 1/ψ (with ψ < 1) units of the good need
to be shipped so that one unit arrives.
The optimal investment, xg, equalizes, at the margin, the cost and the
expected benefits of exporting the intermediate good to S as shown in the
following first order condition:
1 =
Mg. 4 in λg︷ ︸︸ ︷
Γgtλ′ (Γgtxgt )
4 in value︷ ︸︸ ︷
Et {φΛNt+1 (vgt+1 − vt+1)}. (1.8)
The marginal cost of investing one unit of output in exporting the good
(LHS) is 1, while the expected marginal benefit is equal to the associated
increase in the probability of international diffusion times the discounted gain
from making the intermediate good global.
It is now easy to see why expenditures on the international diffusion of
technologies will move procyclically. During recessions, the value of a global
intermediate good declines by more than the value of a local intermediate good
(i.e. (vgt+1 − vt+1) declines). In this case, xgt will decline since the return to
investing in exporting intermediate goods goes down. The reverse, of course,
will happen during booms.
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The value of an intermediate good, vgt , is given by
vgt = max
xTt
pigt − etxTt + (1.9)
φEt
{
ΛNt+1
[
λ
(
ΓTt xTt
)
vTt+1 +
(
1− λ
(
ΓTt xTt
))
vgt+1
]}
,
where pigt denotes the per period profits of a global intermediate goods pro-
ducer, xTt is the number of units of country S ′s final output spent in transfer-
ring the production of the intermediate good to S, λ(ΓTt xTt ) is the associated
probability of successfully completing this foreign direct investment, where the
function λ(.) satisfies λ′ > 0, λ′′ < 0, et is the exchange rate (dollars per peso),
vT is the market value of the company that produces a transferred intermedi-
ate good, and ΓTt is a scaling factor, taken as exogenous by the innovator and
equal to
ΓTt =
bT
(P kNtKNt/A
g
t )
. (1.10)
Foreign Direct Investment.– The South has comparative advantage in as-
sembling manufacturing goods (e.g. Iyer, 2005). In particular, it takes one
unit of final output to produce a unit of intermediate good in N , while if the
intermediate good is assembled in S, it only takes 1/ξ(< 1) units of country
S output. This cost advantage results in higher profit flows from transferred
global intermediate goods than from global intermediate goods (i.e. piTt > pi
g
t ),
and induces producers of global intermediate goods to transfer the production
of intermediate goods from N to S.
The optimal intensity of FDI, xTt , equalizes the private marginal costs and
expected benefits of transferring the production to S. The marginal cost is et,
while the expected marginal benefit is the increase in the probability of suc-
ceeding in the FDI times the discounted gain from transferring the production
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of the intermediate good to S. Formally,
et =
Mg. 4 in λT︷ ︸︸ ︷
ΓTt λ′
(
ΓTt xTt
) 4 in value︷ ︸︸ ︷
Et
{
φΛNt+1
(
vTt+1 − vgt+1
)}
, (1.11)
where vT is defined by the following Bellman equation:
vTt = piTt + φEt
{
ΛNt+1vTt+1
}
. (1.12)
1.3.2 Production
Investment.– Investment is produced in two stages. In a first stage, a contin-
uum of NKct differentiated capital goods producers combine the intermediate
goods available in the country to manufacture their capital goods. In a second
stage, the differentiated capital goods are used to produce competitively new
investment. This production structure generates a counter-cyclical price of
capital both in the short and in the medium term. This seems an important
feature of business cycle in developing countries. In our sample of dveelop-
ing countries, we observe that the correlation between output and the relative
price of capital, both at high and medium term frequencies, is significant and
around -0.2.
Let Ict(r) be the amount of differentiated capital produced by producer r,
and let Irct(s) be the amount of intermediate good s she demands. Then we
can express the amount of differentiated capital she produces by
Ict (r) =
(∫ Act
0
Irct(s)
1
θ ds
)θ
, with θ > 1. (1.13)
Investment, Jct, is produced competitively by combining these Nkct differ-
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entiated capital outputs as follows:
Jct =
(∫ NKct
0
Ict (r)
1
µK dr
)µK
,with µK > 1. (1.14)
Each differentiated capital goods producer holds some market power that
enables her to earn monopolistic rents from selling her capital good. To be
operative, capital goods producers need to incur an operating cost, okct. We as-
sume that okct is proportional to the sophistication of the economy as measured
by the wholesale value of the capital stock:
okct = bkcP
K
ctKct, (1.15)
where bkc is a positive constant.
Higher rents lead more capital goods producers to enter the production of
differentiated capital goods. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, the level
of Nkct is such that operating profits (LHS) equal operating costs (RHS):
µk − 1
µk
PKct (j) Ict(j) = bkcP
K
ctKct, (1.16)
where PKct (j) is the price charged by the producer of the jth differentiated
capital good in country c.
Observe from (1.13) and (1.14) that there are efficiency gains in producing
new capital from increasing the number of intermediate inputs, Act, and of
differentiated capital producers, Nkct. As we shall see, these efficiency gains are
responsible for the counter-cyclicality of the price of new capital, PKct .14
Output.– For symmetry with the capital sector, we assume that final out-
put, Yct, is produced in two stages. At the first stage, each of Nct differenti-
14An alternative formulation with similar implications for the high frequency fluctuations
in the relative price of capital would be to introduce counter-cyclical price markups.
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ated output producers, indexed by j, combines capital, Kcjt, and labor, Lcjt,
to produce its differentiated output, Yct(j), with the following Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Yct(j) = (1 + g)t (UcjtKcjt)α (Lcjt)1−α , (1.17)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of disembodied productivity,15 and U
denotes the intensity of utilization of capital. Factor markets (i.e. labor and
capital) are perfectly competitive.
At the second stage, gross output, Yct, is produced competitively by aggre-
gating the Nct differentiated final goods as follows:
Yct = [
∫ Nct
0
Yct(j)
1
µdj]µ, with µ > 1. (1.18)
Differentiated final goods producers need to incur an operating cost, oct,
to remain operative. We assume,
oct = bcP
K
ctKct. (1.19)
Free entry equalizes the per period operating profits to the overhead costs
determining the number of final goods firms Nct.
µ− 1
µ
Pct (j)Yct(j) = bcP
K
ctKct (1.20)
1.3.3 Households
Households.– In each country, there is a representative household that con-
sumes, supplies labor and saves. It may save by either accumulating capital
or lending to innovators. The household also holds equity claims in all mo-
15For simplicity, we assume that it is exogenous. It is quite straightforward to endogenize
it as shown in Comin and Gertler (2006).
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nopolistically competitive firms in the country. It makes one period loans to
innovators and also rents capital that it has accumulated directly to firms.
Physical capital does not flow across countries. Further, there is no other
form of international lending and borrowing. This implies that N ′s FDI in S
is the only item in S ′s financial account.
Let Cct be consumption and µwct a shock to the disutility of working. Then
the household maximizes its present discounted utility as given by the following
expression:
Et
∞∑
i=0
βt+i
[
lnCct − µwct
(Lct)ζ+1
ζ + 1
]
, (1.21)
subject to the budget constraint
Cct = ωctLct + Πct +DctKct − P kctJct +RctBct −Bct+1 − Tct (1.22)
where Πct reflects the profits of intermediate goods producers paid out fully as
dividends to households, Dct denotes the rental rate of capital, Jct is investment
in new capital, Bct is the total loans the household makes at t − 1 that are
payable at t, and Tct reflects lump sum taxes. Rct is the (possibly state-
contingent) payoff on the loans.
The household’s stock of capital evolves as follows:
Kct+1 = (1− δ(Uct))Kct + Jct(1− ξc
(
Jct
Jct−1(1 + gK)
)
), (1.23)
where gK denotes the steady state growth rate of capital. δ(Uct) is the de-
preciation rate which is increasing and convex in the utilization rate as in
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988). The convex function ξc(.) rep-
resents the adjustment costs that are incurred when the level of investment
changes over time. We assume that ξc(1) = 0, ξ′c(1) = 0, so that there are
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no adjustment costs in the steady state.16 Note also that the function ξc(.) is
indexed by c reflecting international asymmetries in the magnitude of adjust-
ment costs.
The household’s decision problem is simply to choose consumption, labor
supply, capital and bonds to maximize equation (1.21) subject to (1.22) and
(1.23).
Government.– Government spending, Gct, is financed every period with
lump sum taxes, Tct:
Gct = Tct. (1.24)
1.4 Symmetric equilibrium
The economy has a symmetric sequence of markets equilibrium. The endoge-
nous state variables are the aggregate capital stocks in each country, Kct, and
the stocks of local, Alt, global, A
g
t , and transferred, ATt , intermediate goods.
The following system of equations characterizes the equilibrium.
Resource Constraints and Aggregate Production.– The uses of output in
each country are divided into consumption, government spending, overhead
costs, production of intermediate goods used in the production of new capital
and investments in the creation, diffusion and transfer of intermediate goods:
16This is the specification for the investment adjustment costs used in Christiano, Eichem-
baum and Evans (2005), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu
(2009).
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YNt = CNt + St + xgtAlt +
overhead costs︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ− 1
µ
YNt +
µK − 1
µK
PKNtJNt +GNt (1.25)
+
intermediates sold to N︷ ︸︸ ︷
PKNtJNt
µKθaNt
(1 + A
g
t
Alt
) +
intermediates sold to S︷ ︸︸ ︷
et
PKStJSt
µKθaSt
Agt
ATt
(
ψet
ξ
) 1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
production of investment goods
YSt = CSt + xTStA
g
t +
overhead costs︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ− 1
µ
YSt +
µK − 1
µK
PKStJSt +GSt (1.26)
+
intermediates sold to N︷ ︸︸ ︷
PKNtJNt
etµKθaNt
ATt
Alt
(
ψξ
et
) 1
θ−1
+
intermediates sold to S︷ ︸︸ ︷
PKStJSt
µKθaSt
ξ
1
θ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
production of investment goods
.
The output produced in each country is given by
Yct = (1 + g)tNµ−1ct (UctKct)αEηcjt (Lcjt)
1−η−α , (1.27)
where the term Nµ−1ct reflects the efficiency gains from diversity.
Factor Markets.– The labor market in each country satisfies the require-
ment that the marginal product of labor equals the product of the price markup
and the household’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure and con-
sumption:
(1− α)Yct
Lct
= µµwctL
ζ
ctCct. (1.28)
The equilibrium conditions for capital and the utilization rate are, respec-
tively:
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α
Yct
Kct
= µ
[
Dct + δ(Uct)P Ict
]
(1.29)
α
Yct
Uct
= µδ′(Uct)P IctKct. (1.30)
Optimal Investment.– The stock of capital evolves according to the follow-
ing law of motion:
Kct+1 = (1− δ(Uct))Kct + Jct(1− ξc
(
Jct
Jct−1(1 + gK)
)
) (1.31)
The adjustment costs introduce a wedge between the price of new capital
(PKct ) and the price of installed capital (P Ict) when the flow of real investment
deviates from the steady state level. In particular, a reduction in investment
raises the price of installed capital because the adjustment costs in (1.31)
induce a higher cost of investment in the future. As a result, the optimal
investment dynamics (1.32) tend to smooth out investment flows:
PKct = P Ict
[
1− ξc
(
Jct
Jct−1 (1 + gK)
)
− ξ′c
(
Jct
Jct−1 (1 + gK)
)
Jct
Jct−1 (1 + gK)
]
(1.32)
+Et
P Ict+1βΛc,t+1ξ′c
(
Jct+1
Jct (1 + gK)
)(
Jct+1
Jct (1 + gK)
)2 .
Consumption/Savings.– We can express the intertemporal Euler equation
as
Et
Λc,t+1
[
α Yct
µKct+1
+ (1− δ(Uct+1))P Ict+1
]
P Ict
 = 1, (1.33)
where
Λc,t+1 = βCct/Cct+1. (1.34)
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Arbitrage between acquisition of capital and loans to innovators and exporters
implies
Et {Λc,t+1Rt+1} = Et
Λc,t+1
[
α Yct
µKct+1
+ (1− δ(Uct+1))P Ict+1
]
P Ict
 . (1.35)
Free Entry.– Free entry by final goods producers in each sector yields the
following relationship between operating profits and the number of final good
producers:
µ− 1
µ
Yct
Nct
= bcP
K
ctKct; (1.36)
µK − 1
µK
PKct Jct
NKct
= bkcP
K
ctKct. (1.37)
Profits, Market Value of Intermediates and Optimal Technology Diffusion
and FDI.– The profits accrued by local intermediate good producers depend
only on the demand conditions in N , while the profits of global and transferred
intermediate goods depends also on the demand in S. Specifically, they are
given by
pit =
(
1− 1
θ
)
PKNtJNt
µkaNtAlt
(1.38)
pigt =
(
1− 1
θ
)
PKNtJNt
µkaNtAlt
+
(
1− 1
θ
)
et
PKStJSt
µkaStATt
(
ψet
ξ
) 1
θ−1
, (1.39)
piTt =
(
1− 1
θ
)
PKNtJNt
µkaNtAlt
(
ψξ
et
) 1
θ−1
+
(
1− 1
θ
)
et
PKStJSt
µkaStATt
, (1.40)
where aNt is the ratio of the effective number of intermediate goods in N
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relative to Alt, and aSt is the ratio of the effective number of intermediate goods
in S relative to ATt :
aNt =
1 + Agt
Alt
+ A
T
t
Alt
(
ψξ
et
) 1
θ−1
 ; (1.41)
aSt =
Agt
ATt
(
ψet
ξ
) 1
θ−1
+ 1
 . (1.42)
The market value of companies that currently hold the patent of a local,
global and transferred intermediate good are, respectively,
vt = pit − xgt + φEt {ΛN,t+1 [λ (Γgtxgt ) vgt+1 + (1− λ (Γgtxgt )) vt+1]} ,(1.43)
vgt = pigt − etxTt + (1.44)
φEt
{
ΛN,t+1
[
λ
(
ΓTt xTt
)
vTt+1 +
(
1− λ
(
ΓTt xTt
))
vgt+1
]}
,
vTt = piTt + φEt
{
ΛN,t+1vTt+1
}
, (1.45)
where the optimal investments in exporting and transferring the production
of intermediate goods from N to S are given by the optimality conditions
1 = φΓgtλ′ (Γgtxgt )Et {ΛN,t+1 (vgt+1 − vt+1)} , (1.46)
et = φΓTt λ′
(
ΓTt xTt
)
Et
{
ΛN,t+1
(
vTt+1 − vgt+1
)}
. (1.47)
The amount of output devoted to developing new technologies through
R&D is determined by the following free entry condition:
St = φEt {ΛN,t+1vt+1(At+1 − φAt)} . (1.48)
These investments in the development and diffusion of technology allow us
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to characterize the evolution of technology in both countries.
Evolution of Technology.– The evolution of productivity over the medium
and long term in N and S depends on the dynamics of innovation and inter-
national diffusion. New technologies are developed according to the following
law of motion:
ANt+1
ANt
= χ
 St
P
k
NtKNt
ρ + φ. (1.49)
The optimal diffusion and adoption conditions together with the laws of
motion for Ag, and AT yield the following equilibrium dynamics for the stock
of global and transferred intermediate goods:
Agt+1
Agt
= φλ(Γgtxgt )
Alt
Agt
+ φ(1− λ(ΓTt xTt )); (1.50)
ATt+1
ATt
= φλ(ΓTt xTt )
Agt
ATt
+ φ. (1.51)
Finally, the definition of ANt allows us to determine the stock of local
intermediate goods, Alt.
Alt = ANt − Agt − ATt .
Relative Price of Capital.– The price of new capital is equal to a markup
times the marginal cost of production.
PKNt = µKθN
−(µkN−1)
kNt (aNtAlt)−(θ−1); (1.52)
PKSt = µKθ
(NkSt)−(µkS−1)
ξ
(aStATt )−(θ−1). (1.53)
Observe from (1.52) and (1.53) that the efficiency gains associated with Act
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and Nkct reduce the marginal cost of producing investment. Fluctuations in
these variables are responsible for the evolution in the short, medium and long
run of the price of new capital, PKct . However, Act and Nkct affect PKct at different
frequencies.
Because Act is a state variable, it does not fluctuate in the short term.
Increases in Act reflect embodied technological change and drive the long-run
trend in the relative price of capital. Pro-cyclical investments in the develop-
ment and diffusion of new intermediate goods lead to pro-cyclical fluctuations
in the growth rate of Act, generating counter-cyclical movements in PKct over
the medium term. Nkct, instead, is a stationary jump variable. Therefore, the
entry/exit dynamics drive only the short term fluctuations in PKct .
In light of the frequency at which these mechanisms operate, we can de-
compose PKct into the product of two terms: the medium term wholesale price,
P
K
ct , defined in (1.54), that is governed exclusively by technological conditions
in the medium term, and a high-frequency component, PKct /P¯Kct , that is instead
governed by cyclical factors:
P¯Kct = (Act)−(θ−1). (1.54)
Balance of Payments.– The current account balance is equal to the trade
balance plus the net income from FDI investments. In equilibrium, a current
account deficit needs to be financed by an identical net inflow of capital. Since
the only form of capital that flows internationally is foreign direct investment,
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the financial account balance is equal to the net inflow of FDI:
Current account balance in S︷ ︸︸ ︷
QNtJNtA
T
t
µkNtaNtAlt
(
ψξ
et
) 1
θ−1
− etQStJStA
g
t
µkStaStATSt
(
ψet
ξ
) 1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S′s Trade balance
−piTt ATt︸ ︷︷ ︸
S′s Net income
= −
S′s financial account balance︷ ︸︸ ︷
etx
T
t A
g
t .
(1.55)
1.5 Model Evaluation
In this section we explore the ability of the model to generate cycles at short
and medium term frequencies that resemble those observed in the data in de-
veloped and, especially, in developing economies. Given our interest in medium
term fluctuations, a period in the model is set to a year. We solve the model by
loglinearizing around the deterministic balanced growth path and then employ-
ing the Anderson-Moore code, which provides numerical solutions for general
first order systems of difference equations.17 We describe the calibration before
turning to some numerical exercises.
1.5.1 Calibration
The calibration we present here is meant as a benchmark. We have found
that our results are robust to reasonable variations around this benchmark.
To the greatest extent possible, we use the restrictions of balanced growth
to pin down parameter values. Otherwise, we look for evidence elsewhere in
the literature. There are a total of twenty-seven parameters summarized in
Table 2. Thirteen appear routinely in other studies. Six relate to the process
of innovation and R&D and were used, among others, in Comin and Gertler
(2006). Finally, there are eight new parameters that relate to trade and the
17Anderson and Moore (1983).
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process of international diffusion of intermediate goods and two related to the
adjustment costs. We defer the discussion of the calibration of the standard
and R&D parameters to the Appendix and focus here on the adjustment costs
parameters and those that govern the interactions between N and S.
We treat asymmetrically adjustment costs in Mexico and the U.S. based on
the ample evidence on the thinner secondary markets for capital goods, more
prevalent irreversibilities in plant-level investment, and larger costs of obtain-
ing construction permits and import licenses in Mexico relative to the U.S.
(e.g. Gelos and Isgut, 2001, Gwartney et al., 2007, World Bank, and Miller
and Holmes, 2009). Comin et al. (2009) estimate ξ′′N(1) structurally using a
similar model with just one country (i.e. the U.S.) and with an endogenous
counter-cyclical relative price of capital as in our model. They obtain an esti-
mate close to 1 that is not statistically different from 1. Accordingly, we set
ξ′′N(1) to 1.
It is more intricate to calibrate ξ′′S(1) since, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no estimates of investment flow adjustment costs models for develop-
ing countries. However, it is possible to use the existing estimates of quadratic
adjustment costs for developing countries to obtain a reasonable calibration
for ξ′′S(1). As discussed above, investment adjustment costs introduce a wedge
between the price of installed (P It ) and uninstalled capital (PKt ). A natural
way to calibrate ξ′′S(1) is to set it to a value that allows our model to match
the elasticity of the wedge between P ISt and PKSt with respect to investment.
One difference between models with quadratic and with investment flow ad-
justment costs is that in the former the wedge between P ISt and PKSt depends
only on current investment while in the latter it also depends on future in-
vestment (i.e. JSt+1). Therefore, a natural way to calibrate ξ′′S(1) is to set
it to match the elasticity of the price wedge to a 1% permanent increase in
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investment.18 Using the estimates from Iscan (2000), and Warner (1992 and
1994), this exercise yields a value for ξ′′S(1) of 1.5.
We calibrate the six parameters that govern the interactions betweenN and
S by matching information on trade flows, and U.S. FDI in Mexico, the micro
evidence on the cost of exporting and the relative productivity of U.S. and
Mexico in manufacturing. First, we set ξ to 2 to match Mexico’s relative cost
advantage over the U.S. in manufacturing identified by Iyer (2005). We set the
inverse of the iceberg transport cost parameter, ψ, to 0.95,19 the steady state
probability of exporting an intermediate good, λg, to 0.0875, and the steady
state probability of transferring the production of an intermediate good to S,
λT , to 0.0055. This approximately matches the share of Mexican exports and
imports to and from the U.S. in Mexico’s GDP (i.e. 18% and 14%, respectively)
and the share of intermediate goods produced in the U.S. that are exported
to Mexico. Specifically, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) estimate
that approximately 20 percent of U.S. durable manufacturing plants export.
However, these plants produce a much larger share of products than non-
exporters. As a result, the share of intermediate goods exported should also
be significantly larger. We target a value of 33% for the share of intermediate
goods produced in the U.S. that are exported. This yields an average diffusion
lag to Mexico of 11 years, which seems reasonable given the evidence (e.g.
Comin and Hobijn, 2010).
Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) have estimated that the sunk cost of
exporting for Colombian manufacturing plants represents between 20 and 40
percent of their annual revenues from exporting. We set the elasticity of λg
18In practice, the calibrated value would be the same whether the increment is permanent
or only lasts for two periods.
19Interestingly, the value of ψ required to match the trade flows between the US and
Mexico is smaller than the values used in the literature (e.g. 1/1.2 in Corsetti et al., 2008)
because of the closeness of Mexico and the US and their lower (nonexistent after 1994) trade
barriers.
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with respect to investments in exporting, ρg, to 0.8 so that the sunk cost of
exporting represents approximately 30 percent of the revenues from exporting.
The elasticity of λT with respect to FDI expenses, ρT , together with the steady
state value of λT , determine the share of U.S. FDI in Mexico in steady state.
We set ρT to 0.5 so that U.S. FDI in Mexico represents approximately 2% of
Mexican GDP.
1.5.2 Impulse response functions
To be clear, the exercises that follow are meant simply as a first pass at
exploring whether the mechanisms we emphasize have potential for explaining
the data: They are not formal statistical tests. For simplicity, the only two
shocks we consider are innovations to the wage markup, µwct, in N (U.S.) and
in S (Mexico). Several authors20 have argued that these shocks may capture
important drivers of business cycles. However, we show that our findings are
robust to other relevant shocks such as shocks to TFP and to the relative price
of capital.
Response to a U.S. Shock.– Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions
to a U.S. wage markup shock. Solid lines are used for the responses in Mexico
while dashed lines represent the responses in the U.S. The response of the
U.S. economy to a domestic shock is very similar to the single-country version
presented in Comin and Gertler (2006). In particular, a positive wage markup
shock contracts domestic labor supply (panel 2) causing a recession (panel 1).
In addition to the decline in hours worked, the initial decline in U.S. output is
driven by exit in the final goods sector and by a decline in the utilization rate.
The response of U.S. output to the shock is more persistent than the shock itself
(panel 12) due to the endogenous propagation mechanisms of the model. In
20E.g. Hall (1997), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002).
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particular, the domestic recession reduces the demand for intermediate goods
and, hence, the return to R&D investments. This leads to a temporary decline
in the rate of development of new technologies but to a permanent effect on
the level of new technologies relative to trend. The long run effect of the shock
on output is approximately 50% of its initial response.21
The U.S. shock has important effects on Mexico’s economy. Upon impact,
the decline in Mexico’s output is as large as the decline in U.S. output. Mex-
ico’s recession is driven by two forces: the decline in the demand for Mexican
exports to the U.S. (panel 10) and the collapse of Mexico’s investment (panel
4).
Unlike the U.S., the response of Mexico’s output to a U.S. shock is hump-
shaped. At the root of this response we find the dynamics of international
technology diffusion. In particular, the shock to µwNt reduces the return on
exporting new intermediate goods and transferring their production to Mex-
ico. As a result, fewer resources are devoted to these investments (panel 7)
gradually reducing the stock of intermediate goods in Mexico relative to the
steady state (panel 8). Since productivity is determined by the stock of inter-
mediate goods, the slow international diffusion of new technologies also leads
to a gradual decline in Mexican productivity which causes the hump-shaped
response of output.22
Our model generates large fluctuations in Mexico’s productivity. This is
at the root of why U.S. shocks have larger effects on Mexico’s output than in
21In this version of the model, U.S. consumption responds more than U.S. output to a U.S.
shock. As shown in Comin and Santacreu (2010), this is a consequence of the simplifying
assumption that new technologies diffuse immediately in the U.S. When that is the case,
U.S. shocks have large effects on U.S. permament income leading to large fluctuations in
consumption. The introduction of a slow diffusion process as in Comin and Gertler (2006)
or Comin and Santacreu (2010) fixes this counter-factual implication. The excess volatility
of U.S. consumption does not affect significantly the business cycle dynamics in Mexico.
22In the US the response to the shock is monotonic because of the larger effect of the
shock on domestic demand and because technology diffuses faster domestically than inter-
nationally.
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the U.S. itself. Intuitively, the slow pace of international diffusion of interme-
diate goods generates a large gap between the stock of technologies available
for production in the U.S. and Mexico. As a result, when a shock affects the
return to exporting new technologies to Mexico, it induces very wide fluctu-
ations in the flow of new technologies exported to Mexico resulting in wide
swings, over the medium term, in the stock of technologies in Mexico. In the
U.S., in contrast, there is no such a large stock of technologies waiting to be
adopted. Thus, the fluctuations in the stock of technologies and productivity
are significantly smaller than in Mexico.
To illustrate further the role of the international diffusion of technologies
in Mexico’s output dynamics, Figure 3 plots the impulse response function to
a shock to µwNt after shutting down the extensive margin of trade and FDI
channels. When eliminating these linkages between the U.S. and Mexico, the
effect of the shock on Mexico’s economy is much smaller. Mexico’s GDP
now declines by about one fifth of the decline in the model with endogenous
technology diffusion. Further, the response of Mexico’s output diminishes
monotonically and it is less persistent than the response of U.S. output.
In contrast, in our model, the response of Mexico’s output to a U.S. shock
is more persistent than the U.S. response and much more persistent than the
shock itself. Thus, endogenous international technology diffusion can provide
a microfoundation for the finding of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) that (in a
reduced form specification) the shocks faced by developing countries are more
persistent than those faced by developed economies.
The gradual decline in ASt slowly reduces the efficiency of production of
new capital leading to a gradual increase in the price of capital (panel 6).
The initial response of Mexico’s investment to these prospects for the price of
capital largely depends on the magnitude of the adjustment costs. Figure 4
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reports the impulse response functions to a contractionary µwNt shock with no
adjustment costs. In the absence of adjustment costs, firms want to time the
decline in investment with the peak in the price of new capital. As a result
investment does not decline initially but declines sharply later on.
In the presence of adjustment costs, it is very costly to follow this strategy
and companies start reducing their investment when the shock hits the econ-
omy in anticipation of the future increase in the price of capital. As a result,
a contractionary U.S. shock generates a collapse of Mexico’s investment upon
impact (panel 4 of Figure 2) which continues to decline as the price of capital
increases and the economy contracts further. As we shall show below, the data
supports the model’s prediction of a strong co-movement between U.S. output
and Mexico’s investment.
The response of investment to U.S. shocks significantly amplifies the initial
response of Mexico’s output to the U.S. shock. (See Figures 2 and 4.) In the
absence of adjustment costs, Mexico’s investment does not decline when the
shock hits the economy and the only force that drives Mexico’s recession is the
decline in demand for Mexican exports to the U.S. Since the share of exports
in Mexican GDP is not that large, Mexico’s output declines only by 0.025%
in response to a 1% increase in µwNt. With adjustment costs, the collapse of
investment contributes to Mexico’s recession and output declines by 0.45% in
response to the same shock. However, note that in both cases the decline in
Mexico’s output eventually exceeds the size of the recession generated in the
U.S. Similarly, the hump-shaped response of Mexico’s output is independent
of the calibration of the adjustment costs.
Response to a Mexican Shock– Figure 5 displays the impulse response func-
tions to a Mexican wage markup shock (µwSt) in the U.S. (dashed) and in Mexico
(solid). There are some striking differences with Figure 2. First, a Mexican
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shock has virtually no effect in the U.S. This follows from the difference in
size between the two economies but also from the fact that technologies flow
from the U.S. to Mexico and not otherwise. One consequence of this is that
the Mexican shock has a smaller effect than the U.S. shock on the extensive
margin of trade and FDI. As a result, the effect of µwSt on Mexico’s GDP is
more transitory than the effect of a U.S. shock.
However, the most significant observation from Figure 5 is that Mexican
shocks have a larger effect on Mexico’s consumption than on output. This is
the result of both the endogenous relative price of capital and the adjustment
costs. We explain next the intuition for this result.
By the logic explained above, a contractionary shock leads to a gradual
increase in the price of capital. The prospect of a future higher price of capital
has two effects. On the one hand, it prevents investment from falling too much
initially. (This is also achieved by the adjustment costs. See the contrast with
the impulse response to a Mexican shock in the model without adjustment
costs in Figure A1.)23 On the other, it raises current and future interest
rates despite the lower marginal product of capital due to the recession. High
current and future interest rates induce consumers to tilt their consumption
profile against current consumption.
Such a significant decline in Mexico’s consumption is feasible for two rea-
sons. First, investment does not fall too much initially. Second, consistent
with the data, the trade balance is very counter-cyclical. This, in turn, is a
consequence of the persistent response of investment to the shock. Because the
response of Mexico’s investment is so persistent, the value of transferring the
23Adjustment costs smooth the initial response of Mexico’s investment to the domestic
shock. This has two effects. On the one hand, it absorbs resources forcing consumption to
decline. On the other, it increases the persistence of the effects of the shocks, amplifying
the decline in capital gains from exporting and conducting FDI to Mexico. As a result, the
price of capital in Mexico fluctuates more generating a larger appreciation in Mexico’s price
of capital which leads to higher interest rates in response to the shock.
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production of intermediate goods to Mexico, vT , declines more than net income
from transferred technologies, piT (panel 9). This leads to a significant decline
in FDI inflows into Mexico, a phenomenon that has motivated the “sudden
stops” literature (e.g. Calvo, 1998). To reestablish the international equilib-
rium, the peso depreciates, leading to a trade surplus that absorbs resources
and forcing Mexico’s consumption to fall.24
Note that one of the key drivers of the high volatility of consumption in
Mexico is the counter-cyclicality of the price of capital. As we show below,
this prediction is borne by the data. The price of new capital in Mexico is very
counter-cyclical at the high frequency with a correlation between HP-filtered
output and HP-filtered price of capital of -0.55.25 Interestingly, the price of
new capital is significantly more counter-cyclical in Mexico than in the U.S.,
where the equivalent correlation is -0.08. This may explain why consumption
is as volatile as GDP in Mexico but not in the U.S.
Comparing Figures 2 and 5, it is clear that the high relative volatility
of consumption in Mexico is driven by Mexican shocks rather than by U.S.
shocks. This is the case because Mexican shocks have a much larger effect
on Mexico’s interest rates than U.S. shocks. Intuitively, U.S. shocks trigger a
more persistent decline in Mexico’s output than Mexican shocks. As a result,
Mexican companies want to cut their investment more drastically in response
to them. This leads to a larger initial increase in the price of installed capital
(P IS) which reduces the increase in the slope of P IS due to the gradual increase
24The strong counter-cyclical current account is documented by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) in a sample of developing countries (which includes Mexico).
25The counter-cyclicality of the price of new capital in Mexico is robust to other filtering
methods. For example, the correlation between the growth rate in the price of capital and
HP-filtered output is -0.65. Over the medium term cycle the correlation between Mexico’s
price of capital and GDP is -0.71. In the U.S., the correlation between these variables over
the medium term is -0.55. For the full post-war period, the correlations in the U.S. are
slightly larger (in absolute value): -0.18 for HP-filtered data and -0.66 over the medium
term.
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in the price of new capital (PKS ).26 Hence the lower increase in interest rates
following a recessionary shock in the U.S. than one in Mexico.
1.5.3 Simulations
We next turn to the quantitative evaluation of the model. To this end, we
calibrate the volatility and persistence of wage markups shocks in the U.S. and
Mexico and run 1000 simulations over a 17-year long horizon each. Since we
intend to evaluate the model’s ability to propagate shocks both internationally
and over time, we use the same autocorrelation for both U.S. and Mexican
shocks and set the cross-country correlation of the shocks to zero. We set the
annual autocorrelation of markup shocks to 0.6 to match the persistence of
markups in the U.S.27
We calibrate the volatility of the shocks by forcing the model to approxi-
mately match the high frequency standard deviation of GDP in Mexico and
the U.S. This yields a volatility of the wage markup shock of 3.53% in the U.S.
and 4.59% in Mexico. This is consistent with the suspicion that developing
economies are prone to bigger disturbances than developed countries.
Volatility.– Table 3 compares the standard deviations of the high frequency
and medium term cycle fluctuations in the data and in the model. Our cali-
bration strategy forces the model to match the volatilities of output in Mexico
and the U.S. at the high frequency. In addition, the model also comes very
close to matching the volatility of output over the medium term both in Mex-
ico (0.04 vs. 0.037 in the data) and in the U.S. (0.026 vs. 0.015 in the data).
26As discussed above, a decline in investment leads to an increase in the price of in-
stalled capital because the adjustment costs embedded in (1.23) imply that lower levels of
investment today increase the costs of investment tomorrow.
27See Comin and Gertler (2006) for details. Note that, because of the propagation ob-
tained from the endogenous technology mechanisms, this class of models requires a smaller
autocorrelation of the shocks to match the persistence in macro variables. In short, they are
not affected by the Cogley and Nason (1995) criticism that the Neoclassical growth model
does not propagate exogenous disturbances.
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Given the low persistence of shocks, matching these moments suggests that
the model induces the right amount of propagation of high frequency shocks
into the medium term.
The model does a good job in reproducing the volatility observed in the
data in variables other than output. It does a remarkable job in matching the
volatility of Mexico’s consumption both at the high frequency (0.031 vs. 0.031
in the data) and over the medium term cycle (0.044 vs. 0.04 in the data). This
is of special interest given the attention that the international macro literature
has given to these moments.
The model also generates series for investment, the relative price of capital,
bilateral trade flows, the extensive margin of trade and FDI flows that have
similar volatilities to those observed in the data both at the high frequency
and medium term. For those instances where there are some differences, the
empirical volatilities tend to fall within the 95% confidence interval for the
standard deviation of the simulated series.28
Co-movement.– Most international business cycle models have problems
reproducing the cross-country co-movement patterns observed in macro vari-
ables. First, they lack international propagation mechanisms that induce a
strong positive co-movement in output. Second, they tend to generate a
stronger cross-country co-movement in consumption than in output, while in
the data we observe the opposite (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992).29
Our model fares well in both of these dimensions. Panel A of Table 4
28One exception is the growth in the number of intermediate goods exported from the U.S.
to Mexico, where our model generates less volatility than we observe in the data counterpart
of this variable.
29Several authors, including Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Kollmann (1996), have shown
that reducing the completeness of international financial markets is not sufficient to match
the data along these dimensions. Kehoe and Perri (2002) have made significant progress
by introducing enforcement contraints on financial contracts. This mechanism limits the
amount of risk sharing, reducing consumption co-movement and increasing the cross-country
co-movement in output. However, output still co-moves significantly less than in the data.
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reports the cross country correlations between Mexico and the U.S. for con-
sumption and output, both in the model and in the data. The model gener-
ates the strong co-movement between U.S. and Mexico GDPs observed in the
data. The average cross-country correlation in our simulations is 0.68 with
a confidence interval of (0.3 , 0.89) that contains the correlation observed in
the data (0.43). The model also generates a smaller cross-country correla-
tion for consumption than for output, as we observe in the data: The average
cross-correlation is 0.055 with a confidence interval that contains the empirical
correlation (0.2).30
Our model’s ability to match the empirical cross-country co-movement pat-
terns resides in the combination of endogenous diffusion and flow investment
adjustment costs. The endogenous international diffusion of technologies gen-
erates a strong cross-country co-movement in output and productivity over
the medium term. Because of adjustment costs, Mexican firms respond to the
future productivity path by adjusting their investment contemporaneously in
a pro-cyclical way. This induces the cross-country correlation in output and
investment. The large effect that foreign shocks have on domestic investment
limits the possibility for a large consumption response, hence inducing a higher
cross-country correlation in output than in consumption.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the contemporaneous correlation between the
HP-filtered Mexican variables and HP-filtered output in both Mexico and the
U.S.31 Broadly speaking, the model does a very good job in capturing the con-
temporaneous co-movement patterns within Mexico but also between Mexico
and the U.S. The model generates the observed correlation between consump-
30The international business cycle literature has also found it difficult to generate positive
cross-correlations in investment and employment (Baxter, 1995). As it is clear from Figure
2, our model delivers both.
31Note that we do not filter the growth rate of intermediate goods since this variable is
already trend stationary.
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tion and output in Mexico (0.61 vs. 0.78 in the data). Note also that, in both
model and data, Mexico’s consumption is insignificantly correlated with U.S.
GDP. This indicates that U.S. shocks do not contribute to the high volatility
of Mexico’s consumption. This instead is the result of the response of Mexico’s
consumption to domestic shocks.
A key driver of the volatility of consumption is the dynamics of the price of
capital induced by domestic shocks. It is reassuring that the model matches the
negative co-movement between Mexico’s output and the price of new capital (-
0.36 vs. -0.54 in the data). Note also that the model generates an insignificant
contemporaneous co-movement between the price of capital in Mexico and
U.S. GDP, which is consistent with the evidence (-0.08 in model vs. 0.13 in
data). As we show below, this is the case because U.S. shocks drive the price
of new capital over the medium term but not so much contemporaneously.
Recall that the strong co-movement between U.S. output and Mexico’s in-
vestment is the key driver of the large effect that U.S. shocks have on Mexico’s
GDP. The model also captures the strong co-movement between Mexican in-
vestment and output in both the U.S. (0.77 vs. 0.6 in the data) and Mexico
(0.69 vs. 0.62 in the data).
Similarly, recall that the medium term productivity dynamics in Mexico
result from the cyclicality of the flow of intermediate goods that diffuse to
Mexico (i.e. the extensive margin of trade). The model matches quite closely
the correlation between our data-counterpart for this variable and output in
both the U.S. (0.42 vs. 0.28 in the data) and in Mexico (0.43 vs. 0.42 in the
data).
The model also captures broadly the cyclicality of the bilateral trade flows.
In particular, the model generates the strong counter-cyclicality of Mexico’s
trade balance. The correlation between Mexico’s trade balance and GDP is
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-0.96 vs. -0.83 in the data. This is the case because, both in the data and
in our model, imports from the U.S. co-move more with Mexico’s GDP than
exports to the U.S. The model also captures the high correlation of bilateral
trade flows with U.S. GDP.
A variable where the model underperforms is FDI. Though the model
matches cyclicality of FDI in the data, the correlations with both U.S. and
Mexico’s GDP are too high. This may reflect the presence of a small but
volatile component in actual FDI that does not respond to the U.S. or Mex-
ican business cycle. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that
FDI is much more persistent in our model than in the data.32 In any case,
the counterfactually high cyclicality of FDI flows does not affect significantly
the model’s ability to generate co-movement between the U.S. and Mexico.
That is the case because the key driver of Mexican productivity dynamics is
the stock of intermediate goods available for production in Mexico. Whether
available intermediate goods are produced in Mexico or the U.S. is much less
relevant for Mexican productivity.
Inter-frequency Co-movement.– One of the motivations for our model was
the observation that U.S. high frequency fluctuations lead medium term fluc-
tuations in Mexico. The impulse response functions to U.S. shocks (see Figure
2) show that, qualitatively, the model is able to generate these persistent ef-
fects. Table 5 explores the quantitative power of the model to reproduce the
inter-frequency co-movement patterns we observe in the data. The first row
of Table 5 reports the empirical correlation between lagged HP-filtered U.S.
output and the medium term component of Mexico’s output. The second row
reports the average of these statistics across 1000 simulations of the model.
The model roughly captures the contemporaneous correlation between high
32In particular, the annual autocorrelation of FDI/GDP in our model is 0.42 while in the
data it is -0.35.
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frequency fluctuations in U.S. output and medium term fluctuations in Mex-
ico’s output (0.37 in the model vs. 0.28 in the data). More importantly, the
model generates a hump-shaped cross-correlogram between these two variables
as we observed in the data. However, in the data the peak correlation occurs
after two years (0.53), while in the model it occurs on average after one year
(0.42).
A key prediction of our model is that the high frequency response of the
extensive margin of trade to U.S. shocks generates counter-cyclical fluctuations
in the relative price of capital in Mexico over the medium term. The fourth
row in Table 5 presents the average correlation across our 1000 simulations
between the medium term component of Mexico’s relative price of capital and
HP-filtered U.S. output at various lags. In both actual and simulated data, the
contemporaneous correlation is insignificant. The correlation becomes more
negative as we lag U.S. GDP in both cases. In the simulated data the peak
(in absolute terms) is reached after two years (-0.38), while in the actual data
it is reached after three years (-0.5).
Unlike U.S. shocks, Mexican shocks do not have a hump-shaped effect on
Mexico’s output over the medium term fluctuations. The correlation between
HP-filtered and the medium term component of Mexico’s output is positive
and declines monotonically as we lag the series of HP-filtered output.33 Our
model is consistent with this co-movement pattern. (See rows 5 and 6 in Table
5.)
33In the working paper version, we make a similar point by estimating VARs with HP-
filtered Mexico’s GDP and the medium term component of several Mexican variables (in-
cluding GDP).
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1.6 Discussion
Next, we explore in more detail the implications of our model and compare it
to existing models of trade and international business cycles.
Other Shocks.– For concreteness, we have used wage markup shocks as the
sole source of fluctuations in our simulations. However, our findings are not
driven by the nature of the shocks. To illustrate this, we introduce shocks to
TFP and to the price of investment. Figure 6 presents the impulse response
functions to a (negative) TFP shock (second row) and a (positive) shock to the
price of investment (third row) both in the U.S. To facilitate the comparison,
the impulse response function to the U.S. wage markup shock is presented in
the first row of the figure.
Qualitatively, the impulse response functions to these shocks are very sim-
ilar. In all of them there is a large effect upon the impact of the U.S. shock on
Mexican output, though the initial response for the two new shocks is smaller
in Mexico than in the U.S. All shocks generate a hump-shaped response of
Mexico’s output. And in all three cases, the U.S. shock eventually has a larger
effect on Mexico than in the U.S. The economics of the response are the same as
in the wage markup shock described above. All three shocks trigger a large and
persistent slowdown in the flow of new technologies to Mexico and an initial
decline in Mexico’s investment larger than the initial decline in consumption.
As the productivity of the capital goods sector deteriorates relative to trend,
investment declines further generating the hump in the output response.
The response to Mexican shocks is also robust to the nature of the shocks
(see Figure 7). For the three Mexican shocks, Mexico’s consumption responds
initially more than output and the response of investment is hump-shaped.
The similarity of the impulse responses across the three types of shocks sug-
gests that a richer calibration that allowed for a broader set of shocks would
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capture as well as our simulations the cyclical properties of the Mexican econ-
omy and the co-movement patterns with the U.S.
Sunk vs. Fixed Exporting Costs.– Much of the theoretical international
macro literature that has incorporated the extensive margin of trade has relied
on extensions of the Melitz (2003) model. The Melitz model is a two country
model with firms of heterogenous productivity and where firms have to incur
in some costs to export. Unlike our model, most of the models that have used
the Melitz framework to explore business cycle dynamics use fixed cost instead
of sunk cost to adjust the range of intermediate goods available for production.
The empirical literature on firm dynamics and exports has found that there
are large sunk costs of exporting new products (e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1997;
Das et al., 2007). However, the use of fixed costs could be defended on the
grounds of their tractability if the model with fixed costs has propagation and
amplification power similar to that of the model with sunk costs of exporting.
To explore whether this is the case, we develop a version of our model where, to
export intermediate goods, firms in N now just need to incur a per period fixed
cost. For consistency, we also make the investment in transferring production
from N to S a fixed cost. Other than these two changes, this version of the
model is identical to our original model. This model is basically a variation on
the financial autarky model in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) with physical capital
and without heterogeneity. We calibrate the fixed costs of exporting and FDI
so that in steady state the trade flows are the same as in our original model.
Figure 8 plots the impulse response functions to a U.S. wage markup shock
in the model with fixed costs. The differences with our original model are re-
markable. In the model with fixed costs of exporting, a contractionary U.S.
shock causes a much smaller decline in Mexico’s output - only 30% of the
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decline in U.S. output - than in our model.34 This is the case because in the
model with fixed cost of exporting, the flow of exported and transferred in-
termediate goods adjusts in response to fluctuations in current profits. In the
model with sunk costs, the flow of technologies adjusts in response to fluctu-
ations in the present discounted value of profits. Given the high persistence
of profits, the present discounted value of profits fluctuates more and more
persistently than current profits. As a result, the range of intermediate goods
declines by more over the medium term, generating larger increases in the
relative price of capital and larger declines in investment.
The larger drop in U.S. than in Mexico’s investment reduces the relative
demand for intermediate goods produced in Mexico. To reestablish the in-
ternational equilibrium, the peso needs to depreciate. The depreciation of
the peso, together with Mexico’s recession, causes a large drop in FDI and
in the number of intermediate goods produced in Mexico. This is similar to
the mechanism used in Bergin et al. (2009) to explain the higher volatility of
off-shored industries in Mexico than in the U.S. observed in the data.35
Implications for Aggregate Volatility.– It is clear from Figure 2 that U.S.
shocks are a significant source of volatility in Mexico’s GDP. But what share of
Mexican fluctuations is due to U.S. shocks and what share is due to domestic
shocks? Similarly, how much do Mexican shocks contribute to the volatility
of U.S. GDP?
Table 6 answers these questions by reporting the share of output volatility
in each country attributable to each kind of shock. The first two columns
34This magnitude is consistent with the findings in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
35A different approach to modeling production sharing is followed by Burnstein, Kurz and
Tesar (2008). Rather than using variation in the extensive margin, their model assumes a
complementarity between domestic and foreign intermediate goods in U.S. production. By
changing the importance of the sector where domestic and foreign intermediate goods are
complementary, they can generate a significant increase in the correlation between U.S. and
Mexican manufacturing output.
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focus on the volatility of HP-filtered output while the next two focus on the
volatility of output over the medium term cycle. Consistent with Figure 5,
Mexican shocks account for a small fraction of U.S. fluctuations (3% at high
frequency and 2% over the medium term cycle).
In contrast, U.S. shocks represent a very significant source of Mexican
fluctuations. At the high frequency, 64% of Mexico’s GDP volatility is driven
by U.S. shocks, while over the medium term cycle, U.S. shocks induce 66%
of the volatility in Mexico’s GDP. This proves the importance of explicitly
modelling the U.S. economy to study the business and medium term cycles of
the Mexican economy.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed an asymmetric two-country model to study
business cycle fluctuations in developing countries. The model introduces two
key elements: (i) endogenous and slow diffusion of technologies from the devel-
oped to the developing country, and (ii) flow adjustment costs to investment.
These mechanisms yield five predictions consistent with the business cycles of
developing countries.
First, business cycle shocks to developed economies have large effects on de-
veloping economies. Second, these effects are persistent inducing fluctuations
at frequencies lower than the conventional business cycle. Third, the cross-
country correlation of output is higher than that of consumption. Fourth,
interest rates are counter-cyclical in developing countries. Fifth, consumption
is more volatile than output in developing countries. After calibrating the
model to the Mexican economy, we have found that the model also does a
good job quantitatively.
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One of the key contributions of this paper is to extend the business cycle
models of endogenous technology (e.g. Comin and Gertler, 2006) to two-
country settings. There are several alternative configurations of the two coun-
tries that are worth pursuing. One natural variation is to model both countries
as advanced economies that develop new technologies through R&D and adopt
each other’s technologies. This configuration would naturally capture the in-
teractions between the U.S. and the EU, or the U.S. and Japan. A second
variation could be to keep the asymmetry between the developed and develop-
ing countries but introduce low frequency transitions in the developing country
to its balanced growth path. This configuration would be helpful to analyze
the interdependence between the U.S. and China at the high and medium term
frequencies.
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1.A Chaper 1 Appendix: Calibration
In this appendix we describe the calibration of the twelve standard parameters
and the six parameters that relate to the R&D process. We set the discount
factor β equal to 0.95, to match the steady state share of non-residential invest-
ment to output. Based on steady state evidence we also choose the following
numbers: (the capital share) α = 0.33; (government consumption to output)
GN/YN = 0.2 and GS/YS = 0.1; (the depreciation rate) δ = 0.1; and (the
steady state utilization rate) U = 0.8, based on the average capacity utiliza-
tion level in the postwar period as measured by the Board of Governors. We set
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ at unity, which represents
an intermediate value for the range of estimates across the micro and macro
literature. Similarly, we set the elasticity of the change in the depreciation
rate with respect to the utilization rate, (δ′′/δ′)U, at 0.15, used, for example,
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2009).
Finally, based on evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997), we fix the steady state
gross value added markup in the consumption goods sector, µc, equal to 1.1
and the corresponding markup for the capital goods sector, µk, at 1.15. We
normalize the number of final goods firms to 1. Given this normalization and
the markups, we set the operating costs parameters, bc and bkc , so that the
total overhead costs from entering are 10% of gross output. This implies that
bc = 0.5 and bkc = 0.016.
We set the population of the U.S. relative to Mexico to 3. Similarly, we set
the relative productivity levels in final goods production to 3.35 so that U.S.
GDP is approximately 12 times Mexico’s GDP.
We next turn to the “non-standard” parameters. The estimates for the
obsolescence rate have a range from the 4% per year in Caballero and Jaffe
(1992) to around 20% in Pakes and Schankerman (1984). Based on this range
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we consider an obsolescence rate of 10% which implies a value for φ of 0.9.
The steady state growth rates of GDP and the relative price of capital in
the model are functions of the growth rate of new technologies, which in our
model are used to produce new capital, and of the exogenous growth rate of
disembodied productivity, g. By using the balanced growth restrictions and
matching the average growth rate of non-farm business output per working
age person (0.024) and the average growth rate of the Gordon quality adjusted
price of capital relative to the BEA price of consumption goods and services
(-0.026), we can identify the growth rate of disembodied productivity, g, and
the productivity parameters in the technologies for creating new intermediate
goods, χ. Accordingly, we set g = 0.0072 and χ = 2.69.
There is no direct evidence on the gross markup θ for specialized interme-
diate goods. Given the specialized nature of these products, it seems that an
appropriate number would be at the high range of the estimates of markups
in the literature for other types of goods. Accordingly we choose a value of
1.5, but emphasize that our results are robust to reasonable variations around
this number.
There is also no simple way to identify the elasticity of new intermediate
goods with respect to R&D, ρ. Griliches (1990) presents some estimates using
the number of new patents as a proxy for technological change. The estimates
are noisy and range from about 0.6 to 1.0, depending on the use of panel
versus cross-sectional data. We opt for a conservative value of 0.65, in the
lower range. The calibrations of θ, φ, χ and ρ yield an R&D share in U.S.
GDP of approximately 1% which is in line with the ratio of private R&D
expenditures in the investment goods sector to GDP, averaged over the period
1960-2006.
Finally, we fix the autocorrelation of the preference/wage markup shock to
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0.6 so that the model generates an autocorrelation that approximately matches
that of the total markup as measured by Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido (2002).
We set the autocorrelation of the TFP and price of investment shocks to 0.9.
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1.B Chapter 1 Figures & Tables
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Figureȱ1A:ȱEvolutionȱofȱHPȬfilteredȱGDPȱperȱworkingȱageȱpopulationȱinȱMexicoȱandȱtheȱUSȱ
ȱ
Source:ȱWorldȱDevelopmentȱIndicators,ȱAuthorsȇȱcalculationsȱȱ
Figureȱ1B:ȱEvolutionȱofȱGDPȱperȱworkingȱageȱpopulationȱinȱMexicoȱandȱtheȱUSȱfilteredȱatȱdifferentȱfrequencies

Source:ȱWorldȱDevelopmentȱIndicators,ȱAuthorsȇȱcalculationsȱȱ
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Lags 0 1 2 3
Developing GDP (HP-filtered) 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.11 0.05
Developing GDP (Medium Term Component) 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.61*** 0.39
Note: Coefficients of univariate regression: GDP Developing on GDP Developed. Significance level determined using robust standard errors. 
Varieties imported from Developed (HP-filtered)
Varieties imported from Developed (Medium term 
business cycle)
Note: Contemporanoeus correlation.
Lags 0 1 2 3
GDP developing country 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.03
Relative price of capital developing country -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.32***
Note: All series are filtered using a Band-Pass filter that isolates frequencies between 8 and 50 years.
Notes for Tables 1A-1C
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Medium Term Component filtered using a Band Pass filter that siolates cycles with period between 8 and 50 years.
The developing countries linked to the U.S. are Mexico, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru,
El Salvador and Nicaragua. The countries linked to Japan are Panama, Thailand, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Africa and Malaysia.
Developed GDP (HP-filtered)
Durable manufacturing varieties imported from 
p
filtered)
p g
filtered)
0.17*** 0.62***
Table 1A: Relationship between HP GDP in developed economy and GDP in developing filtered at high frequency 
Table 1B: Cyclicality of imported varieties durable manufacturing
Table 1C: Medium term correlation between varieties imported from developed economy and relative price of 
0.57***0.12***
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Tableȱ3ȱ:ȱVolatilityȱModelȱvs.ȱDataȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
HighȱFrequencyȱ MediumȱtermȱCycleȱ
MEXICOȱ Dataȱ Modelȱ ȱȱ Dataȱ Modelȱ
GDPȱȱ 0.026 0.024 0.037 0.04 
(0.014 , 0.037) (0.019 , 0.07) 
CONSUMPTIONȱ 0.031 0.031 0.040 0.044 
(0.019, 0.046) (0.024 , 0.074)  
INVESTMENTȱ 0.079 0.068 0.082 0.12 
(0.03 , 0.12) (0.05 , 0.23) 
RELATIVEȱPRICEȱOFȱ
CAPITALȱ 0.029 0.016 0.042 0.035 
(0.007, 0.028) (0.013 , 0.067) 
IMPORTSȱ(FROMȱUS)ȱ 0.090 0.050 0.117 0.084 
(0.023 , 0.09)  (0.035 , 0.15) 
EXPORTSȱ(TOȱUS)ȱ 0.090 0.060 0.134 0.105 
(0.027 , 0.11)  (0.042 , 0.19) 
TRADEȱSUPLUS/GDPȱ 0.014 0.020 0.026 0.026 
(0.01 2, 0.03) (0.013, 0.046) 
GROWTHȱINȱ
INTERMEDIATEȱGOODSȱ
EXPORTEDȱFROMȱUSȱTOȱ
MEXICOȱ
0.049 (all)  
0.047 (dur.) 
   0.019          
(0.01, 0.029) 
    
FDI/GDPȱ 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.017 
(0.002 , 0.01) (0.006, 0.044) 
ȱȱ           
U.S.ȱGDPȱ 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.026 
ȱ (0.01 , 0.027) (0.013 , 0.044) 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
Note:ȱPeriodȱ1990Ȭ2006.ȱHighȱfrequencyȱcorrespondsȱtoȱcyclesȱwithȱperiodsȱlowerȱthanȱ8ȱyearsȱandȱisȱobtainedȱbyȱȱfilteringȱ
simulatedȱdataȱwithȱaȱHodrickȬPrescottȱfilter.ȱMediumȱtermȱcyclesȱcorrespondsȱtoȱcyclesȱwithȱperiodsȱshorterȱthanȱ50ȱyearsȱandȱisȱ
obtainedȱbyȱfilteringȱsimulatedȱdataȱwithȱaȱBandȬPassȱfilter.ȱTheȱrelativeȱpriceȱofȱcapitalȱisȱtheȱinvestmentȱdeflatorȱdividedȱbyȱtheȱ
GDPȱdeflator.ȱGrowthȱinȱintermediateȱgoodsȱisȱnotȱfiltered.ȱAllȱstandsȱforȱallȱmanufacturingȱsectorsȱwhileȱdurȱstandsȱforȱdurableȱ
manufacturing.
 
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Tableȱ4:ȱContemporaneousȱCoȬmovementȱpatternsȱ
 ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
PANELȱA:ȱCrossȬcountryȱcorrelationsȱbetweenȱMexicoȱandȱU.S.ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
Dataȱ Modelȱ
GDPȱ 0.43* 0.68 
(0.31 , 0.89) 
CONSUMPTIONȱ 0.2 0.05 
(-0.54, 0.059) 
PANELȱA:ȱCorrelationȱofȱMexicanȱMacroȱVariablesȱwithȱMexicanȱandȱU.S.ȱGDPȱ
ȱȱ GDPȱUSAȱ ȱȱ GDPȱMEXICOȱ
Dataȱ Modelȱ Dataȱ Modelȱ
CONSUMPTIONȱ 0.02 0.06 0.78*** 0.61 
(-0.54, 0.61) (-0.01, 0.91) 
INVESTMENTȱ 0.6*** 0.77 0.62*** 0.69 
(0.26, 0.91) (0.23, 0.93) 
RELATIVEȱPRICEȱOFȱCAPITALȱ 0.13 -0.08 -0.54*** -0.36 
(-0.52, 0.4) (-0.75 , 0.13) 
IMPORTSȱ(FROMȱUS)ȱ 0.61*** 0.85 0.83*** 0.74 
(0.73, 0.93) (0.32, 0.93) 
EXPORTSȱ(TOȱUS)ȱ 0.68*** 0.70 0.08 0.57 
(0.37, 0.94) (-0.03, 0.9) 
MEXICANȱTRADEȱ
SURPLUS/GDPȱ 0.07 -0.62 -0.83*** -0.96 
(-0.88,-0.17) (-0.99, -0.86) 
GROWTHȱINȱINTERMEDIATEȱ
GOODSȱEXPORTEDȱFROMȱUSȱ
TOȱMEXICOȱ
0.2 (all) 
0.28
(dur.)
   0.42          
(-0.12, 0.76) 
0.35 (all) 
0.42 (dur.) 
   0.43          
(-0.1, 0.78) 
FDI/GDPȱ 0.23 0.89 0.11 0.73 
(0.66, 0.98) (0.36, 0.92) 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
Note:ȱPeriodȱ1990Ȭ2006.ȱAllȱvariablesȱbutȱFDIȱareȱscaledȱbyȱworkingȱageȱpopulationȱinȱMexico.ȱAllȱvariablesȱotherȱthanȱgrowthȱofȱ
intermediateȱgoodsȱhaveȱbeenȱHPȬfiltered.ȱTheȱmodelȱstatisticsȱareȱtheȱaverageȱofȱtheȱcontemporaneousȱcrossȬcorrelationsȱfromȱtheȱ
MonteȱCarloȱconsistingȱofȱ1000ȱ17Ȭyearȱlongȱsimulations.ȱInȱparenthesisȱ95ȱpercentȱconfidenceȱintervals.ȱTheȱrelativeȱpriceȱofȱcapitalȱ
isȱmeasuredȱbyȱtheȱinvestmentȱdeflatorȱoverȱtheȱGDPȱdeflator.ȱAllȱstandsȱforȱallȱmanufacturingȱsectorsȱwhileȱdur.ȱstandsȱforȱdurableȱ
manufacturing.ȱ*ȱdenotesȱsignificanceȱatȱtheȱ10%ȱlevel,ȱ**ȱdenotesȱsignificanceȱatȱtheȱ5%ȱlevelȱandȱ***ȱdenotesȱsignificanceȱatȱtheȱ1%ȱ
level.ȱ
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Tableȱ5:ȱCrossȬCorrelogramȱAcrossȱFrequenciesȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
LagsȱofȱHighȱFrequencyȱUSȱOutputȱ
0ȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ
MEDIUMȱTERMȱCOMPONENTȱMEXȱ
GDPȱ
Dataȱ 0.28 0.49* 0.53** 0.39 
Modelȱ 0.37** 0.42** 0.35** 0.18 
MEDIUMȱTERMȱCOMPONENTȱRELATIVEȱPRICEȱOFȱCAPITALȱINȱMEXȱȱ
Dataȱ 0.35 0.02 -0.24 -0.5** 
Modelȱ -0.14 -0.30* -0.38* -0.35 
LagsȱofȱHighȱFrequencyȱMEXȱOutputȱ
0ȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ
MEDIUMȱTERMȱCOMPONENTȱMEXȱ
GDPȱ
Dataȱ 0.45** 0.32 0.05 -0.16 
Modelȱ 0.52** 0.45** 0.25 -0.01 
MEDIUMȱTERMȱCOMPONENTȱRELATIVEȱPRICEȱOFȱCAPITALȱINȱMEXȱȱ
Dataȱ -0.13 -0.32 -0.34 -0.22 
Modelȱ -0.33** -0.45** -0.45** -0.32 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
Note:ȱPeriodȱ1990Ȭ2006.ȱHighȱfrequencyȱcorrespondsȱtoȱcyclesȱwithȱperiodsȱlowerȱthanȱ8ȱyearsȱandȱisȱobtainedȱbyȱfilteringȱsimulatedȱ
dataȱwithȱaȱHodrickȬPrescottȱfilter.ȱMediumȱtermȱcyclesȱcorrespondsȱtoȱcyclesȱwithȱperiodsȱlowerȱthanȱ50ȱyearsȱandȱisȱobtainedȱbyȱ
filteringȱsimulatedȱdataȱusingȱaȱBandȬPassȱfilter.ȱTheȱreportedȱmeasuresȱareȱtheȱaverageȱofȱtheȱcontemporaneousȱcrossȱcorrelationsȱ
fromȱtheȱMonteȱCarloȱconsistingȱofȱȱ1000ȱ17Ȭyearȱlongȱȱsimulations.ȱ*ȱdenotesȱsignificanceȱatȱtheȱ10%ȱlevelȱandȱ**ȱdenotesȱ
significanceȱatȱtheȱ5%ȱlevel.ȱ
ȱ ȱ
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Tableȱ6:ȱDecompositionȱofȱoutputȱvolatilityȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
HighȱFrequencyȱ MediumȱTermȱCycleȱ
USȱvolatilityȱ Mexicanȱvolatilityȱ USȱvolatilityȱ Mexicanȱvolatilityȱ
USȱShocksȱ 0.97 0.64 0.98 0.66 
MexicoȱShocksȱ 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.34 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
Note:ȱShareȱofȱoutputȱvolatilityȱinȱtheȱrelevantȱcountryȱatȱtheȱrelevantȱfrequencyȱassociatedȱtoȱshocksȱeitherȱfromȱtheȱUSȱorȱMexico.ȱ
HighȱfrequencyȱfluctuationsȱareȱisolatedȱusingȱaȱHodrickȬPrescottȱfilterȱwithȱfilteringȱparameterȱ100.ȱMediumȱtermȱcycleȱȱisȱ
obtainedȱbyȱusingȱaȱBandȱPassȱfilterȱthatȱisolatesȱfluctuationsȱassociatedȱwithȱcyclesȱofȱperiodȱshorterȱthanȱ50ȱyears.ȱȱ
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Chapter 2
Price-Setting Discoveries:
Results from a Developing
Country
2.1 Introduction
The idea of sticky prices is at the heart of modern day macroeconomics for ex-
plaining economic fluctuations over the short horizon. It implies that instead
of being vertical, the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping. Therefore,
fluctuations in aggregate demand can cause fluctuations in output. This setup
is fundamental for monetary policy as it determines the extent to which money
growth, with its influence on aggregate demand, can influence the real econ-
omy. As it is commonly implied, the lengthier the period between price changes
the greater the influence of monetary policy. Therefore, it is quintessential to
empirically establish the extent and the nature of sticky prices.
Until recently, there had been a gap between theoretical explanations of
price-stickiness and studies of their empirical importance. Partly in response
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to this gap and partly because of the apparent success over the last two decades
of monetary policy in curbing inflation, central bankers and academics of ad-
vanced economies have devoted much resources to the empirical study of price
stickiness.1 To name a few studies Rotemberg (1982), Carlton (1986), Cec-
chetti (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder (1991), Blinder et al. (1998), Taylor
(1999), Aspland, Eriksson and Freiberg (2000), Hall, Walsh and Yates (2000),
Bils and Klenow (2004), Levy, Datta and Bergen (2002), Amirault et al. (2005)
and more recently Fabiani et al. (2007), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and
Greenslade and Parker (2012). This large literature for U.S. and European
countries shows that the degree of price-stickiness is considerable and pricing
strategies are complicated.
However, the corresponding effort to study price-stickiness in developing
economies leaves much to be desired. Such a study is all the more important
in light of the growing literature that documents the contrasting features of
the developing world such as: (i) procyclical monetary policies, (ii) persistence
of inflation levels in the double-digits and (iii) higher than average volatilities
of annualized inflation rates (see especially Age´nor and Montiel (2010) and
Frankel (2010) and the literature therein). Furthermore, with the expected rise
of the emerging markets as world economic engines it will become increasingly
important to study in detail the behavior of their product markets and the
extent to which they differ from that of the developed world.
In this paper, we present results of 1189 face-to-face structured interviews
carried out in 2009 to 2011 with entrepreneurs representing formal firms in the
manufacturing and services sector of Pakistan. By formal, it is meant that our
firms are officially registered, tax liable and also report data to employment
agencies. Therefore, these firms necessarily take part in the official GDP and
1The European Central Bank has a large team working under the aegis of ‘Inflation
Persistence Network ’to study prices.
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employment statistics. This study is comparable to similar research work in
developed countries in that key questions were benchmarked and drawn from
the pioneering works by Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998) for the U.S.,
Fabiani et al. (2007) for the Euro area and Greenslade and Parker (2012) for
the U.K.
The interviewers inquired about the nature of the product market, fre-
quency of price reviews and price changes, key explanations for price-stickiness,
dissemination of economic shocks, and the nature of interaction with the infor-
mal sector entrepreneurs. Understanding the linkages with the informal sector
is important given that in Pakistan the informal economy2 employs more than
70% of non-agricultural labor force.3
To the authors’ knowledge, features such as the scale of structured inter-
views (only Blinder et al. (2007) for US, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada
and to a smaller extent Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France used structured
interviews), sectoral coverage, updated list of price theories and questions on
the informal sector makes our survey the first exercise of its kind jointly con-
ducted by a central bank and statistical agencies. Furthermore, this study is
a good test for the universality of a great number of price theories developed
by economists over the last few decades.
A few words on the macroeconomic situation of Pakistan at the time of
the interviews (Dec 2009-Jun 2011) before the presentation of key results. In
November 2008, Pakistan entered a 23 month IMF program (the 11th since
1988) after a balance-of-payments crisis in May 2008. The average annualized
inflation rates for Pakistan during the three months of the interviews in Punjab
was 12.5%, and during the year of survey in Sindh was 14%; which is 4-
2Informal sector output is at least one-fifth of the reported GDP (see Arby, Hanif and
Malik (2010))
3Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2009-10.
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6% above Pakistan’s 50-year trend. During the fiscal year 2010, (i.e. July
2009-June 2010) real GDP grew by 3.8% and the annual unemployment rate
was 5.6%.4 Monetary policy was conducted under a dirty-float, with implicit
inflation and growth rate targets of 9% and 3.3% respectively.
We establish twelve stylized facts about price-setting behavior in Pakistan’s
formal manufacturing and services sectors and compare them with pervious
work where possible:
Fact 1 The median frequency of price changes in the manufacturing and
services sector is 6 and 2 times a year respectively. The equivalent figures are
1 and 1.4 times a year in Europe and the US respectively;
Fact 2 Prices are rigid downwards and more so for the services sector; a
result consistent with previous work;
Fact 3 Formal firms are relatively more sensitive and promptly accom-
modate to changes in (a) overall cost and in particular that of energy and
intermediate inputs, (b) competitors’ prices and (c) the exchange rate. How-
ever, changes in demand and financial-costs matter less. This is consistent
with previous literature for developed countries, with the main difference be-
ing that labor costs relative to energy costs were found to be more relevant for
them;
Fact 4 Time dependent price rules are more common than state-dependent
ones, with 51% of firms using the former; while for developed economies the
same figure is 33%;
Fact 5 The top three reasons for delaying price changes upwards are: (a)
the fear that other firms will not follow, (b) the uncertainty that shocks might
be temporary and (c) the fear of customer retaliation. The first and the third
reasons are in line with the results from developed economies;
4The unofficial unemployment rates are higher, but they are hard to assess as 70% of
non-agricultural household′s working hours are spent in the informal sector.
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Fact 6 37% of owners reported that prices are benchmarked to competitor’s
price, while 47% reported setting prices on the basis of constant or variable
markup. The same figures stand at 27% and 52% respectively for developed
countries. However, there is considerable imperfect competition in all types
of economies;
Fact 7 The manufacturing sector–where costs of raw material account for
70% of total cost– responds more to cost shocks relative to the services sector–
where labor costs account for 40% of total cost;
Fact 8 All firms, big or small, use backward and forward-looking informa-
tion sets in making price decisions. In particular, 46% of firms use a combi-
nation of backward and forward looking information while only 29% use pure
forecasts. In contrast, the use of forecast information is considerably higher
in developed countries, with 55% of firms relying on it;
The remaining facts are particular to the linkages between formal and
informal sector as viewed by the formal sector entrepreneurs:
Fact 9 43% of formal firms interviewed interact with the informal sector
either through demand or supply channels;
Fact 10 Economies of scale, customer preferences and market power mo-
tivates formal firms to remain in the formal sector;
Fact 11 According to formal firms, tax exemptions and weak enforcement
are the main reasons for the existence of informal sector;
Fact 12 Formal firms with frequent interaction with the informal sector
tend to have relatively lower probability of price change suggesting that in-
teractions with informal economy serve as a shock absorber; in particular for
demand shocks.
This paper presents results from our survey and compare our results with
the US and the Euro Area where possible. The rest of the paper is organized
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as follows: Section 2 presents the research design. Sections 3-7 discuss various
aspects of pricing. Section 8 presents caveats of our study while a final section
concludes.
2.2 The Research Design
Generally, there are three approaches to obtaining information on price stick-
iness at the firm level: (i) using secondary data from which one may infer
stickiness, (ii) sending surveys through e-mail or post or (iii) conducting one-
on-one structured interviews.
The first approach has the concern that data on economic outcomes is not
sufficiently detailed in Pakistan at the firm level for a meaningful study on
prices. The second approach has the concern that unlike in western countries
in Pakistan, the concept of obtaining qualitative information through e-mail
and post is relatively new which might lead to low response rates. Also, there
is no guarantee that the survey would be filled by a suitable person in the
organization. The concern for the third approach is that it is costly (especially
for large sample size like ours) and the length of the survey process may be
longer.
We adopted structured-interviews approach for our survey for three rea-
sons: complexity of the questionnaire, potential poor response rate through
traditional mail and the fear that questionnaire might not reach the appro-
priate person. Generally, lower response rates do not necessarily indicate any
bias, especially if distributed systematically across the sample. However, we
post-stratify our sample results based on firms’ size and economic activity to
reduces this bias. This proved important as we had a lower response rate for
larger firms. Other surveys such as Kwapil et al. (2005) and Loupias and
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Ricart (2004) also find similar large firm behavior. Despite the higher cost,
face-to-face interviews are considered to produce higher quality results and a
higher response rate. They also reduce the possibility of fluke answers, provide
direct access to the suitable individual and allow interviewers to carry out a
longer list of queries.
Overall, the literature recognizes the potential of Blinder’s unorthodox sur-
vey approach. Indeed, no less than 17 developed countries have used detailed
questionnaires (via e-mail or post) to study the pricing pattern5 in the man-
ufacturing and services sectors. Nonetheless, with all the qualitative surveys
(structured interviews or otherwise) there is the danger of misinterpretation by
respondents with the slightest change in the wording of the questions leading
to disproportionate responses. In many cases, respondents may use intuition
rather than what they do in practice to respond to the questions.
In full recognition of the possibility that these challenges might be more
acute for a developing country like Pakistan, we teamed up with the pre-
mier statistical agencies of Pakistan.6 They selected experienced interviewers
with local know-how and contacts to conduct our survey. The State Bank of
Pakistan provided focused training (both theoretical and practical) to these
selected interviewers for complex real world situations, where they need to
elaborate and explain the questions for clarity. SBP 7 also conducted two sep-
arate pilots before launching the study. For a further quality check, economists
from the State Bank randomly audited 10% of live interviews.
The face-to-face interviews took place between December 2009 and June
2011. The study began in the province of Punjab in December 2009 and ended
in March 2010. In the province of Sindh, it was launched in June 2010 and
5The U.S. used structured interviews.
6These agencies are well-equipped for this exercise as they conduct the census of the
manufacturing sector in Pakistan.
7State Bank of Pakistan, which is the Central Bank of the country.
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ended in October 2011. 8
2.2.1 The Questionnaire
The questionnaire is benchmarked to Blinder (1991) and the collection of stud-
ies in Fabiani et al. (2007). This is imperative as it allows us to draw parallels
between price-setting behavior of firms in developing and developed economies
where possible.
In line with previous work, section A of our questionnaire contains ques-
tions on the general profile of the firm as well as queries on the types of
customer and the nature of competition in their respective market. Section
B, C, and D contain questions on various aspects of price setting of the main
product–the one with highest domestic sales. Section E contains queries on
existing theories of price-stickiness and dissemination of shocks. Section F
contains queries on the interlinkages between the formal and informal sectors.
In order to better capture the ground realities of the Pakistani economy,
the questionnaire was customized in the following ways: First, we asked formal
firms about their interactions and views on the informal sector. Second, we
asked entrepreneurs about breakdown of their cost structure. Third, in the
section on price-dissemination we paid particular attention to the effects of
external shocks on prices. Indeed, Pakistan is exceptionally vulnerable to
external shocks with 11 IMF programmes since 1988.9 This is important as
little is known about shock transmission in developing countries at the micro
level.
On the testing side, the newly designed questionnaire was tested between
ourselves and crucially on a separate sample of 50 randomly selected firms in
8The main reason for delay in completion of surveys in Sindh was the precarious law and
order situation during the period of surveys
9See www.imf.org.
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Karachi;10 The final questionnaire was then translated into Urdu.11 We have
attached the questionnaire in Appendix C.
2.2.2 Sampling
We covered the ‘formal’ manufacturing and services sector in the provinces of
Punjab and Sindh. The other two provinces of the country (Balochistan and
Khyber-Pakhtun Khwa) were avoided due to safety reasons at the time of the
interviews. Our focus on the lager provinces and sectors ensures that our
results are a good representation of the pricing pattern of the formal sector in
Pakistan.
The population frame for the manufacturing sector consists of all firms
which reported in the last census of manufacturing industries (CMI). The
manufacturing sector is dominated by certain types of economic activities as
well as having a greater share of small sized firms. Therefore, a purely random
sample would run the risk of having a bias towards these activities and firms.
To overcome this problem, stratified random sampling was used.
The firms were stratified on the basis of economic activity and firm size.
The manufacturing sample covers firms with International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) economic activity codes from 15 to 36 (excluding 30).12
The population of firms for the above mentioned sub-sectors of the manufac-
turing sector was split into three categories of employment brackets: 10-50,
10Pakistan’s largest metropolis.
11Pakistan’s national language.
12The activities are: 15-(food products & beverages), 16-(tobacco products), 17-
(manufacture of textiles), 18-(wearing apparel), 19-(leather products), 20-(wood & wood
products), 21-(paper & paper products), 22-(publishing, printing & reproduction), 23-
(petroleum), 24-(chemicals & chemical products),
25-(rubber & plastics products), 26-(other non-metallic mineral products), 27-(basic met-
als),
28-(fabricated metal products), 29-(machinery & equipment N.E.C.), 31-(electrical machin-
ery & apparatus), 32-(Radio,TV & communication equipment), 33-(medical & optical in-
struments), 34-(motor vehicles & trailers), 35-(other transport equipment), 36-(furniture).
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51-250 and more than 250 employees. On the basis of these classifications,
a random sample for the manufacturing sector was drawn from 63 mutually
exclusive strata. We drew a sample of 1200 firms for the manufacturing sector
in Sindh and Punjab, along with a replacement-sample representing 50% of
the original sample to cover the possibility of non-response. In case of non-
response, a firm from a particular stratum was replaced by another firm from
the same stratum to maintain sectoral representation.
The sampling for the services sector is more complicated in that there is no
formal population frame available for firms in the services sector. Therefore, we
used the database of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)
which maintains a complete list of firms registered with them. However, the
SECP frame lacks information on firm size and dormant/ non-dormant status
of firms. Therefore, we impose the following constraints on the sample selection
in the services sector. First, to minimize the chance of selecting dormant firms
from a massive database, we only selected firms that had been registered within
the last 10 years and if registered before that time period have reported to
SECP at least once in the last 10 years.13 Second, to avoid small firm bias, only
firms with paid-up capital more than RS. 2,000,000 (USD 23,500) were selected
in our sample .Third, we only included firms involved in economic activities
where it is possible to identify a main service. A random sample of 270 firms
was selected from transport and telecommunication, hotels and restaurants,
education and health care services on the basis of sectoral distribution. With
the above limitations, results for the services sector should be interpreted
cautiously as they only reflect price-setting behavior for selected services and
not from a well-defined sample frame. We, therefore, present services sector
results separately as well.
13Every firm registered with SECP has the obligation to report its statistics on annual
basis but few do so on a regular basis.
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Table 1 provide details of the sample. As of June 2011, 1189 structured
interviews were completed. Of these interviews, 1025 are from the manufac-
turing sector with 286 (that is 28%) out of 1025 from the Sindh province.
The services sector accounted for 14% of the sample. In practice, most of the
price-setting surveys in the Euro Area are biased towards the manufacturing
sector, due to particular nature of price-setting surveys.
A few thoughts on the sample size before we discuss the results. The sam-
ple size of 1189 manufacturing and services sector firms makes our survey the
fifth largest price survey among the existing European and U.S. surveys. Also,
to best of author’s knowledge this survey is first of its kind for an emerging
economy like Pakistan. The covered sample of 1025 firms in the manufactur-
ing sector is about 9.4 % of the target population, which is well above the
usual convention of choosing a sample of about 5 % of the population. How-
ever, sample for the services sector was selected as a small proportion of a
pseudo-sample because of the non-availability of any formal population frame
as discussed earlier.
In order to make sure that our sample is a good representation of the
population, we allocated the sample according to respective strata shares in
population. However, for stratas with very small share in population sample
size was deliberately increased to be able to make stronger statistical inferences
for them. The allocated sample was then drawn randomly from sample frames.
For very small stratas, we included all of the firms from such stratas in our
sample.
To draw valid inferences for the population on the basis of this sample, it
was necessary to post-stratify the data to control for possible selection bias
due to either closure of some selected firms, firms being sole-exporter of their
product or firms shifting to a different economic activity. Similarly, large firms’
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decisions are likely to be more important. Also, we had lower response rate
from larger firms so data needed to be adjusted for firm size as well. Fur-
thermore, aggregate weighted results appear under the nomenclature of ‘total
’in our Tables. For this, we reweighed the data on the basis of sector weights
in the population. Appendix B contains the details of the post stratification
scheme.
The manufacturing and services sectors combined to account for 71% of
GDP in 2010. However, taking only into consideration the subsectors that are
covered in our interviews, our final sample is representative of firms that pro-
duce around 25.2–27 % of Pakistan’s GDP. The under-representation of the
services sector is noticeable but common in other international price related
studies as well. This is because it is not straight forward to define the main
product for some services sector firms. Services like financial services, con-
struction, retail and trade were not included where product usually changes
with every transaction. Also, in our case the sample frame for the services sec-
tor was not available. Given the list of subsectors in the manufacturing and
the services sectors, on aggregate we believe to have captured a true picture
of ‘price-setting’ in Pakistan with identifiable products.
2.3 The Environment
To a great extent, price determination and its adjustment depends on the
market structure. The structured interview approach addresses this issue by
asking about firm size, importance of the main product for the firm, firm’s
position in the market, and the nature of firm’s relationship with customers.
The questions in our structured interviews focused on the dominant prod-
uct of a given firm in terms of turnover in Pakistan. In manufacturing and
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services sector, we found that on average turnover generated by the main
product is 77% and 85% respectively. Furthermore, the national market was
the main market for 95% of manufacturing and 86% of services sector firms
for their main product in our sample. This implies that our survey results
present a representative picture of pricing pattern at the firm level in Pak-
istan. This suits our needs as we are primarily interested in understanding the
pricing-pattern in Pakistan.14
As for the interaction with customers, the majority15of manufacturing sec-
tor firms sell their main product to other firms. While in services sector 58%
of the firms directly deal with final customers. This implies that the results
of our interviews refer to producers prices for the manufacturing sector and
customer prices for the services sector. Furthermore, for firms in our sample
the majority of customers (56% manufacturing and 36% services) tend to be
repeat customers. However, the share of repeat customers in our sample of
Pakistani firms is less than Europe, where 70% of sales are based on long-term
clients.
Table 3 eludes to the degree of competition in manufacturing and services
sectors. Majority of firms perceive market competition to be high or very high
in the industry. The share of firms claiming to operate in a medium or weak
competition is 24% and 18% for manufacturing and services sector respectively.
This implies that markets are more competitive in Pakistan than in Euro Area
where 40% of firms perceive competition to be weak. This finding is further
corroborated by the fact that 37% and 41% of firms in the manufacturing and
services sector respectively place themselves not to be amongst the top ten
firms.
14International penetration of the main product for formal sector firms in Pakistan is at
least three times lower than the Euro Area.
1580%
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In sum, it is possible to infer that there is a monopolistic environment
in Pakistan with firms usually having long-term relationship with customers.
However, this environment is more competitive than Europe and the propor-
tion of firms with long-term relationship with customers is smaller.
2.4 A Profile of Price Setting
Most New-Keyensian economists believe that the slow adjustment in prices
and wages play an important role for explaining short run economic fluctua-
tions. However, New-classical economists argue that prices are flexible, even in
the short-run, and that explanations for economic fluctuations must be found
elsewhere in factors such as technology shocks and preferences. These differing
views fundamentally affect the choice of the critical assumption of perfect vs.
imperfect competition in product and labor markets for the purpose of build-
ing any general equilibrium model of the economy. Therefore, it is essential
to get a solid empirical grasp on the extent and the nature of price and wage
stickiness in Pakistan.
This section is devoted to price-setting behavior of firms in our sample,
namely, the basis on which prices are set, revised and frequency of price change.
In the previous section, we found some indication of imperfect competition in
Pakistan. This result is further confirmed by the finding in Table 4 that 34%
and 63% of firms in the manufacturing and services sectors reported applying
the markup rule of pricing. Overall, 47% of formal sector firms in our sample
use the markup rule.16 A further 44% and 29% of manufacturing and services
sector firms reported following their competitors in setting prices. Overall,
the numbers are not too different from the results in Europe, with the main
16Surprisingly, ‘markup’ is commonly used in Pakistan to denote unit profit margin in the
local language.
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difference being the relatively higher use of the markup rule in the services
sector in Pakistan.
These results further support the existence of imperfect competition in Pak-
istan and the idea that firms set prices themselves. Next, we turn our attention
to main reasons for price reassessments. To establish these features, we ignore
prices determined by government. The academic literature identifies three
main methods of price evaluation: (i) at regular time intervals Taylor (1980)
and Calvo (1983) (ii) on the basis of specific events Barro (1972), Sheshinski
and Weiss (1983) and Caplin and Leahy (1997) and (iii) a combination of the
former two. It is also possible for firms to adopt both methods of price ad-
justment. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect firms to accommodate for specific
changes even when they generally adhere to a time interval approach for price
changes; this idea was first debated in Hall et al. (2000) then further taken by
Apel et al. (2005).
In Table 5, the estimated weighted average of firms that review their prices
at regular time-intervals is 51% and a further 9% of firms review prices gen-
erally at regular time intervals, while also accommodating for specific events.
This implies that 60% of the firm change prices on the basis of time-dependent
rules. These numbers are similar to Blinder et al. (1998) for US and Hall et
al. (2000) for UK where the figures are 60% and 70% respectively. In contrast,
European figures from Fabiani et al. (2007) of 34% and for Sweden of 44.8%
in Apel et al. (2005) are far lower. This difference may be due to their market
structure, with a significantly higher proportion of long term customers and
also the fact that Sweden and Euro Area had lower inflationary environment
at the time of their surveys. Therefore, for firms in their sample prices reviews
were only necessary on specific occasions. In the case of Pakistan, 50 year
trend inflation of 8% implies that it is imperative for firms to reassess prices
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more regularly. Table 5 also provides a breakdown of price reassessment ap-
proaches taken by manufacturing and services sector and by firm size. Both
sectors are similar in the way prices are reviewed. Moreover, the firm size is
positively correlated with the regularity of price reviewing.
We now turn our attention to different measures of prices stickiness. This
is crucial as it determines the extent to which monetary policy can have a
real impact on the economy. As discussed earlier, frequent changes in prices
lower the length of price spells by making the aggregate supply curve steeper.
In Table 6, we discuss the key measure of price-stickiness by directly asking
entrepreneurs about their actual number of price changes in a typical year.
The median17 number of price changes in Pakistan is 3 times a year. This
is almost 3 times higher than what is found in the developed world. This
implies that median spell of a price change is 4 months. Furthermore, 24% of
the firms change their prices within a month; once again greater than what is
found in studies on the Euro area and US respectively.
We also discover in Table 6A, that at a disaggregate level, manufacturing
sector prices are much more flexible than prices in the services sector and firm
size positively impacts the median frequency of price changes. This implies
that for manufacturing duration of price spells is no longer than 2 months. The
latter results are also found in the developed economies but their significance
is not as sharp. It is also noticeable that small and large firms have similar
median number of price changes. The find that Pakistan, with a steady-state
year-on-year inflation of 8%, has a greater frequency of price change than
developed economies compares favorably with studies such as Cecchetti (1986),
Kashyup (1995), Buckle and Carlson (1995) and Taylor (1999) which observe
17The mean would be a misleading measure of central tendency in this case as some firms
change their prices on continuous basis. For these firms we assume that prices change on
daily basis to simplify our analysis.
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that during periods of high average inflation the duration of price-spells tended
to be shorter in the countries of their interest.
Price adjustments downward show a different pattern. In Table 6B, we
can see that median price cuts happen once a year for the manufacturing
sector, while for the services sector this is only true over a long period of five
years. Overall, for both manufacturing and services sector price cuts tend to
occur after two and half year showing considerable amount of downward price
rigidity.
In sum, there are price rigidities in Pakistan, but far less than what is
found in developed economies. There is a higher degree of price rigidity in the
services sector compared to the manufacturing sector. The empirical evidence
presented on price stickiness, with a higher frequency of price change, have
important implications for policy-making in Pakistan.
First, monetary policy in such an economic environment would have a
smaller impact on real economy than in an environment with a lower frequency
of price change. This happens because a smaller proportion of firms will have
their actual prices different from the optimal levels giving the policy maker a
very small window of opportunity to affect output.
To reiterate this point further, let us make the unlikely assumption that
all features of the Pakistani economy resemble that of the U.S. economy with
the exception of the frequency of price change as reported in Table 6. We
plug this information in a simple Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model of the U.S. In our version, nominal price rigidity is the only
source of friction with all other standard ingredients such as monopolistic
competition in the product market, monetary policy and balanced budget. In
Fig.1, we present the impact of a one standard-deviation interest rate shock
on the output gap. The real impact of a policy shock on output for Pakistan is
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smaller, with the brunt of its effect dying out within three quarters. While on
the other hand, for the US case output falls 17% below its potential and effects
of policy shock dies out only after the 17th quarter. This simple exercise shows
that only using assumption of price-rigidity to explain economic fluctuations
and persistence in real variables in emerging markets such as Pakistan may
not be the best idea.
Figure 2.1: The impact of an interest-rate shock on the output gap (y − y∗).
Second, the higher frequency of price change calls for policy-making and
analysis to be based on data that is at a frequency better than quarterly and
quarterly at worst. This is confirmed by the Calvo 18 probabilities in Table 6
which show that prices are optimized within a quarter.
Third, the finding that time-dependent rules are also applicable to economies
with high inflation and high frequency of price change has not been docu-
mented previously in the literature to our knowledge. The potential reason
behind this puzzle is the frequency of price reviews. Price review within a
18Calvo probability refers to the probability that a firm cannot change its price during a
given period.
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month is the most common practice in the Pakistani markets, where for US
and Euro area only 25% of firms review prices within a month. The time depen-
dent firms with a high frequency of price reviews indicate that despite following
a time-dependent rule for price change, the probability of re-optimizing prices
increases with significant differences between original and optimal prices. The
behavior of such firm is likely to resemble state dependent firms. Note that
our pattern of pricing appears not to be conditioned by the choice of year as
the firms provided similar answers to what they actually did in 2008 and 2009.
These results naturally raise an important question for developing economies
such as Pakistan. Models based on time-dependent rules with fairly low fre-
quency of aggregate price change and where these changes are staggered are
the mainstay of monetary economics for explaining persistence in inflation
and output. However, it seems not to be the most appropriate way to model
behavior of Pakistani economy.
We have already learnt that formal sector firms in Pakistan change prices
more frequently than firms in developed countries, but what stops them from
changing prices even more frequently. To answer this question we presented
firms with an extensive list of statements, based on a manifold of theories,
and asked them to identify the ones that were used in the practical sense for
delaying price adjustments.
Firms were asked to evaluate importance of different pricing theories for
their pricing decisions on the scale of: very important, important, of minor
importance and unimportant. The responses were coded from 1 to 4 respec-
tively. The responses for the manufacturing and services sector were used to
rank different theories. In Table 7A, we present the results of top five explana-
tions for the manufacturing and the services sector. For comparison, we also
present the results from U.S. and Euro Area.
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The top three explanations for delaying price adjustment are: (i) firms
prefer to act once they have observed how their peers behave (82% of the
firms ranking this aspect important or better) i.e. firms care about relative
prices (ii) the fear of customer retaliation (48% of the firms ranking this aspect
important or very important) and (iii) the perception that shocks might be
of temporary nature (44% of the firms ranking this aspect important or very
important). Generally, our results are closer to the US than the Euro Area,
Hall et al.(2000) for UK and Apel et al.(2005) for Sweden. This should be
expected given that the median frequency of price change in the US is relatively
higher than elsewhere. The ideas of implicit contracts, costly price adjustments
and costly information appear at the bottom of our ranking. The latter two
theories performed especially badly in other surveys as well. For details of
mean scores see Table 7B in the Appendix.
We also asked firm owners separately if any of the relevant theories in
Table 7A hindered them from marking down prices. In response, the top two
explanations stayed the same as in Table 7A. However a different theory was
ranked third (with 64% of firms choosing it) and it is that firms refrain from
reducing prices during bad times as it hurts their cash flows.
These results are reasonable for Pakistan considering its higher frequency
of price changes. For example, it is hard to imagine a formal price-agreement
in the manufacturing sector when the typical price duration is only 2 months.
However, in the services sector where the median price change is twice a year,
explicit contracts make more sense and were also reported as the third most
mentioned reason for price stickiness.
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2.5 Factors Determining Price Adjustment
There are four key ingredients of price determination. First, what drives price
changes. Second, differences in firm behavior when prices go up as opposed
to when they go down. Third, the speed with which different shocks are
incorporated into prices. Fourth, the type of information used during the
decision making. We have briefly talked about points two and three in the
context of demand and supply shocks but we explore each of these aspects in
detail below.
It is important to highlight that firms are more concerned with price in-
creases rather than reductions. Indeed, the median frequency of price decreases
for manufacturing and services sector firms over the last five years prior to the
interview are 5 & 1 respectively. With this in mind, analysis on factors leading
to price reductions should be taken with a pinch of salt.
In Table 8, we report causes of price changes and the approximate speeds
with which these changes pass-through to prices. The top four reasons for
prices to go up or down for the manufacturing sector are raw-material costs,
energy costs, exchange rate movements and the competitor’s price. For the
services sector, raw-material cost matters less while labor cost matters more
due to their cost structure. In Table 8, we also report how quickly important
changes are incorporated in prices for these reasons. The most important
reason for a price change gets incorporated in decision-making within a span
of three months. Other less important reasons are incorporated in pricing
decisions within six months. In the case of the Euro area, costs are also more
important but with the difference that raw material and labor cost rank higher
when prices go up while raw-material costs and competitor’s price matter more
when prices decrease. These differences can be explained by the nature of
market and cost structure of the manufacturing and service sector in Pakistan.
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We do not have equivalent speeds of adjustment available for other countries
for comparison.
Table 8 also tests the asymmetry of mean lag of prices changes for given
reasons. We find that for most of the reasons it takes significantly longer
on average to markdown prices then markup except for general price level in
the manufacturing sector, and demand changes and labor productivity for the
services sector.
In Table 9, we present the breakdown of firms’ cost structure in 2009. We
find that local and imported raw-material costs account for 70% of total cost
in the manufacturing sector, which explains the presence of exchange rate and
local raw material costs as prime forces driving price changes.
Next, we asked firms about the type of information they use for determin-
ing prices of their main product. We focused on finding out whether price
setting is based on information referring to past, future or a combination of
both past and future. This is important as it can shed light on the sources of
inflation persistence from the point of view of businesses. According to Table
10, 46% of all formal sector firms use a combination of past and future informa-
tion. Combining this information with firms using only historical data, 71% of
the firm use backward-looking information as part of their price-setting mech-
anism. Furthermore, we find that 71% and 70% firms in the manufacturing
and services sector respectively use backward looking rules. The predomi-
nance of backward-looking rules in our sample contrasts with that of Fabiani
et al.(2007), where the fraction of firms practicing backward-looking pricing
relative to those making price decision on the basis of forecasted data is the
reverse of what we discovered in Pakistan.
These results on price determination have important policy implications.
First, for an economy that reprices at least 12.2% of its GDP (manufactur-
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ing sector) six-times-a-year and has lower responsiveness to financial costs
compared to exchange rate, inflation stabilization policies should pay more
attention to exchange rate policies. This repricing reflects the cost structure,
where one-quarter of the inputs (imported raw material and energy to some
extent) have an exchange rate component. Second, frequent repricing by firms
may also be a reflection of the lack of trust on the policy-makers to stabilize
an economy that has gone through an IMF programme no less than 11 times
over the last two decades.
2.6 Linkages with the Informal Economy
An innovative part of our survey is that we ask formal firms about their ex-
istence in the formal sector and their connections with the informal sector.
As mentioned before, In Pakistan employment in the informal sector accounts
for 70% of the non-agriculture labor force, with 21% of these jobs belonging
to manufacturing type activities. Meanwhile, formal sector employment for
the manufacturing sector is 20%. Given the size of the informal economy and
its overarching presence in the manufacturing sector, it is important to un-
derstand the linkages that might exist between the product markets of formal
and informal sector.
The literature on the informal sector is mostly concentrated on the labor
market (see Perry et al. (2007) for a comprehensive review). The literature
reveals four dominant views on the existence of the informal sector: (i) dualist
view, which argues that informal sector is comprised of marginal activities Hart
(1973), (ii) structuralist view in Moser (1978) and Castells and Portes (1989),
which says that firms in the informal economy are subordinates to large enter-
prizes in the formal sector allowing the latter to cut costs and hence improve
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competitiveness, (iii) the legalist view of de Soto (1989 and 2000), which says
that cost, time and effort of legislation is at the source of informal sector and
(iv) voluntarist view akin to Hirschman (1970), in which entrepreneurs make a
conscious decision to remain in the informal sector having done a cost-benefit
analysis.
These differing views lead to a variety of interplay between the formal and
informal sector to explain labor market issues in developing countries. We
think that these theories are equally important for the product market behav-
ior; a connection largely ignored in the literature. The price-setting behavior
in the formal sector, and hence its consequences for inflation and output, would
be different for structuralist view as opposed to dualist view. The structuralist
view of informality allows the formal sector to be more competitive, whereas
in the dualist approach the link between formal and informal sector is nonex-
istent.
Therefore, realizing the importance of the interplay between the formal and
informal sectors in determining prices, we asked formal firms in our interviews
about their views on the existence of the informal sector. In addition, we also
asked them about the extent and nature of their interaction with firms in the
informal sector.
In Table 11, the top three reasons for firms operating in the formal sector
are: (i) customer preferences, (ii) economies of scale and (iii) market power.
Together these imply that a Dixit-Stiglitz type setup is most relevant for mod-
eling the formal sector. Surprisingly, seeking access to formal financial and
overseas market appears to be of little importance.
Similarly, we presented firms with a list of possible concerns that they face
in the formal sector. The mean scores are presented in Table 12. The top three
concerns for both the manufacturing and the services sector are: (i) product
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standardization, (ii) costly entry and exit and (iii) discriminatory electricity
charges.
We now move on to one of the most interesting parts of the interview,
where we asked formal firms about their linkages with the informal sector.
In Table 13, we find that 58% and 22% of firms in the manufacturing and
services sector respectively interact with the informal economy. To put it in
the aggregate context, approximately half of firms that produce one quarter
of Pakistan’s GDP are affected through demand or supply channels of the
informal economy. Naturally, it is important to find out the nature of this
interaction. There are three channels of interaction (i) demand channel in
which informal firms compete for market share with their formal counterpart,
(ii) supply channel in which informal firms supply inputs to formal firms and
(iii) combination of (i) and (ii).
For the manufacturing sector, 58% of firms are affected by the informal
sector through demand and supply channels. The nature of interaction with
the informal sector is weaker for the services sector, with only 22% of the firms
reporting an interaction with the informal firms through demand or supply
channels. The results for the services sector are expected as the informal sector
may find it tough to reproduce and/or co-produce intangible goods provided
by their formal counterparts.
Looking at these results from the viewpoint of firm-size reveals that, overall,
formal firms of different size have similar level of interaction with the informal
sector through demand or supply channels. But there are subtle differences
in the type of interaction. In particular, small and medium sized firms have
much bigger supply-side interlinkages when compared with larger firms while
the opposite is true for demand-side interactions.
On the demand side, we find that on average the market-share of the infor-
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mal firms in the manufacturing is one quarter, while for the services sectors it
is close to one-third. On the supply side, informal sector provides input worth
one-third of costs for all those firms using informal economy inputs. When
we asked formal firms about why they use the informal sector as a partner in
their supply-chain, the top most reply was their ‘flexibility’ as input suppliers.
Finally, we asked firm owners to rank a list of reasons for the existence
of the informal economy. According to formal entrepreneurs, the top four
reasons for the existence of informal sector are lack of taxes, poor compliance
(hence enforcement), simple production process and costless entry and exit
respectively for the manufacturing sector. For the services sector, the top
two reasons are same but cheap labor is ranked third. The result on lack
of enforcement is in line with Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008).
Surprisingly, the least important factor for the firms to exist in the informal
sector according to formal sector firms is the lack of resources.
Given the above results, one can conclude that according to formal firm
owners, the informal sector entrepreneurs are thriving both as producers and
as input suppliers. This finding is especially relevant for the manufacturing
sector. Furthermore, formal firms with the highest level of interaction with
the informal sector also display greater degree of nominal price-rigidity.
These results tend to support the structuralist view of informality, the idea
that there are input-output linkages between the formal and informal sector,
and the voluntarist view, the idea that entrepreneurs are choosing to stay out
of the formal sector, as possible explanations for the existence of the informal
economy.
However, this can not be conclusive, as the results presented here only
reflect the view of formal firm owners about the informal sector. The robust-
ness of these findings can only be confirmed with our forthcoming paper on
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price-setting in the informal sector.
2.7 Econometrics of Pricing
To test the robustness of some of our results, we now examine how the number
of price changes per year depends on certain features of the market structure
using simple OLS regressions. The features we incorporate rest on earlier dis-
coveries and also well-known textbook theories namely: (i) firms with higher
share of market are less likely to change their prices (ii) firms claiming to be
in highly competitive markets, ‘mark-to-market’ and hence adjust their prices
more frequently (iii) customer-markets, where firms with a larger proportion
of direct sales to clients on regular basis, have stickier prices, (iv) firms with
flatter marginal cost curve are less likely to change their prices, (v) less com-
monly known works of Moser (1978) and Castells and Portes (1989) argue for
the structuralist view that firms in the informal economy assist larger enter-
prizes in the formal sector enabling them to improve competitiveness and (vi)
Hirschman (1970)’s voluntarist idea that firms stay out of the formal sector
out of choice.
To reflect these discoveries in our empirical model we use a variety of
variables. To capture the size of the firm, we introduce two dummies for firm
size, MEDIUM (set to 1 if number of employees are between 51 to 250 for
the manufacturing sector and paid-up capital between Rs.15-50 mln for the
services sector) and LARGE (set to 1 if firm has more than 250 employees
for the manufacturing sector and paid-up capital more than Rs.50 mln for
the services sector). The type of economic activity is captured by MANUF
dummy which is set to 1 for firms belonging to manufacturing sector and zero
otherwise. The dummy PROVINCE is set equal to 1 for province of Punjab.
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The dummy variable for market share MARKET takes the value 1 if firm is
among top four firms and 0 otherwise. The share of turnover generated through
direct sales to consumers is captured by variable HH. The dummy INF takes
the value 1 if firm has some interaction (either from demand or supply sides)
with informal sector of economy. The dummy for exporting firms EXP takes
value 1 if firm is exporting its main product and 0 otherwise. The Ordinary
Least Square regression with frequency of price changes on the left-hand-side,
y, yields the following results.
y = 36.6
(15.24∗∗)
− 9.9
(6.35)
MEDIUM − 1.5
(13.02)
LARGE +23.4
(15.8)
MANUF − 5.3
(11.2)
PROVINCE
− 17.3
(8.7∗∗)
MARKET − 14.2
(6.80∗∗)
EXP − 18
(8.25∗∗)
INF−0.22
(0.16)
HH+error
(2.1)
R2: 8.4% Number of Observations= 1099 S.E.= Brackets.
The number of changes in price are significantly less for firms with higher
market share. We also find weak evidence (p-value: 0.16) for customer market
theory (Phelps and Winter, 1970) that reckons that firms with higher share
of consumers tend to have stickier prices. In a similar vein, firms exporting
their main product also tend to change prices less frequently as well as those
interacting with the informal sector. We estimated different combinations
of eq.(1) using the given set of variables, our results appear to be robust to
these modifications. The explanatory power of the regression remains very low
(8.4%) due to the diversity of market environment in our economic activities.19
Previously, in Table 8, we showed that cost related factors topped the
explanations for upward price adjustment.
Next, using a probit regression we estimate the extent to which this key
19Apel et al. (2005), also faced similar difficulties.
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decision20 is influenced by the set of independent variables in eq.(2). The left-
hand-side variable in this scenario is the decision to change prices upwards due
to a positive cost shock. This is captured by the dummy,c, set to 1 if firms
ranked overall cost as either very important or important for adjusting price
upwards.
c = 0.5
(0.32)
+ 0.20
(0.21)
MEDIUM +0.45
(0.53)
LARGE + 0.43
(0.25∗)
MANUF − 0.24
(0.219)
PROVINCE
− 0.01
(0.28)
MARKET + 0.62
(0.35∗)
EXP +0.32
(0.2)
INF − 0.001
(0.003∗)
HH − 0.5
(0.25∗∗)
MC + error
(2.2)
R2: 16.3% Number of Observations= 1167 S.E.= Brackets
The above probit results show that the probability of changing prices upwards,
given a positive cost shock, is higher for firms belonging to the manufacturing
sector as well as for those that export their main product.This result mainly
reflects the composition of their cost structure.The probability of changing
prices upwards due to cost shocks tends to decreases for firms coming into
direct contact with consumers in their overall customer base, supporting the
customer market theory with (p-value = 0.06). This is contrary to the last
model. Furthermore, flatter marginal costs imply a lower probability of pass-
though to prices where the variable, MC, is a dummy set to 1 for those firms
indicating costs being rigid as output expands. Finally, in terms of pass-
through of cost shocks to prices, any type of interaction with the informal
sector is unimportant. This result does not bode well with the structuralist
view of the informal sector which emphasizes the role of informal sector on the
cost side of formal sector firms.
Next we consider the same exercise as in eq.(2) but for a positive demand
shock, i.e. factors that determine the probability of revising prices upwards
20For positive cost shocks only, with downward rigid prices positive cost shocks are more
relevant compared to negative ones
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given a positive demand shock. This effect is captured by the dummy, d, which
is set to 1 for firms ranking demand shocks as being either important or very
important for upwards price revisions and zero otherwise. The results are as
follows:
d = 0.15
(0.28)
- 0.45
(0.19∗∗)
MEDIUM+0.22
(0.31)
LARGE + 0.12
(0.241)
MANUF +0.12
(0.2)
PROVINCE
− 0.85
(0.22∗∗∗)
MARKET +0.33
(0.28)
EXP − 0.49
(0.2∗∗)
INF− 0.01
(0.003∗∗∗)
HH + error
(2.3)
Eq.(3) indicates that the probability of price-increments fall significantly fol-
lowing a positive demand shock when firms have higher market share, inter-
act more with consumers directly and the informal sector and belong to the
medium-size firm category. The above evidence tends to support the volun-
tarist view of the informal economy in that influence on formal sector firms’
prices is being exerted by competition from firms in the informal economy.
2.8 Caveats
Despite all the interesting results, this study is subject to shortcomings. One
of the most important caveat of this study is the possibility that questions
in our structured interviews were answered by respondents in the context of
current high inflation21 environment prevailing in the economy.
However, this possible bias in responses due to prevailing economic con-
ditions at the time of survey was partially addressed in two ways. First, we
asked only few questions with reference to any specific year, most of the ques-
tions were asked about general pricing behavior without specification of time.
Furthermore, for questions that did involve time, enumerators probed the re-
21We have already mentioned that during the survey, inflation was 4-6% above its histor-
ical average of 8% and continues to persist at higher level.
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spondents about whether their responses would have been different in 2007
and 2008.22 Second, it is reasonable to expect lower price-stickiness in a coun-
try with such a high steady state inflation of 8%. This assertion is further
supported by pricing surveys in other countries.23
Therefore, most of the results presented in this paper should also apply
to normal times. Nevertheless, a fool-proof method of meeting this concern
would be to conduct a panel survey in normal times which the central bank is
committed to do in the future.
Another caveat of this study is the population frame of the services sector.
The frame for the services sector was manually constructed using a database24
that lacks information on number of employees and standard economic classi-
fication code, but has data on paid up capital.
We excluded firms that have not reported in last ten years. By excluding
firms that have not reported recently, we probably missed out on some live
firms. However, it would not matter if the missing services sector firms are
distributed evenly across different economic activities.
Furthermore, we only selected firms with paid up capital of more than
Rs.2,000,000. This might have introduced a bias for larger services sector
firms. However, note that given our small sample size for services sector it
would have been almost impossible to make statistically significant inferences
for a very large population of small firms.
Finally, during our survey another group of researchers came up with a
similar study for Pakistan. Shahid, Satti and Saghir (2010) conducted the
survey for price setting behavior for only four cities of the province of Punjab.
However, their study, had many shortcomings such as lack of national rep-
22We found little difference in responses between different years.
23Canada, UK and Turkey displaying higher inflation rates at the time of their surveys
also reported higher frequency of price change.
24Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s listing of registered firms
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resentation, no proper customization and ignoring the existence of informal
economy. However, we take this study as a pilot for our survey in Punjab and
find that most of our results were consistent with Shahid et al (2010).
2.9 Conclusion
We presented results of 1189 structured interviews of formal sector firms in the
manufacturing and services sectors in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The
sample for the manufacturing sector is fully representative while the services
sector, which is 14% of the total sample, is less so.
We find that although imperfect competition is a good representation of
firm’s behavior, frequency of price changes are high enough to question the
role of nominal rigidities in explaining business cycle fluctuations in Pakistan.
The exchange rate is more important than financial costs in price-setting and
generally cost shocks matter more than demand shocks. Most of the firms
in our sample use some kind of backward-looking information, while making
pricing decisions.
Also, majority of formal firms interact with firms in the informal sector,
however manufacturing sector have a higher level of interaction with the infor-
mal sector than the services sector. Finally, formal firms with greater interac-
tion with the informal sector firms tend to increase their prices less frequently.
103
Bibliography
[1] Age´nor, P. and Montiel, P. (2010). Development Macroeconomics, 3rd
Edition, Princeton University Press.
[2] Amirault, D., Kwan, C. and Wilkinson, G. (2005). “A Survey of the Price
Setting Behaviour of Canadian Firms”, Bank of Canada Review, Winter
2004-2005, pp. 29-40.
[3] Arby, M., Hanif, M. and Malik, J. (2010). “The Size of Informal Economy
in Pakistan”. SBP Working Paper No. 33.
[4] Apel, M., Friberg, R. and Hallsten, K. (2005). “Micro Foundations
of Macroeconomic Price Adjustment: Survey Evidence from Swedish
Firms”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 37, pp.313-338.
[5] Asplund, M., Eriksson, R. and Friberg, R. (2000). “Price Adjustments by
a Gasoline Retail Chain”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 102,
pp. 101-121.
[6] Barro, R. (1972). “A Theory of Monopolistic Price Adjustment”, Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 39, pp. 17-26.
[7] Bils, M. and Klenow, P. (2004). “Some Evidence on the Importance of
sticky Prices”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, pp. 947-985.
104
[8] Blinder, A. (1991). “Why are Prices Sticky? : Preliminary Results from
an interview Study”, American Economic Review, Vol. 81, pp. 89-96.
[9] Blinder, A., Canetti, E., Lebow, D. and Rudd, J. (1998). Asking About
Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness, Russel Sage
Foundation New York
[10] Buckle, R. A., and Carlson, J. A. (1995). Price Durations with Two-Sided
Pricing Rules, in Karl Heinrich Oppenlanderand and Gu¨nter Poser (Eds),
Busisness Cycle Surveys: Forecasting Issues and Mathodological Aspects.
Avebury: Aldershot.
[11] Calvo, G. (1983). “Staggered Pricing in a Utility Maximizing Framework”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 383-398.
[12] Caplin, A. and Leahy, J. (1997). “Aggregation and Optimization with
State-Dependent Pricing”, Econometrica, Vol. 65, pp. 601-625.
[13] Carlton, D. (1986). “Rigidity of Prices”, American Economic Review, Vol.
76, pp.637-658
[14] Castells, M. and Portes, A. (1989). “World Underneath: The Origins,
Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy”, in Portes, A., Castells,
M. and Benton, L. (eds.) The Informal Economy – Studies in Advanced
and Less Developed Countries, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, pp.11-37.
[15] Cecchetti, S. (1986). “The Frequency of Price Adjustment. A Study of
the Newsstand Prices of Magazines”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 31,
pp. 255-274.
105
[16] Dabla-Norris, E., Gradstein, M. and Inchauste, G. (2008). “What Causes
Firms to Hide Output? The Determinants of Informality”, Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 85, pp. 1-27.
[17] De Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path, Harper and Row New York
[18] De Soto, H. (2000). Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the
West & Fails Everywhere Else, New York Random House.
[19] Fabiani, S., Loupias, C., Martins, F. and Sabbatini, R. (2007). Pricing
Decisions In The Euro Area: How Firms Set Prices and Why, Oxford
University Press.
[20] Druant, M., Fabiani, S., Hernando, I., Kwapil, C., Landau, B., Loupias,
C., Matha, T., Martins, F., Sabbatini, R., Stahl, H. and Stokman, A.
(2005). “The Pricing Behaviour of Firms In The Euro Area: New Survey
Evidence”, European Central Bank Working Paper No.535
[21] Frankel, J. (2010). “Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets: A Survey”,
NBER Working Paper 16125.
[22] Greenslade, J.V., and Parker, M. (2012). “New Insights Into Price-Setting
Behaviour in the UK: Introduction and Survey Results”, The Economic
Journal, Vol. 122, Issue 558, pp. F1-F15.
[23] Hall, S., Walsh, M., and Yates, A. (2000). “Are UK Companies’ Prices
Sticky?”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 52, pp. 425-446.
[24] Hart, K. (1973). “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment
in Ghana”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, pp. 61-89.
106
[25] Hirschman, O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to a Decline
in Firms, Organizations and States, Cambridge MA, Harvard University
Press.
[26] Kashyap, A. (1995). “Sticky Prices: New Evidence from Retail Catalogs”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, pp. 245-274.
[27] Kwapil, C., Baumgartner, J.and Scharler, J. (2005). “The Price Setting
Behaviour of Austrian Firms: Some Survey Evidence”, European Central
Bank Working Paper No.464
[28] Levy, D., Dutta, S. and Bergen, M. (2002). “Heterogeneity in Price Rigid-
ity: Evidence from Case Study Using Microlevel Data”, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, pp. 197-220.
[29] Loupias, C. and Ricart, R. (2004). “Price Setting in France: New Evi-
dence from Survey Data”, European Central Bank Working Paper No.423
[30] Malik, W., Satti, A. and Saghir, G. (2010). “Price Setting Behaviour of
Pakistani Firms: Evidence from Four Industrial Cities of Punjab”, PIDE
Working Paper No.65.
[31] Martins, F. (2005). “The Price Setting Behaviour of Portuguese Firms:
Evidence from Survey Data”, European Central Bank Working Paper
No.562.
[32] Moser, C. (1978). “Informal sector or petty commodity production: du-
alism or dependence in urban development?”, World Development, Vol.
9-10, pp. 1041-1064.
107
[33] Nakamura, E. and Steisson, J. (2008). “Five facts about prices: A reevalu-
ation of menu cost models”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 123:4,
pp. 1415-1464.
[34] Pakistan, Government of (2010). Labour Force Survey, 2009-10, Federal
Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division.
[35] Perry, G., Maloney, W. and Arias, O. (2007). Informality: Exit and ex-
clusion. Washington, DC, World Bank.
[36] Rotemberg, J. (1982). “Sticky Prices in the United States”, Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 90, pp. 1187-1211.
[37] Sheshinski, E. and Weiss, Y. (1983). “Optimum Pricing Policy Under
Stochastic Inflation”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50, pp. 513-529.
[38] Taylor, J. (1980). “Staggered wage and price setting in macroeconomics”,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.88, pp. 1–23.
[39] Taylor, J. (1999). “Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeco-
nomics”, in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (eds.). Handbook of
Macroeconomics, pp. 1009-1050. Elsevier, New York.
108
2.A Chapter 2 Comparative Analysis
TABLE A1
Macroeconomic Data
Pakistan a,b Euro Area c United States c
Survey period Dec 2009 - June 2011 Feb 2003 - Nov 2004 Apr 1990 - Mar 1992
Data reference 2009 - 2010 2003 - 2004 1990 - 1992
period
Inflation 11.9 / 18.8 a 1.9 / 2.1 2.3 / 3.9
(GDP Deflator)
Real GDP 2.4 / 3.8 a 0.6 / 1.7 - 0.2 / 3.3
growth
Unemployment rate 5.5 / 5.6 a 8.8 / 8.9 5.6 / 7.5
Exchange rate -0.6 / -4.8 b 11.3 / 3.4 -0.9 / -5.7
variation
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11 & SBP Statistics Department & Fabiani et.al (2007)
a: Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance
b: Author’s calculation on exchange rate data from SBP.
c: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 188
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TABLE A2
The Individual Surveys
Pakistan Euro Area a United States a
Main source Author’s calculations Fabiani et.al (2008) Blinder et.al (1998)
Form of survey Structured face- mailed questionnaires, Structured face-
-to-face interviews phone, face-to-face, to-face interviews
internet
Date or timing Dec 2009 - June 2011 Feb 2003 - Nov 2004 Apr 1990 - Mar 1992
Conducted by Central Bank (SBP) & 4 National Central Princeton graduate
2 Statistical Agencies Banks & students
(BOS Punjab) (BE, FR, LU, PT)
(BOS Sindh) 5 external agencies
(DE, ES, IT, NL, AT)
Firms contacted 1,189 b 24,248 350
Firms interviewed 2,100 b 11,039 200
Response rate 57% b 46% 61%
Random sample Yes: sample was No Yes
stratified according to
size & economic sector
Sectoral coverage Manufacturing 86% Manufacturing 62% Manufacturing 35%
Services 14% Services 21% Services 27%
Trade 13% Trade 18%
Others 4% Others 20%
Representative of Yes No No
the firm size
distribution
Reference price Main product Main product Not specified
Source: Author’s calculations & Fabiani et.al (2007)
a: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 186-187
b: This number is provisional, it will be updated after all the surveys have been completed.
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2.B Chapter 2 Post-Stratification and Weight-
ing Scheme
Following Kwapil et al (2005) and Martins (2005) for Austria and Portugal,
manufacturing sector weights were redefined to sub-sector of economic activity
and size of firm. The weight wh represents the weights of hth stratum
wh =
Ph
P
Sh
S
(2.4)
where, Ph is the number of employees in stratum h in the population, P is
the total number of employees in the population. Similarly, Sh is the number
of employees in the firms interviewed in stratum h and S is total number of
employees for all the firms in our sample.
For services sector, the information set available is not enough to justify
post-stratification for firm-size on the basis of employment. However, we have
information on paid-up capital. We use this information to post stratify for
firm size and therefore allowing us to treat both selected economic sectors con-
sistently. We divided firms in services sector on the basis of paid-up capital (in
local currency) as small, medium and large firms according to < Rs.15,000,000,
15,000,000-50,000,000 and > 50,000,000 respectively.25 The responses for the
services sector in this paper are reported after post stratification, the weight
of hth stratum is given by
wh =
Ch
C
oh
o
(2.5)
where, Ch is the paid-up capital of firms in stratum h, C is the total paid-up
capital of population frame of firms in services sector. Similarly, oh is the
25We can draw comfort from the fact that this categorization has a correlation coefficient
of 0.5 with employment categorization used earlier on the basis of employment data we
collected from the ’surveyed’ sample.
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paid-up capital in the firms interviewed in stratum h and o is total paid-up
capital of all the firms interviewed.
The above individual weighting schemes for the manufacturing and services
sectors do not account for their share in the economy. This means that to make
inferences about price-setting for the aggregate economy, especially for those
results26 that can be aggregated, we must reweigh the results on the basis of
economy-wide sector weights in Table 2.
Therefore, we post-stratified the data of manufacturing and services sectors
by their respective weights in the total GDP, these results are reported under
the nomenclature of ‘total’ in our analysis.
26Note that not at all questions can be aggregated since they may simply be sector specific
. For example costs breakdown in manufacturing sector are naturally different from that of
services sector and therefore can not be aggregated. Similarly, cost specific shocks and their
ramifications for pricing can not aggregated in a sensible way.
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2.C Chapter 2 Reasons for Price Stickiness
Table 7B:
Reasons for Price Stickiness
Manufacturing Services
Theories Mean† p-val∗ Imp.‡ Theories Mean† p-val∗ Imp.‡
Coordination Failure 3.2 0.00 84 Coordination Failure 3.1 0.00 79
Temporary Shocks 2.5 0.00 55 Risking Customer 2.2 0.23 41
Relations
Risking Customer 2.3 0.89 46 Explicit Contracts 2.1 0.17 44
Relations
Procyclical Elasticities 2.3 0.03 44 Temporary Shocks 2.0 0.66 39
Habit Formation 2.2 0.89 40 Procyclical Elasticities 2.0 0.38 40
Constant Unit Cost 2.2 0.20 40 Habit Formation 2.0 0.00 31
Delivery Time 2.1 0.07 41 Thick Markets 1.8 0.01 29
External Financing 2.0 0.00 39 Constant Unit Cost 1.6 0.53 22
Using Inventories 1.9 0.84 30 Informal Sector 1.6 0.42 22
Coordination Failure
Explicit Contracts 1.9 0.88 31 Implicit Contracts 1.5 0.57 19
Thick Markets 1.8 0.49 27 External Financing 1.5 0.09 19
Informal Sector 1.8 0.00 28 Costly Information 1.4 0.54 12
Coordination Failure Gathering
Implicit Contracts 1.6 0.00 22 Menu Costs 1.4 0.02 5
Costly Information 1.4 0.00 13 Delivery Time 1.3 0.00 12
Gathering
Menu Costs 1.3 0.00 8 Using Inventories 1.2 0.00 6
Source: Author’s calculations
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote unimportant, of minor importance, important, and very important
*: This p-value refers to the null hypothesis that theory’s mean score is equal to the theory
*: ranked below
‡: Percentage of firms rating the theory as important or very important.
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2.D Chapter 2 Tables
TABLE 1
The Sample
Manufacturing Services Total
Small 573 103 676
Medium 291 40 331
Large 161 21 182
Sindh Representation 28% 37% 29%
Total 1025 164 1189
Source: Author’s calculations
TABLE 2
The Overall Representation (percentages)
Manufacturing Services Total
Pakistan GDP 2009-10 18.6 52.4 71.0
GDP represented by our sample† 12.2 13-15 25.2-27
Sector distribution in our sample 86 14 100
Source: Author’s calculations & Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11
†: This percentage is used for reweighting sector estimates
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TABLE 3 a
Market and Competition of the Main Product (weighted percentages)
Manufacturing Services Euro Area †
Reference Market
i. International 5 14 27 b
ii. Local Market (City and Surrounding Areas) 33 37
iii. National Market excluding (ii). 62 49
iv. ii+iii 95 86 73 b
% of Turnover in Pakistan
41-60 16 6
61-80 29 7
81-100 45 74
Market Share
Top Firm 5 11
Top Four Firms 13 22
Top Ten Firms 17 22
Not among the Top 10 Firms 37 41
Type of Main Customer and long-term relationship
Other Firms 79 34 75 b
Customers 20 58 21 b
Public Sector 2 8 3 b
Firm-Customer relationships
Long term 56 36 70 b
Occasional 44 64 30 b
Perceived Degree of Competition
Very High 47 56 26.2 c
High 26 24 35.2 c
Medium 22 15 21.5 c
Weak 2 3 17.1 c
Source: Author’s calculations & Fabiani et al.(2007).
†: Weighted Average by country’s GDP in Fabiani et al. (2007).
a: Rescaled figures excluding non-responses
b: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 33
c: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 202
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TABLE 4 a
Price Rules (percentages)
Pakistan Euro Area
Markup †
Manufacturing 34 56 b
Services 63 46 b
Total 47 54 c
Competitors Price
Manufacturing 44 27 b
Services 29 24 b
Total 37 27 c
Other ‡
Manufacturing 22 17 b
Services 8 31 b
Total 16 18 c
Source: Author’s calculations & Fabiani et al.(2005).
a: Rescaled figures excluding non-responses
b: Fabiani et al.(2005), pp 41
c: Fabiani et al.(2005), pp 14
†: Include constant, variable and customer markups.
‡: Include prices determined by association and the government.
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TABLE 5 a
Price Assessments (percentages)
Pakistan Euro Area b US b
Purely Time-Dependent
Manufacturing 54
Services 47
Total 51 34 60
Purely State-Dependent
Manufacturing 27
Services 21
Total 24 20 30
Generally Time-Dependent but also Event Based
Manufacturing 11
Services 7
Total 9 46 10
Purely Time-Dependent
Small 50
Medium 52
Large 57
Source: Author’s calculations; Fabiani et al.(2007) & Blinder et al.(1998).
a: Rescaled figures excluding non-responses
b: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 192
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TABLE 6
Actual Price Changes
Pakistan Euro Area US
Median Number of Price Changes in a Year 3 1 a 1.4 d
Implied Median Spell of Price Change in Months † 4 12 8.6
% of Firms that Review their Prices With a Month 73 26 b 25.6 e
% of Firms that Change Price Within a Month 23.9 16 c 20.9 d
Quarterly Calvo Probabilities using Median Duration ‡ 0.25 0.75 0.65
Source: Author’s calculations; Fabiani et al.(2007) & Blinder et al.(1998).
†: This is ratio of 12 and median of number of price changes in a year.
‡: The probability that firms do not re-optimize the prices they charge during a quarter
a: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 191
b: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 36
c: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 223
d: Authors calculation based on results in Blinder et al.(1998), pp 84
e: Authors calculation based on results in Blinder et al.(1998), pp 90
TABLE 6A
Median Number of Price Changes in a Year
Pakistan
Sector Manufacturing 6
Services 2
Small 3
Firm Size Medium 2
Large 3
Source: Author’s calculation
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TABLE 6B
Median Number of Downward Price Changes in 5 Years
Pakistan
Manufacturing 5
Services 1
Total 2
Source: Author’s calculation
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TABLE 7A a
Ranking Reasons for Price Stickiness
Theories Description Pakistan Europe † US ‡
Manufac Services
Coordination Failure Firms watch what other
firms will do first
1 1 4 1
Temporary Shocks Firms avoid price changes
if they perceive a shock
(demand or supply) to be
transitory
2 4 7
Risking Customer Re-
lations
Customer might take the
price change as exploita-
tive
3 2 1 ∗
Procyclical Elasticities When times are good
customers become more
price sensitive
4 5 6
Habit Formation When times are good
share of non-habitual cus-
tomers with higher price
elasticities increases
5 6
Source: Author’s calculations; Fabiani et al.(2007) & Blinder et al.(1998).
a : It is important to note that we can’t make a direct comparison between rankings from different
countries as the number of theories and style of asking this question is different for different surveys.
However, this comparison is still useful to get a general idea.
†: Unweighted average of national rankings; Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 196
‡: Authors calculation based on results in Blinder et al.(1998), pp 110
∗: In US, firms were asked out of freewill to cite what in general stopped them from changing prices
and the largest majority said customer’s antagonism.
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TABLE 8
The Importance of Factors Driving Price Changes and Lags of Adjustment (mean score†)
Pakistan Euro Area a
Manufacturing Services Overall
↑† ↓† p-value‡ ↑† ↓† p-value‡ ↑† ↓†
Raw Material Cost 3.7∗ 3.4∗ 0.00 1.9∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗∗ 0.00 3.1 2.6
Energy Cost 3.1∗ 2.9∗∗ 0.00 2.5∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗∗ 0.00
Competitor’s Price 2.9∗ 2.9∗ 0.03 2.5∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗ 0.00 2.4 2.8
Exchange Rate 2.5∗∗ 2.4∗∗ 0.00 2.8∗∗ 2.6∗∗∗ 0.00
Demand Changes 2.4∗∗∗ 2.6∗∗ 0.00 2.1∗∗∗ 2.0∗∗∗∗ 0.24
General Price Level 2.2∗∗ 2.4∗∗ 0.18 1.9∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗∗ 0.00
Labor Cost 2.2∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗∗ 0.00 2.5∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗∗ 0.00 3.0 2.1
Financial Cost 2.2∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗ 0.00 1.7∗∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗∗ 0.00 2.2 1.9
Labor Productivity 1.9∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗∗ 0.05 1.4∗∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗∗ 0.92
Source: Author’s calculations & Fabiani et al.(2007)
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote unimportant, of minor importance, important and very important
asterisk denote *incorporated within three months, **incorporated within six months,
***incorporated within nine months, **** incorporated within a year.
‡:Refers to null hypothesis that the mean lag of price adjustment for a given factor for
‡: price increase is equal to price decrease.
↑ and ↓: Refer to increase and decrease in price respectively.
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TABLE 9
Breakdown of Total Cost in 2009 (average of percentages)
Manufacturing Services Total
Local Raw Material Cost 60 8 39
Imported Raw Material Cost 10 8 9
Energy 13 12 13
Labor 11 40 23
Other 6 32 17
Source: Author’s calculations
TABLE 10 a
Information Type (percentages)
Manufacturing Services Total Euro Area
Historical Data 27 22 25 34 b
Forecast 29 30 29 48 b
An Average of Past and Future 44 48 46
Source: Author’s calculations & Fabiani et al.(2007)
a: Rescaled figures excluding non-responses
b: Fabiani et al.(2007), pp 37
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TABLE 11
Why be part of the Formal Sector? (mean score)
Manufacturing † Services † Total † Importance ‡
Economies of Scale 3.4 3.3 3.4 91%
Customer Preferences 3.2 3.4 3.3 87%
Market Power 2.8 2.9 2.8 79%
Favorable Government Policies 2.6 2.7 2.7 66%
Access to Bank Credit 2.4 2.8 2.5 67%
Access to International Market 1.8 2.8 2.1 48%
Source: Author’s calculations
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote unimportant, of minor importance, important and very important
‡: Percentage of firms rating the factor as important or very important.
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TABLE 12
Concerns with Staying in the Formal Sector (mean scores)
Manufacturing † Services † Total † Importance ‡
Product Standardization 3.2 2.6 3.0 74%
Entry-Exit is Costly 2.9 2.5 2.8 62%
Discriminatory Energy Charges 3.1 2.3 2.8 62%
Labor Regulations 2.9 2.2 2.6 63%
EOBI Contributions 2.8 2.2 2.6 58%
Bureaucratic Hurdles 2.5 2.0 2.3 43%
Price Regulations 2.4 2.0 2.2 46%
Rental Charges 2.0 1.8 1.9 30%
Source: Author’s calculations
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote unimportant, of minor importance, important and very important
‡: Percentage of firms rating the factor as important or very important.
∗ Employment and Old Age Benefit
TABLE 13
Linkages with the Informal sector (percentages)
Manufacturing Services Total Small Medium Large
No interaction 41.5 77.8 56.3 56.3 56.1 57.4
Demand Only 32.1 16.0 25.5 24.2 23.2 37.4
Supply Only 7.7 3.8 6.20 6.9 6.1 0.9
Demand and Supply 58.5 22.2 43.7 43.7 43.9 42.6
Market Share 24.8 30.0 26.2
Share in Total Cost 35.8 15.3 30.2
Source: Author’s calculations
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TABLE 14
Factors Contributing to the Existence of the Informal Economy (mean scores)
Manufacturing † Services † Total † Importance ‡
Lack of Taxes 3.4 3.1 3.3 84%
Tax Compliance/Enforcement 3.1 2.8 3.0 82%
Simple Production Process 3.1 2.4 2.9 74%
Costless Entry and Exit 3.0 2.4 2.8 67%
Low Labor Cost 2.9 2.7 2.8 68%
Corruption 3.0 2.2 2.7 62%
Lack of Resources 2.8 2.3 2.6 61%
Source: Author’s calculations
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote unimportant, of minor importance, important and very important
‡: Percentage of firms rating the factor as important or very important.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Business Cycles in
Pakistan: A First Step
3.1 Introduction
What are the stylized facts of the Pakistani economy? Has the nature of the
economy shifted with significant changes in the social and political landscape
of the country? What is the current nature of the Pakistani economy (last few
decades)? What drives short and medium run fluctuations in the economy? Is
the Pakistani economy driven by technology shocks as advocated by the well
known RBC literature or is it driven by external factors?
In order to answer these important questions, I first try to establish the
nature and structure of Pakistani economy over the last 5 decades, focusing
mainly on the period of 1981-2010. After the initial look into salient features
of the economy, this paper also tries to establish some ‘stylized facts’ for the
Pakistani economy. In addition, I find that these ‘stylized facts’ of the economy
have been changing over the last few decades. This lead me to focus on the
relatively contemporary period of 1981-2010 for an in-depth analysis of short-
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run fluctuations. By short run fluctuations, I mean that the empirical analysis
in this paper uses the conventional frequencies for isolating data from its trend
to study business cycles. For completeness, I also examine data in terms of
growth. In addition, we also break down the data decade by decade to get a
clearer picture of changing nature of the cyclical fluctuations in the economy.
Furthermore, I evaluate the fit of the Pakistani macroeconomic data with
a simple Real Business Cycles model for the 1981-2010 period. I find that a
simple RBC model does a good job of matching some of the relevant moments
from the data. However, it fails to account for the increased relative volatility
of consumption and investment as shown by the data.
In order to further improve the fit, I introduce an augmented RBC model,
with an exogenous FDI shock as the main innovation. I find that the aug-
mented RBC model performs better than the simple RBC model for some of
the moments but more importantly delivers the increased relative volatility of
consumption and investment. However, the augmented model does poorly on
the absolute magnitude of volatilities across the board.
Real Business Cycles based models are now being widely used for policy
analysis and the study of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in most developed
countries. In the last few years, emerging economies have also started exploring
the use of RBC type models in their policy making activities.
However, we still know very little about business cycles in developing coun-
tries. Furthermore, existing real business cycles models for developing coun-
tries (Garcia-Cicco (2010), Aguiar & Gopinath (2007)) have been mainly fo-
cused on South American countries. They seem to suggest that cycles in
different developing economies are similar and can be explained in the same
manner. Gopinath (2007) in her paper suggested that business cycles for de-
veloping economies can be explained by a simple RBC model with the addition
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of a stationary trend productivity shock on top of the traditional exogenous
technology shock. However, recent work by Garcia-Cicco et al (2010) chal-
lenges the main result of the earlier work of Gopinath & Gertler (2007) and
reports that for both Chile and Argentina a simple RBC model with a trend
stationary technology shock fails to explain their respective business cycles.
It is a well known fact that not all emerging economies are the same and
therefore it should be no surprise that the nature and behaviour of their
economies differ from each other. These economic differences between de-
veloping countries should be addressed rigorously to completely understand
the business cycles of any particular developing country. This line of reason-
ing has recently become quite popular, as the last few years has seen a rapid
increase in the literature related to country-specific business cycles models for
different developing countries.
Unfortunately, even with the recent surge in the literature related to busi-
ness cycles in developing economies, there are not many business cycle models
for South Asian countries. To the best of the author’s knowledge, only work
for India has been undertaken for both establishing the business cycle facts of
the economy as well as evaluating the fit of a typical RBC model to explain
the ‘stylized facts’ of a South Asian economy. This project is the first of its
kind to explore the short-run fluctuations of the Pakistani economy as well
as checking the ability of the RBC model setup in matching the empirical
moments for the relevant macroeconomic variables (Output, Consumption &
Investment).
The main reason for the dearth of economic research relating to business
cycles of developing countries is the lack of availability of relevant time series
data at appropriate frequency. Therefore, anyone interested in studying the
cyclical fluctuations of a country like Pakistan has to deal with data availability
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and consistency issues even for the most basic macroeconomic variables.
There is no quarterly data available for the relevant macroeconomic series of
Pakistan. The main variables of interest such as output, private consumption,
government expenditures, investment, exports and imports1 are only available
at an annual frequency. However, even with annual data there are still issues of
consistency from different sources. In this scenario, it is hard to even establish
the ‘stylized facts’ of the economy. In this paper, I mainly use the ’annual’
data from Pakistani sources such as the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the
Government of Pakistan and the State Bank of Pakistan. However, for some of
the analysis related to business cycles I also use data from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics database.
In addition, on the calibration front there are no agreed upon values for
even the most basic parameters such as discount rate β or depreciation rate
δ. There is also a severe lack of understanding and knowledge regarding the
micro-foundations of the economy. This is being partially addressed by the
surveys being conducted by the State Bank of Pakistan in the labour, product
and credit markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some
structural facts of the economy as well as the basic ‘stylized facts’ of economic
fluctuations’ in Pakistan. Because this is the first exercise of its kind, the
reader is warned that Section 2 is long. Readers wishing to skip details are
invited to proceed to Section 2.5 for a summary of the various stylized facts
we have uncovered. Section 3 presents our model. Section 4 presents the
calibration, the impulse response functions and evaluates the model’s ability
to capture the basic features of the data. The last section concludes.
1Exports and Imports are the exceptions as data for them is available at monthly fre-
quency
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3.2 Empirical Facts of Pakistani Economy
In this section I first present some structural facts on the Pakistani economy in
general and how the nature of the economy has shifted over the last 50 years.
After discussing the structure of the economy I pay attention to the long run
behaviour of macroeconomic variables of interest. In order to further explore
the link between different variables, I also undertake a thorough analysis us-
ing contemporaneous and dynamic correlations. Finally, I take a look at the
growth rate and HP filtered cyclical series of relevant variables to establish
some ‘stylized facts’ of short run economic fluctuations in Pakistan.
3.2.1 Some Basic Structural Facts
Pakistan has been an agrarian economy from the start of its existence. The
agriculture sector accounted for more than 1/2 of total output in 1950. How-
ever, over time the share of agriculture in total production has been steadily
declining and was a little more than 1/5 of the total Output in 2010.
On the other hand, Figure 1 shows that the decline in the share of agri-
culture in production has been accompanied by an increase in the share of the
services sector in total output. The share of the services sector in production
has increased to more than 1/2 of overall production in the economy and has
been for most part of the last few decades. Furthermore, the share of industry
in production has increased almost 3 fold since 1950. The industrial sector now
accounts for a little less than 3/10 of total output. However, the industrial
sector has stagnated over the last three decades.
Figure 1, points out that the nature of the Pakistani economy has shifted
from being agrarian to more service oriented. However, limiting attention
only to sectoral shares of output can be misleading for fully understanding the
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changing nature and evolution of the Pakistani economy.
Even though the contribution of the agriculture sector has declined signifi-
cantly on the production side, the lower two panels of Figure 1 point out that
in real terms the Pakistani economy is still very agrarian, as almost 1/2 of all
employed persons in the country are still working in the agriculture sector.
This is puzzling as there is a difference in the pattern of sectoral breakdown
of employment and production. It is true that the sectoral share of employed
persons has moved in the same direction as the sectoral share of output for
both the agriculture and services sector. On the other hand, the share of
employed persons working in the industrial sector has remained more or less
the same over the last few decades.
Table 1 shows that even though the sectoral share of agriculture has de-
clined for both output and employment, the decline in the share of output is
steeper than the decrease in the share of employed persons for the agriculture
sector.
This puzzle can be addressed in several ways. First, a possible increase in
labour productivity of the services and industry sector, the latter to a smaller
extent, as well as a possible productivity slowdown in the agriculture sector.
In other words, almost 1/2 of Pakistani labour force (employed persons in
agriculture) is currently producing around 1/5 of its output. Second, the
presence of a large informal sector, not part of our current analysis, can not
be ignored. The informal sector remains a big part of the agricultural sector
and available statistics undermine its dynamics and size.
3.2.2 Some Long-run Ratios
After looking at some structural facts of the economy, lets consider long run
behaviour of macroeconomic variables. In the business cycle literature, it is
131
the usual practice to look at the long run ratio of consumption to output,
investment to output ratio, government consumption to output as well as net
exports to output ratio before studying the short run fluctuations.
Aggregate Investment & Other Disaggregated Components of Ag-
gregate Investment
Lets first consider the long run behaviour of investment over the last few
decades. Investment is widely considered the main driver of long run growth
of any economy. In Figure 2A, we can see that investment to output ratio has
been moving between 0.10 to 0.22 over the last five decades. However, for the
period from 1981-2010 the ratio has fluctuated between a high of 0.21 in 2008
and a low of around 0.14 in 1999 and 2010 respectively. Another interesting
observation from the second panel of Figure 2A is that the volatility of the
investment to output ratio has become much more pronounced over the last
10-15 years.
Due to the previously mentioned importance of investment, the rest of the
panels of Figure 2A help us in taking a detailed look at different components
of aggregate investment in order to better understand the source of volatility
in the investment to output ratio. The rest of the graphs in Figure 2A are
presented as a share of given component of total investment in total invest-
ment (e.g share of private investment in total investment). This helps us in
clearly identifying the relevant patterns in different disaggregated components
of investment.
After breaking down aggregate investment into public and private invest-
ment we can see that the share of public investment in total investment has
been declining from mid to late 80’s until very recently. Furthermore, from
1990 onwards the share of private investment has overtaken the share of public
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investment and was more than twice the size of public investment (0.72 vs 0.28)
in 2010. This shift over the last 20 years or so can be a result of changes in the
financial sector due to financial sector reforms starting in late 80’s and early
90’s. Finally, this significant gap between the share of private and public sec-
tor investment seems to be stabilizing over the last few years. This bodes well
for the idea that Pakistani economy is moving towards a more market driven
economy with a relatively smaller role of government in domestic investment
and minimal interference in financial markets.
Another interesting observation from Figure 2A about the investment dy-
namics of Pakistan is the fact that starting from last decade the decline in
share of public investment in overall investment has been accompanied by the
increase in the share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in overall investment.
Not surprisingly, this surge in FDI in Pakistan is strongest for the most part
of the last decade (2001-2008) where there was a global boom in FDI in devel-
oping countries in general and South Asian countries in particular. However,
just like for other countries FDI inflows to Pakistan have dried up since the
great recession and financial crisis starting in 2008 The share of FDI in total
investment has declined by almost 50% in the last three years.
For Pakistan, the share of FDI in total investment reached a peak value
of 0.17 in 2007 before declining in the last few years. This further emphasizes
the importance of foreign investment in complementing domestic private in-
vestment of the country which in turn is mainly responsible for the economic
growth. In order to further evaluate this claim, I look closely at the link
between domestic and foreign investment in the next sub-section.
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Private Consumption, Government Consumption, Exports & Im-
ports
After investigating the long run behaviour of aggregate investment and its
various disaggregated components, I turn my attention to long run behaviour
of other macroeconomic variables. In the first two panels of Figure 2B, we
present the long run behaviour of private consumption in Pakistan. The ratio
of private consumption to output has fluctuated considerably between 0.68 and
0.84 during the period of 1960-2010. Hence, it is clear that private consumption
has always been the largest component of aggregate output for the Pakistani
economy.
However, it is important to note that the significant role of private con-
sumption from the data comes with a caveat. The data for private consump-
tion in Pakistan is not collected or gathered but instead private consumption
is computed as a residual from the income identity equation. Furthermore,
Malik (2011) using Pakistani data recently found that private consumption
data from national accounts is significantly different from the consumption
data gathered from household surveys.
The long run ratio of private consumption to output is volatile and it shows
some cyclical behaviour. Over the period of 1981-2010, the share of private
consumption in output declined initially reaching the lowest value of 0.68 in
1991. However, since reaching the lowest value of 0.68 the share has had an
increasing trend with a value of 0.82 in 2010.
After analysing the long-run behaviour of private consumption next up is
the long-run behaviour of government consumption. The ratio of government
consumption to output also exhibits significant volatility with values ranging
between 0.08 to 0.17. In particular, the last decade shows a number of episodes
of upward and downward movement in the ratio of government consumption to
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output. The share of government consumption in output also exhibits cyclical
patterns rather than a stable long run value.
Moving on to trade related variables of exports and imports, I consider
their long run behaviour over the last five decades. In Figure 2B, there is a
significant jump upwards in both exports to output and imports to output
ratio in early to mid 70’s. The value of exports to output ratio almost doubled
between 1972 and 1973, similarly the value of imports to output ratio also
increased significantly between 1972 and 1973. Over the last three decades
(1981-2010), the share of exports in output has fluctuated between 0.10 and
0.17. On the other hand, imports to output ratio has been between 0.14 and
0.24.
The behaviour of exports to output and imports to output ratio over the
last three decades is in line with other evidence suggesting that Pakistan over
the last 30 years has started behaving more and more like a small open econ-
omy. This is further supported by the fact that more than 1/3 of output was
due to trade (exports + imports) on average over the period from 1981-2010.
Before moving on to other empirical evidence, it is important to establish
the linkages between different macroeconomic variables and business cycle
features. Let’s revisit the claim made earlier that the economy has started
behaving differently over the last three decades as opposed to the earlier period.
Looking at Table 2, the differences in magnitude of these long run ratios
as measured by mean, median, and volatility as measured by coefficient of
variation, and another measure of volatility (std.dev/median) are obvious.
These differences are less pronounced for the magnitude of some long run
ratios. The absolute value of different long run ratios are similar for the
two periods of 1960-1980 and 1981-2010 except for the trade related ratios
of exports to output and imports to output. The value of both trade variables
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has increased significantly as a share of overall output. For the exports to
output ratio the average value was 0.09 for the earlier period and 0.14 for the
latter period. Similarly, the imports to output ratio on average was 0.15 for the
period spanning 1960-1980 and the average was 0.20 for the period between
1981-2010. On the other hand, the average of private consumption to output
ratio has decreased slightly from 0.79 to 0.75 and investment to output ratio
has increased from 0.15 to 0.17 respectively. Finally, the value of government
consumption to output on average has remained almost same throughout the
last five decades at around 0.11.
The main findings from Table 2 are the significant changes in volatility
measure of coefficient of variation between the two periods for almost all of
the variables. There is a significant decrease in the volatility of both exports
to output ratio and imports to output ratio from the period of 1960-1980 to
the period of 1981-2010. The coefficient of variation for both investment to
output ratio and FDI to output ratio have also reduced significantly for the
latter period as compared to the former period. Interestingly, government
consumption to output ratio is the only long run ratio with a significantly in-
creased volatility during the 1981-2010 period as oppose to the earlier period
of 1960-1980. The volatility of private consumption to output ratio as mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation is very similar for the two periods being
compared. However, as mentioned before, any analysis involving private con-
sumption should be interpreted cautiously due to the residual nature of the
private consumption data.
After the brief comparison of the two periods of 1960-1980 and 1981-2010
based on the magnitude and volatility of long run ratios and our previous
findings about the structure of the economy, I will focus on the period from
1981-2010 for the rest of the empirical analysis.
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3.2.3 Correlations & Dynamic Correlations
In order to better understand the relationship between different macroeco-
nomic variables, I look at contemporaneous correlations and dynamic correla-
tions in this section. In particular, I want to empirically establish the linkages
between output and aggregate investment, FDI, private consumption, govern-
ment consumption, exports and imports. This exercise will help identify the
macroeconomic variables to focus on in order to develop a better understanding
of the economy and to develop a relevant model of business cycle fluctuations
of Pakistan. For this part of the paper, I consider both the growth rate and
HP filtered data for the period of 1981-2010 and decade by decade as well.
Growth Rate
Aggregate Investment & Other Disaggregated Components of Ag-
gregate Investment
First of all, I look at investment related variables as investment and private
consumption are both significantly correlated with output according to Table
3B & Table 4B for both growth rate and HP filtered series.
Table 3A describes the linkages between the growth rate of different dis-
aggregated component of aggregate investment such as private investment, all
public investment2, public investment, government investment, private domes-
tic investment and foreign direct investment and growth rate of output.
Over the period of 1982-2010, the growth rate of aggregate investment,
all public investment, public investment, government investment and foreign
direct investment are all significantly positively related with output growth.
The Table also shows that the growth rate of aggregate investment is most
2It is the sum of public and government investment. The former comprises of investments
by public sector enterprises and the latter refers to investments by federal and provincial
governments in different projects
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significantly correlated with growth of private investment, which in turn is
strongly correlated with the growth of private domestic investment.
However, looking at the data by decade, I see different results for different
decades. The relationship between the growth rate of aggregate investment
and the growth rate of different disaggregated components of aggregate in-
vestment is significantly different for the period of 1982-1990 compared to the
last two decades. During most of the 80’s, Pakistan was under military rule
and public and government investment was the main driver of aggregate invest-
ment. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, private investment
has become the major driving force behind aggregate investment in Pakistan.
This is supported by Table 3A, where correlations for the growth rate of in-
vestment and the growth rate of output as well as between the growth rate of
private investment and the growth rate of output are significantly positive for
the last decade.
Another important result from Table 3A is that the growth in foreign direct
investment has become important over time, in particular over the last decade,
in explaining the growth of aggregate investment as well as the output. The
contemporaneous correlation of FDI with output has increased from 0.07 in the
80’s to 0.49 in the last decade. This increased significance of foreign investment
is further supported by correlation of 0.82 between aggregate investment and
FDI during the last decade.
After the analysis based on contemporaneous correlations, we also look at
dynamic correlations in order to better understand the lead lag relationship
between different variables. This exercise should be ideally done at a quarterly
or monthly frequency but due to unavailability of relevant macroeconomic se-
ries at an appropriate frequency, we consider the relevant dynamic correlations
at an annual frequency.
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The dynamic correlations of different aggregate and disaggregated macro
variables with output are presented in Figure 3 & Figure 4. Figure 3 presents
the correlations for both growth rate as well as detrended series of output with
different components of investment. Data is annual from 1982 to 2010, and
the Figure plots the correlation between real GDP, Yt and It+j against j, where
I represents a disaggregated component of aggregate investment. In order to
establish the changing nature of the economy, each panel also has the relevant
dynamic correlation by the decade as well.
In Figure 3, the first panel is showing the dynamic correlation for the
growth rate of real GDP with real investment. The growth rate of aggregate
real investment is significantly positively correlated with the growth rate of
output at the first lead for the covered period of 1982-2010. However, it is
interesting to note that the dynamic correlations differ considerably between
the last two decades and the 80’s. This is generally true for the dynamic cor-
relation behaviour of most disaggregated components of aggregate investment
with output. During the last decade, the growth rate of aggregate investment
is positively correlated with growth rate of output for the first lag as well as for
both leads. Therefore, the relationship between aggregate investment and out-
put has been changing over the last decade and the importance of investment
for the economy has been highlighted once more.
The behaviour of the growth rate of private investment as measured in
terms of its dynamic correlation with the growth rate of output is almost iden-
tical to the behaviour of aggregate investment as shown in Figure 3. Only for
the last decade, the growth rate of private investment is positively correlated
with the growth rate of output at first lag and both leads. On the other hand,
for 90’s growth rate of private investment is clearly lagging output growth.
The growth rate of all public investment is positively correlated with output
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growth for the first and the last decade at the first lead, as well as for the
whole period of 30 years. Therefore, growth in all public investment usually
lagged behind the growth in output during our period of interest. However,
for the 1982-1990 period growth in all public investment was both a leading
and lagging indicator of growth in output.
The growth rate of public investment is positively correlated with output
growth for all the decades at the first lead as well as for the whole period of
30 years. Therefore, growth in all public investment usually lagged behind the
growth in output during our period of interest.
Turning to government investment, we can see that the growth rate of
government investment is positively correlated with the growth rate of output
for all three decades for the first lag. However, for the last decade the positive
correlation with output is stronger for the first lead as well. Therefore, growth
in government investment was a leading indicator for the growth of output for
the period of 1982-1990. For the period of 2001-2010 growth in government
investment was both a leading and lagging indicator for growth in output. For
the majority of both decades, Pakistan was under military rule and once again
I find evidence supporting the active role of government investment during
military regimes.
After looking at the behaviour of growth rates of private and public sector
investment, we decided to take a closer look at the role of domestic and foreign
contribution to growth of private investment. The evidence presented earlier
points towards increasing importance of foreign investment. Therefore, in
order to disentangle the importance of domestic and foreign investment in the
economy we also look at the dynamic correlations of growth in private domestic
investment and foreign direct investment with growth in output respectively.
The growth rate of private domestic investment is not positively correlated
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with growth rate of output for the whole period as well as for the first two
decade for first lag and first lead. However, for both decades growth in private
domestic investment is positively correlated with growth in output for both
second lag and second lead. For the last decade, growth of private domestic
investment is positively correlated with output growth at both leads and lags.
This points toward increasing importance of private domestic investment for
economic growth of Pakistan. However, it is important to note that growth in
private domestic investment is more likely to follow growth in output rather
than leading to output growth.
Finally, the growth rate of foreign direct investment is positively correlated
with the growth rate of output at the first lead for all three decades as well as
for the complete period from 1982 to 2010. So, for all three decades growth in
output is usually followed by a growth in FDI. However, from 2001 onwards
growth in FDI is also positively correlated with output growth at the first
lag. This implies that growth in FDI is both a leading and lagging indicator
of growth in output for the last decade. Therefore, our emphasis on foreign
direct investment in driving Pakistani economy in particular during the last
decade is further corroborated by dynamic correlations presented in Figure 3.
Private Consumption, Government Consumption, Exports & Im-
ports
Table 3B describes the linkages between the growth rate of remaining dis-
aggregated components of output such as private consumption, government
consumptions, exports and imports with the growth rate of output.
Over the period of 1982-2010, the growth rate of private consumption,
government consumption, exports and imports are all positively correlated
with the growth rate of output. The Table also shows that growth rate of
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private consumption is most significantly related with growth rate of output
same as the growth rate of aggregate investment. Interestingly, growth of
both private and government consumption is positively correlated with the
growth rate of imports. However, government consumption is also significantly
positively correlated with both aggregate investment and FDI. The growth in
exports is not significantly positively correlated with any of the disaggregated
components of output for the given period. Finally, as mentioned before,
the growth rate of imports is correlated with the growth rate of aggregate
investment, private consumption and government consumption.
However, looking at the data by decades we see different results for differ-
ent decades. The relationship of output and different components of output is
significantly different for the period of 1982-1990 compared to the other two
decades. For this period none of the components of the output are signifi-
cantly correlated with output. The growth rate of private consumption has
the strongest correlation of 0.46 with growth of output. However, for this
period growth of exports is significantly negatively correlated with growth of
FDI & private consumption. Finally, the growth rate of imports is positively
correlated with private consumption growth for this period.
During the 90’s the growth rate of private consumption and exports are
both significantly positively correlated with output growth. The growth rate
of private consumption has a contemporaneous correlation of 0.67 with growth
of output and growth of exports has a correlation of 0.68 with output growth.
Government consumption is positively correlated with output as well as all
other components of output other than the aggregate investment. However,
the correlation of growth in government consumption is strongest with the
growth rate of FDI. Both exports and imports are positively correlated with
output as well as some components of output such as private consumption
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and government consumption. Imports, in particular, have strong positive
correlation with aggregate investment as well as statistically significant positive
correlation with both private and government consumption.
The last decade is the most interesting one in the sense that output is not
only positively correlated with aggregate investment as mentioned before but
also with all the disaggregated components of output. This positive correlation
of output with different components of output imply that the growth experience
of Pakistan in the last decade was not driven only by investment or trade, but
the combination of all different components of output. The most interesting
finding for this period is the significant positive correlation of imports with
investment, FDI and government consumption. This finding combined with the
importance of FDI in driving investment and output as discussed previously
once again points towards the importance of external shocks for the Pakistani
economy.
The dynamic correlations of growth rate of different components of output
with growth rate of output are presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4 presents the dynamic correlations for both growth rate as well as
detrended series of output with different components of output. Data is annual
from 1982 to 2010, and the Figure plots the correlation between real GDP, Yt
and PCt+j, GCt+j, EXPt+j, IMPt+j against j, where PC, GC, EXP and
IMP are private consumption, government consumption, exports and imports
respectively.
In order to establish the changing nature of the economy, each panel also
has the relevant dynamic correlation by the decade as well.
In Figure 4, the first panel is showing the dynamic correlation for growth
rate of real GDP with growth rate of private consumption. The growth rate
of private consumption has almost no or negative correlation with the growth
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rate of output for the period from 1982-2010. However, it is interesting to
note that the dynamic correlations differ considerably between the last two
decades and the decade from 1982-1990. This is generally true for the dynamic
correlation behaviour of all components of output with output. During the last
two decades, the growth rate of private consumption is positively correlated
with the growth rate of output for the first lead. Therefore, the relationship
between private consumption and output has been changing over the last two
decades compared to the 80’s.
The growth rate of government consumption is positively correlated with
the growth rate of output for the first lead. For all periods, the growth rate of
government consumption and growth rate of output is negatively correlated for
both lags. Therefore, we can say that growth in output was generally followed
by growth in government consumption.
Now turning to trade variables, we first look at the behaviour of exports.
For the period of 1982-2010, growth in exports appears to be a leading indicator
of output growth. Looking closely at the link between exports and output by
decade paints a complicated picture. During the 80’s, the growth rate of
exports is negatively correlated with the growth rate of output at the first lag
and positively correlated at the first lead. This implies that growth in exports
followed growth in output during the period from 1982-1990. On the other
hand, for the last two decades we find the exact opposite of what happened
during the 80’s. During last two decades, growth in exports was positively
correlated with growth in output at the first lag and negatively correlated
for both leads. This implies that growth in exports was followed by growth
in output for the last two decades. In other words, an increase in growth of
exports led to growth in output during this period. It is important to also point
out that this leading behaviour of growth in exports is much more pronounced
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for the last decade. This further lends supports to the importance of external
shocks for recent performance of Pakistani economy.
Finally, the growth in imports has mainly been a result of growth in output.
For the period of 1982-2010, growth in imports has been positively correlated
with growth in output at first lead and negatively correlated at first lag. The
same behaviour is observed for the 90’s. However, during the last decade
growth in imports is positively correlated with growth in output for both the
first lead and first lag. However, the correlation between output growth and
imports growth is much stronger for the first lead compared to the first lag.
Therefore, growth in imports usually lagged output growth for the period of
our analysis.
HP Filtered Data
Aggregate Investment & Other Disaggregated Components of Ag-
gregate Investment
For the de-trended data, I first look at the investment related variables, as in-
vestment and private consumption are both significantly correlated with out-
put according to Table 3B & Table 4B for both growth rate and HP filtered
series.
In order to de-trend different macroeconomic series, we use HP filter with
λ = 100, which is the value normally used in the literature for annual data.
The Table 4A describes the linkages between de-trended private invest-
ment, de-trended all public investment, de-trended public investment, de-
trended government investment, de-trended private domestic investment, de-
trended foreign direct investment and de-trended output.
Over the period of 1981-2010, aggregate investment, private investment,
all public investment , public investment, government investment and foreign
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direct investment are all significantly positively correlated with output.
The Table 4A also shows that aggregate investment is significantly posi-
tively correlated with all the disaggregate components of aggregate investment.
However, it is most strongly positively correlated with private investment. In-
terestingly, private investment is strongly positively correlated with private
domestic investment, government investment and FDI.
However, looking at the data by decades we see different results for different
decades. The relationship of investment with its disaggregated components is
different for the three periods of 1981-1990, 1991-2000 & 2001-2010. This once
again points towards the continuously evolving nature of economic fluctuations
in Pakistan over the last few decades.
However, since the early 1990’s private investment has become the major
driving force behind aggregate investment in Pakistan. This is further sup-
ported by Table 4A, where correlations are significantly positive for each of the
last two decades for de-trended aggregate investment and de-trended output
as well as between de-trended private investment and de-trended output for
the last decade.
Looking at the period of 1981-1990, we find some strange observations,
such as strong negative correlation between private investment and output
as well as between private domestic investment and output. During this pe-
riod, aggregate investment was significantly positively correlated with both
all public investment and public investment. Also, de-trended government
investment was strongly negatively correlated with both private and private
domestic investment. This behaviour of aggregate investment and its different
components is in line with our earlier explanations regarding military rule and
nationalization of investment during this period.
During the last two decades, we find more typical behaviour of aggregate
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investment and its disaggregated components. For both decades, de-trended
output is positively correlated with aggregate investment as well as with all
public investment, public investment, government investment and foreign di-
rect investment.
In addition, for the last decade de-trended output is significantly positively
correlated with aggregate investment, private investment, private domestic in-
vestment and foreign direct investment. The significant relationship between
private investment and aggregate investment is also supported by the correla-
tions reported in Table 4A for the last decade. Finally, the strong link between
private investment and aggregate investment as well as output is due to both
the domestic3 component of private investment as well as the foreign4 one.
Another important result from Table 4A is that foreign direct investment
has steadily gained importance over time in explaining short-run fluctuations
of aggregate investment as well as the output in particular over the last two
decades. The contemporaneous correlation of FDI with output has increased
significantly from 0.07 in the 80’s to 0.73 for the last two decades. This in-
creased significance of foreign investment is further supported by the correla-
tion coefficient of 0.92 between aggregate investment and FDI during the last
decade.
After the analysis based on contemporaneous correlations, we turn our at-
tention to dynamic correlations in order to better understand the lead lag
relationship between different de-trended variables of interest. This exercise
should be ideally done at a quarterly or monthly frequency, but due to un-
availability of relevant macroeconomic series at appropriate frequency, we look
at dynamic correlations at an annual frequency.
The dynamic correlations of different de-trended aggregate and disaggre-
3private domestic investment
4foreign direct investment
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gated macro variables with de-trended output are presented in Figure 3 &
Figure 4. Figure 3 presents the dynamic correlations for both growth rate as
well as HP filtered series of output with growth rate and HP filtered series of
different disaggregated components of investment. The data is annual from
1981 to 2010, and the Figure plots the correlation between either the growth
rate of real GDP or the de-trended real GDP, Yt and It+j against j, where I rep-
resents either growth rate of different disaggregated component of aggregate
investment or de-trended disaggregated component of aggregate investment.
In order to further evaluate the changing nature of the economy, each panel
also has the relevant dynamic correlations by the decade as well.
In Figure 3, the second panel is showing the dynamic correlation for HP
filtered real GDP with HP filtered real aggregate investment. The de-trended
aggregate investment is positively correlated with de-trended output for both
lags and both leads for the covered period of 1981-2010. However, it is inter-
esting to note that the dynamic correlations differ from one decade to another.
During the last decade, de-trended aggregate investment is positively corre-
lated with de-trended output for the first lag as well as for both leads.
The behaviour of de-trended private investment as measured in terms of
its dynamic correlation with de-trended output is similar to the behaviour of
de-trended aggregate investment as shown in Figure 3. For the last decade,
de-trended private investment is significantly positively correlated with the de-
trended output at both first lag and fist lead. For the earlier two decades, it is
clear that de-trended private investment was a lagging indicator of de-trended
output. However, for the last decade de-trended private investment seems to
be both leading and lagging the de-trended output.
The de-trended all public investment is positively correlated with de-trended
output for the last two decades at the first lead as well as for the whole period of
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30 years. Therefore, de-trended all public investment usually lags de-trended
output for the period from 1981-2010. However, only for the 80’s, de-trended
all public investment is a leading indicator of de-trended output.
On the other hand, de-trended public investment is positively correlated
with de-trended output for the whole period of 30 years as well as for all
three decades at the first lead. Therefore, de-trended public investment lags
de-trended output during the time period covered in our analysis..
In Figure 3, we can see that de-trended government investment is pos-
itively correlated with de-trended output at the first lag for the first two
decades as well as for the whole period from 1981-2010. Furthermore, for
both 80’s and 90’s de-trended government investment is negatively correlated
with de-trended output for both leads. However, during the last decade de-
trended government investment is positively correlated with de-trended output
for both leads and negatively correlated for both lags. Therefore, de-trended
government investment was a leading indicator of de-trended output for the
first two decades and a lagging indicator for the last decade.
The evidence presented so far in this section has repeatedly pointed to-
wards the importance of private investment in explaining economic behaviour
of Pakistan over the last few decades. Therefore, in order to disentangle the
importance of domestic and foreign component of private investment for short-
run economic fluctuations we look at the dynamic correlations of de-trended
private domestic investment and de-trended foreign direct investment with
de-trended output respectively.
The de-trended private domestic investment is positively correlated with
de-trended output for the whole period as well as for 80’s and the last decade
for the first lead. However, it is also positively correlated with output at the
first lag for the last decade and at both lags for the whole period of 1981-2010.
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This point towards increasing importance of fluctuations in private domestic
investment for the fluctuations in output.
Finally, de-trended foreign direct investment is positively correlated with
de-trended output at the first lead for the all three decades as well as for
the complete period from 1981 to 2010. However, more importantly for the
whole period as well as the last decade fluctuations in FDI is strongly positively
correlated with fluctuations in output at the first lag as well. This implies that
fluctuations in FDI not only follow fluctuations in output but can also lead to
fluctuations in the output. Therefore, the role of foreign direct investment in
driving Pakistani economy during the last decade as well as for the complete
period of our analysis is important for de-trended variables as well.
The short run fluctuations in output are driven by short-run fluctuations
in aggregate and private investment. Furthermore, the short run fluctuations
in FDI and private domestic investment are strongly correlated with short run
fluctuations of output specially for the last decade.
Private Consumption, Government Consumption, Exports & Im-
ports
After detailed discussion of contemporaneous correlations and dynamic corre-
lations of de-trended aggregate investment and de-trended output as well as
de-trended components of aggregate investment with de-trended output, lets
turn our attention to other macroeconomic variables such as private consump-
tion, government consumption, exports and imports.
The Table 4B describes the linkages between different de-trended com-
ponents of output such as de-trended private consumption, de-trended gov-
ernment consumptions, de-trended exports and de-trended imports with de-
trended output.
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Over the period of 1981-2010, de-trended private consumption, de-trended
government consumption, de-trended exports and de-trended imports are all
strongly positively correlated with the de-trended output. The Table also
shows that de-trended imports is most strongly positively correlated with de-
trended output. Interestingly, both de-trended private consumption and de-
trended government consumption are positively correlated with de-trended
imports. However, government consumption is also significantly positively
correlated with both aggregate investment and FDI. The de-trended exports
is only significantly positively correlated with de-trended output. Finally, de-
trended imports are positively correlated with all other de-trended components
of output except for de-trended exports.
However, looking at the data by decades we see different results for different
decades.
The relationship of de-trended output and different de-trended components
of output is significantly different for the period of 1981-1990 compared to the
other two decades. For this period only, de-trended government consump-
tion is significantly positively correlated with the de-trended output. The de-
trended aggregate investment is strongly negatively correlated with de-trended
private consumption and positively correlated with de-trended exports. How-
ever, for this period de-trended exports is significantly negatively correlated
with de-trended private consumption. Finally, de-trended imports is positively
correlated with de-trended private consumption for this period.
During the 1990’s, all different de-trended components of output are strongly
positively correlated with de-trended output. The de-trended private con-
sumption has a contemporaneous correlation of 0.85 with de-trended output.
The de-trended private consumption itself is positively correlated with de-
trended aggregate investment with a correlation coefficient of 0.56. The de-
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trended government consumption is significantly positively correlated with de-
trended FDI, de-trended exports and de-trended imports. However, the cor-
relation of de-trended government consumption is strongest with de-trended
FDI. Both de-trended exports and de-trended imports are positively correlated
with de-trended output as well as all other de-trended components of output.
During the period of 2001-2010, de-trended output is positively correlated
with all de-trended components of output and with significant correlations
with de-trended aggregate investment, de-trended FDI and de-trended im-
ports. These significant correlations of de-trended output with different de-
trended components of output implies that short-run economic fluctuations in
the last decade was not driven only by investment or consumption or trade
but it was a combination of all.
The most interesting finding for this period is the significant positive corre-
lation of de-trended imports with de-trended aggregate investment, de-trended
FDI & de-trended government consumption. These findings combined with
the importance of de-trended FDI in driving de-trended output as discussed
previously once again emphasizes the importance of external shocks for the
short-run economic fluctuations in Pakistan.
The dynamic correlations of different de-trended components of output
with de-trended output are presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4 presents the correlations for both the growth rate as well as de-
trended series of output with different components of output. The data is
annual from 1981 to 2010, and the figure plots the correlation between real
GDP, Yt and PCt+j, GCt+j, EXPt+j, IMPt+j against j, where PC, GC, EXP
and IMP are private consumption, government consumption, exports and im-
ports respectively.
In order to establish the changing nature of the economy, each panel also
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has the relevant dynamic correlation by decade as well.
In Figure 4, the second panel is showing the dynamic correlation of de-
trended output with de-trended private consumption. The de-trended private
consumption is positively correlated with de-trended output for the period
from 1981-2010 for both leads as well as for the first lag. However, it is
interesting to note that dynamic correlations differ considerably decade by
decade.
During the 80’s, de-trended private consumption is negatively correlated
with de-trended output for both lags and the first lead. This implies that for
the period of 1981-1990 de-trended private consumption is neither a leading
nor a lagging factor for the de-trended output.
For the last decade, de-trended private consumption is positively correlated
with de-trended output at both first lag and first lead as well. This means
that fluctuations in private consumption are both impacted by fluctuations
in output as well as impacting output fluctuations. The positive correlation
between de-trended private consumption and de-trended output is stronger for
the first lag as compared to the first lead for the last decade.
Therefore, the relationship between private consumption and output has
been evolving over time and the increased importance of private consumption
for the economy has been highlighted by this simple analysis.
The de-trended government consumption is positively correlated with de-
trended output for the first lead for all three decades as well as for the whole
period of 1981-2010. In addition, for all three decades de-trended government
consumption and de-trended output is negatively correlated for both lags. For
the complete period of analysis, there is a positive correlation between de-
trended government consumption and de-trended output at the first lag as
well. However, the positive correlation is stronger between de-trended govern-
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ment consumption and de-trended output for the first lead even for the whole
period. Therefore, de-trended government consumption is clearly a lagging
indicator for de-trended output for the three decades considered in our anal-
ysis. However, it can be both leading and lagging indicator for the period of
1981-2010.
Now turning to trade related variables, we first look at the behaviour of
exports. For the period of 1981-2010, there is only slight positive correlation
between de-trended exports and de-trended output for the first lead but a
strong positive correlation for both lags. Therefore, de-trended exports are
clearly a leading indicator of de-trended output for the period of 1981-2010.
However, looking at dynamic correlations of de-trended exports and de-
trended output decade by decade paints a different picture. During the 80’s &
90’s de-trended exports has almost no correlation with de-trended output at
first lag and positively correlated at the first lead. This implies that fluctua-
tions in exports followed fluctuations in output during the first two decades.
On the other hand, for the last decade we find the exact opposite of what
happened during the first two decades. In the period from 2001-2010, de-
trended exports is significantly positively correlated with de-trended output
at both lags and negatively correlated for both leads. This implies that fluc-
tuations in exports were followed by fluctuations in output. In other words,
an increase in de-trended exports led to an increase in de-trended output
during this period. Therefore, de-trended exports was a leading indicator of
de-trended output for the last decade. This further lends support to the im-
portance of external factors for economic fluctuations in Pakistan.
Finally, fluctuations in de-trended imports has mainly been a result of
fluctuations in de-trended output. For the period of 1981-2010, de-trended
imports has been positively correlated with de-trended output for both lags
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and both leads. However, the behaviour of de-trended imports and de-trended
output is markedly different for all three decades. For the 80’s, there seems
to be no relationship between the two variables neither at lags nor at leads.
In the second decade of interest, de-trended imports are a lagging indicator
of de-trended output. Finally, during the last decade de-trended imports was
positively correlated with de-trended output at both first lead and first lag.
However, the positive correlation between de-trended output and de-trended
imports is much stronger for the first lead compared to the first lag. Therefore,
even for the last decade we can’t claim de-trended imports to be a leading
variable for de-trended output. At best, de-trended imports are both a lagging
and leading indicator of de-trended output for the last decade.
The empirical results discussed in this section once again highlight the
importance of external factors such as fluctuations in exports as a leading cause
or indicator of fluctuations in aggregate output for a small open economy like
Pakistan. In particular, as pointed out earlier all of these results are found to
be much more stronger for the period starting from 1990’s and much stronger
for the last decade.
3.2.4 Not So ‘Stylized Facts’ of Pakistani Business Cy-
cles
After a detailed discussion of different structural and empirical facts of Pak-
istani economy over the period of 1981-2010, now I can finally introduce and
discuss the so called stylized facts of the Pakistani business cycles for our main
period of interest as well as for each of the three decades that we have analysed
throughout the empirical section. The business cycles are usually character-
ized by volatility, relative volatility, co-movement and persistence of
different macroeconomic variables of a given economy. Before continuing with
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my analysis, it is important to mention that for a developing economy like Pak-
istan ‘stylized facts’ are not very well known and there is no clear consensus
on what are actually the ‘stylized facts’ of the economy. Data inconsisten-
cies are one of reasons for this lack of consensus as well as the continuously
changing nature of economic fluctuations in Pakistan. Therefore, in this sec-
tion I present my not so ‘stylized facts’ for the business cycles of Pakistan for
both growth rate and de-trended series of the relevant macroeconomic series.
Furthermore, I only discuss the ‘stylized facts’ for the last 30 years and the
relevant statistics for each decade are reported in Table 5 in the Appendix A.
Growth Rate
The relevant second moments for the growth rate of real output, real aggre-
gate investment, real private consumption, real government consumption, real
exports, real imports and real FDI are reported in Table 5 of the Appendix A.
The business cycles are usually characterized by volatility, relative volatility,
co-movement and persistence of different macroeconomic variables of a given
economy. Therefore, I look closely at each of these group of moments closely
for the Pakistani economy for the period of 1982-2010.
The growth rate of real output is more volatile then most of the developed
economies5. The magnitude of volatility of the growth rate of real output is
very similar for the whole period of 30 years as well as for the last decade.
However, rather than discussing the absolute volatility of different macroeco-
nomic variables. It is useful to consider the relative volatility with respect to
real output of these variables. As usual, the measure of absolute and relative
volatility are standard deviations of the time series of a given variable and the
ratio of the standard deviation of a given variable to standard deviation of
5Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
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output.
Interestingly, the growth rate of all the relevant macroeconomic variables
such as aggregate investment, FDI, private consumption, government con-
sumption, exports and imports are all more volatile than the growth rate
of output. The growth rate of real aggregate investment is about 4 times as
volatile as the growth rate of real output. Private consumption is least volatile
among all other components of output. The growth rate of private consump-
tion is one and half time as volatile as growth rate of output. On the other
hand, government consumption is the most volatile variable other than FDI.
The growth rate of government consumption is almost 7 times as volatile as
output. The trade variables are also more volatile than real output. As the
growth rate of exports is more than 4 times as volatile as growth rate of output
and the growth rate of imports is more than 5 times as volatile as output. Fi-
nally, foreign direct investment is the most volatile variable relative to output.
The relative volatility of growth rate of FDI to growth rate of output is 25.
After discussing relative volatility of different macroeconomic variables rel-
ative to output for the last 30 years, I consider the same dispersion measures
for the last decade. The nature of economic fluctuations in Pakistan has been
continuously evolving. Therefore, it is important to be aware of what has hap-
pened over time in the economy as well as to focus on the main changes that
have taken shape over the last few years. The relative volatility of aggregate
investment with respect to output has increased over the last decade. Govern-
ment consumption is still the most volatile component of output, but now the
magnitude is even higher from before. However, relative volatility of private
consumption, exports and FDI have declined over the last decade. Finally,
relative volatility of imports has been increasing over the last decade.
After volatility, we turn our attention to co-movement between the growth
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rate of output and the growth rate of other macroeconomic variables. Dur-
ing the period of 1982-2010, the growth rate of aggregate investment, private
consumption, government consumption, exports, imports and FDI all are sig-
nificantly positively correlated with growth rate of output. This pro-cyclical
behaviour of variables is strongest for aggregate investment, private consump-
tion and imports respectively. Finally, for the last decade the correlation of
growth rate of output is strongest with growth rate of aggregate investment,
growth rate of private consumption and growth rate of FDI. This is in line
with evidence presented thus far for the importance of aggregate investment
in general and foreign direct investment in particular for explaining economic
fluctuations of Pakistani economy for the last few decades.
Finally, we consider the persistence of various macro variables of interest
over the period from 1982-2010 as well as for each of the three decades. Output
and aggregate investment are the only variables that display persistence for
the whole period. On the other hand, for the last decade persistence of both
growth rate of output and growth rate of aggregate investment has increased
as well as growth rate of FDI being persistent as well. This lack of persistence
in most of the macro variables is further proof of changing nature of economic
fluctuations in Pakistan. However, the autocorrelation coefficients for the last
decade point towards increase in persistence level for most of the variables.
HP Filtered Data
The second order moments for de-trended output, aggregate investment, pri-
vate consumption, government consumption, exports, imports and FDI are
reported in Table 6 of the Appendix A. The business cycles are usually char-
acterized by volatility, relative volatility, co-movement and persistence of dif-
ferent de-trended macroeconomic variables of a given economy. Therefore, I
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investigate these second order moments closely for the Pakistani economy for
the period of 1981-2010 in order to get a better understanding of Pakistani
business cycles over the last three decades.
The de-trended output for Pakistan over the last 30 years is more volatile
then most developed economies6. The magnitude of volatility of de-trended
real output is very similar for the whole period of 30 years as well as for
the last two decades. However, rather than discussing the absolute volatility
of different macroeconomic variables for all the periods, we will focus our
attention on relative volatility with respect to real output of these variables.
The relative volatility is measured as a ratio of the standard deviation of
a given de-trended macroeconomic variable to the standard deviation of de-
trended output.
For the period of 1981-2010, all the de-trended macroeconomic variables
are more volatile than de-trended output. The de-trended aggregate invest-
ment is about four and half times as volatile as de-trended real output. Private
consumption is clearly the least volatile among all other components of output.
Private consumption is less than one and half time as volatile as output. On
the other hand, government consumption is the second most volatile variable
after FDI. The de-trended government consumption and de-trended imports
are around 5 times as volatile as de-trended output. The de-trended exports
is around three and a half times as volatile as output. Finally, foreign di-
rect investment is the most volatile variable relative to output. The relative
volatility of FDI to output is 17.6.
The nature of short term economic fluctuations in Pakistan has been con-
tinuously evolving. Therefore, one should be aware of what has happened over
time in the economy as well as focus on the main features of the last few years
6Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
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to come up with an appropriate business cycles model. During the period
2001-2010, relative volatility of aggregate investment, government consump-
tion, imports and FDI is higher from the magnitudes of relative volatilities of
these variables for the whole period. On the other hand, relative volatility of
private consumption and exports with respect to output has been consistently
declining over time and reaching their lowest values in the last decade. This
decline in relative volatility indicates possible similarities between Pakistani
business cycles as well as business cycles of developed economies in recent
times. In particular, the decline in relative volatility of private consumption
with respect to output can be a sign that the Pakistani economy is moving to-
wards behaving like a developed economy as far as the second order moments
are concerned.
The co-movement of de-trended output with de-trended macro variables
helps us in classifying them as pro-cyclical, a-cyclical or counter-cyclical vari-
ables with respect to output. During 1981-2010, de-trended aggregate invest-
ment, private consumption, government consumption, exports, imports and
FDI all are significantly positively correlated with de-trended output. This
strong pro-cyclical behaviour is strongest for imports, aggregate investment,
and FDI. The de-trended private consumption, government consumption and
exports are also but to a lesser degree significantly positively correlated with
output.
This trend still holds for the last decade. All the de-trended variables
including private consumption, government consumption and exports are pos-
itively correlated with de-trended output. However, de-trended aggregate in-
vestment is clearly most significantly positively correlated with de-trended
output. The de-trended imports and de-trended FDI are the other two sig-
nificantly pro-cyclical variables. The behaviour of different de-trended macro
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variables over the last three decades in general and for the last few years in
particular consistently highlight the importance of aggregate investment and
imports in explaining fluctuations in output for Pakistani economy over the
last few decades and possibly in the future.
Finally, we consider the persistence of relevant de-trended macro variables
for the period 1981-2010 as well as by decade. All the de-trended variables
exhibit some persistence. However, output, aggregate investment, FDI and im-
ports are the most persistent out of all the variables. The persistence level has
stayed the same for output and aggregate investment and has been increasing
for some of the other de-trended variables. In particular, the autocorrelation
of exports and FDI has both increased for the last decade.
3.2.5 Summary of Stylized Facts by Category
In order to focus on the main empirical findings for Pakistan over the last few
decades. Lets recall the main points of this section:
Structural facts and long-run ratios (1960-2010)
• Pakistan has always been an agrarian economy, from its independence
till now even after more than 60 years.
• The nature of production has shifted away from agriculture to mainly
services and industry.
• However, employment shares still indicate that the agriculture sector still
maintains a lion share of the real economy
• The long run ratios of the economy such as investment to output, private
consumption to output, government consumption to output, exports to
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output and imports to output all display volatility over time instead of
having a stable trend.
• The volatility of the investment to output ratio has become more pro-
nounced over the last two decades.
• Looking further into disaggregated components of investment, I find that
share of private investment in aggregate investment has taken over the
share of public investment over the last couple of decades.
• This decline in share of public investment, in particular over the last
decade, has been accompanied by an increase in foreign direct investment
to the economy.
• The long run ratio of private consumption to output is volatile and
displays cyclical behaviour. Private consumption has always been the
largest component of output in Pakistan. However, it is important to
keep in mind that private consumption data in Pakistan is computed as
a residual.
• The government consumption to output ratio is also very volatile and
seems to follow a cyclical pattern. It has been particularly more volatile
over the last decade.
• Both trade related long run ratios, namely exports to output and imports
to output show a significant jump in the early 70’s.
• The magnitude of both the exports to output and imports to output
ratio increased significantly in early 70’s.
• Trade has accounted for more than one third of output over the last
three decades. This lends credence to treating Pakistan as a small open
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economy.
• The long run behaviour of the economy has changed over time. The
behaviour of long run ratios for the first two decades and the last three
decades differ by volatility as well as for magnitude for some variables.
Correlations and Dynamic Correlations (1981-2010)
• For the last three decades, the growth rate of output is most significantly
positively correlated with growth rate of aggregate investment, growth
rate of private consumption and growth rate of imports.
• The growth rate of output also has positive contemporaneous correlation
with growth rate of government consumption and growth rate of exports.
• The relationship between growth rate of output and growth rate of
other macroeconomic variables is similar even when compared decade by
decade. However, there are some differences between the three decades.
In particular, 80’s results are different from the correlations for the last
two decade.
• The growth of most of the macroeconomic variables are lagging behind
the growth in output. Therefore, dynamic correlation analysis points out
that only growth rate of exports for the last decade was a clear leading
indicator of growth in output.
• The growth in government investment was a leading indicator of growth
in output during the period from 1982-1990. Furthermore, for the last
decade growth of government investment was both a leading and a lag-
ging indicator of output growth.
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• FDI growth was usually followed by output growth for most of the period
of interest. However, for the last decade in our analysis FDI growth was
both a leading and lagging indicator of output growth.
• For the period from 1981-2010, de-trended output is significantly posi-
tively correlated with de-trended imports, de-trended aggregate invest-
ment, de-trended government consumption, de-trended private consump-
tion, de-trended exports and de-trended FDI.
• The contemporaneous correlation of de-trended output is strongest with
de-trended imports, de-trended aggregate investment and de-trended
FDI.
• The co-movement between de-trended output and other de-trended macro
variables differ significantly by decade.
• During the 80’s only de-trended government consumption is significantly
positively correlated with de-trended output. Furthermore, all other
de-trended variables have almost no correlation with de-trended output
during the first decade in our analysis.
• On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between de-trended
output and all de-trended macroeconomic variables for the 90’s. The
positive correlation is statistically significant for de-trended private con-
sumption, de-trended exports, de-trended FDI, de-trended imports and
de-trended government consumption.
• During 90’s, de-trended private consumption and de-trended exports are
the most strongly correlation macro variables with de-trended output.
• For the last decade, once again there is a positive correlation between
de-trended output and all de-trended macro variables of interest.
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• However, the positive correlation is significant only for aggregate invest-
ment, imports and FDI.
• Most of the de-trended macroeconomic variables are lagging behind de-
trended output, or for most of them, are both lagging and leading de-
trended output. Therefore, dynamic correlation analysis points out that
de-trended exports is the only clear leading indicator of de-trended out-
put.
• The leading relationship of de-trended exports with de-trended output
is strongest for the last decade.
• The stylized facts of business cycles in Pakistan for the given period for
the growth rate are:
The ’stylized facts’ of Business Cycles (1981-2010)
Growth Rates
• The growth rate of all macroeconomic variables are more volatile than
the growth rate of output for given period of interest.
• The growth rate of aggregate investment is four times as volatile as the
growth rate of output. The private consumption growth rate is one
and half times as volatile as the growth rate of output, growth rate of
government consumption and FDI are seven and twenty-five times more
volatile than output. Finally, exports and imports growth are more than
four and more than five times as volatile as growth of output respectively.
• The growth rate of aggregate investment, private consumption, govern-
ment consumption, exports, imports and FDI are all positively correlated
with growth rate of output.
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• This pro-cyclical behaviour is strongest for growth rate of aggregate in-
vestment, private consumption and imports.
• The growth rate of output is most strongly correlated with growth of
aggregate investment, growth rate of private consumption and growth
rate of FDI for the last decade.
• The growth rate of output and growth rate of aggregate investment are
the only variables that show any kind of persistence.
HP Filtered Data
• All de-trended macroeconomic variables are more volatile than de-trended
output for the period 1981-2010.
• The de-trended aggregate investment is four and a half times as volatile
as de-trended output. The de-trended private consumption is the least
volatile variable, with it being less than one and half times as volatile as
de-trended output.
• The de-trended government consumption and de-trended imports are
around five times as volatile as de-trended output. De-trended exports
are about three and half times as volatile as output. Lastly, de-trended
FDI is the most volatile variable.
• During the last decade, relative volatility of aggregate investment, gov-
ernment consumption, imports and FDI is higher from the values for the
whole period.
• The de-trended aggregate investment, private consumption, government
consumption, exports, imports and FDI are all significantly positively
correlated with de-trended output.
166
• This pro-cyclicality of variables is strongest for de-trended imports, ag-
gregate investment and FDI.
• The de-trended output is significantly positively correlated with de-
trended aggregate investment, de-trended imports and de-trended FDI
for the last decade.
• The de-trended macroeconomic variables that show persistence during
the period of 1981-2010 are output, aggregate investment and FDI. For
the last decade, de-trended exports and de-trended imports also show
persistence in addition to de-trended output, aggregate investment and
FDI.
3.3 Model
After discussing in detail different structural and so-called stylized facts of the
Pakistani economy over the last few decades, I finally turn my attention to an
appropriate economic model that can help us explain the aggregate fluctua-
tions of the economy. Our empirical evidence has repeatedly pointed towards
the importance of aggregate investment, FDI and imports in explaining short-
run fluctuations in output over the last 30 years and in particular for the last
decade. However, in this paper I start from the simplest of RBC model first
and then introduce and augmented version of the simple real business cycles
model. The idea is to see how far these simple models can take us in explaining
recent aggregate fluctuations of Pakistani economy.
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3.3.1 A Simple Real Business Cycles Model
In order to evaluate the ability of a simple real business cycles model to capture
cyclical fluctuations of Pakistani economy, I consider the most basic RBC
model which is easily available in most macro books. Our model is a closed
economy representative agent model with exogenous technology shock. The
representative agent in our simple RBC model tries to maximize the following
separable utility function over an infinite time horizon
max Et
∞∑
i=0
βt
[
lnCt + ψ
(1−Nt)1−σ
1− σ
]
(3.1)
where Et is the expectation at time t, β is the discount rate, Ct is the
consumption of our representative agent at time t, Nt represents the number of
hours spent working, −1
σ
is the frisch elasticity of leisure and ψ is the parameter
explaining the utility gained by our representative agent through leisure. This
utility function is consistent with balance growth.
The representative agent tries to maximize the infinite stream of utilities
given that in each period he/she faces the following budget constraint. The
equation below is actually the typical aggregate resource constraint for a closed
economy without government.
Ct + It = Yt (3.2)
where It is the aggregate investment in the economy at time t and Yt is
aggregate output.
The production in this economy follows a simple cobb-douglas function.
The output in the economy depends on physical capital, labor and technology
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according to the following equation.
Yt = K1−αt (AtNt)
α (3.3)
Yt is the output, Kt represents physical capital, At denotes technology and
Nt is labor. (1− α) is the share of capital in production.
The physical capital in this economy gets accumulated according to follow-
ing capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3.4)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Finally, we model technology by using total factor productivity as a proxy
for technological progress. Technology is exogenous as is typical in RBC liter-
ature and it follows an AR-1 process.
ln (At+1) = ρAln (At) + A,t (3.5)
3.3.2 Augmented Real Business Cycles Model
The augmented RBC model is similar to the typical closed economy RBC
model presented earlier. Indeed, the augmented model also has a represen-
tative agent that tries to maximize the infinite stream of discounted utilities
given the budget constraint. The main innovation is the introduction of an
exogenous FDI shock and the division of aggregate investment into domestic
and foreign components in our capital stock accumulation Eq.(6).
This model is isomorphic to a RBC model with investment-specific tech-
nology shock as studied by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) and
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997). The main difference between their
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model and ours is that they use the relative price of investment as the exoge-
nous shock to aggregate investment and we use FDI. However, the propagation
mechanism in both models work in a very similar manner
To be precise, there are now two types of investment in our closed economy.
It denotes domestic investment which is our typical aggregate investment that
is usually incorporated in these closed economy RBC models. On the other
hand, I∗t is the foreign investment which we are interpreting as foreign direct
investment:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It(I∗t )γt (3.6)
The reason we introduce FDI in our augmented RBC model is the abundant
empirical evidence presented in the previous section supporting the significant
role of FDI and trade variables in driving the business cycle fluctuations of
the Pakistani economy over the last few decades and in particular for the last
decade.
Our specification in above equation implies that there is strong comple-
mentarity between foreign and domestic investments in Pakistan. This is an
important point as I also tried more general alternative specifications, such as
CES, which produced an empirical fit inferior to the above model. Therefore,
the assumption of complementarity between the two types of investment is
needed to get the model to capture key facts from the data.
However, another possibility is that both domestic and foreign investment
respond to an underlying common shock process, such a investment-specific
technology shock, changes in tax or regulatory structure, business confidence,
stability, political change etc., that drives all investment decisions.
Another important point is that I should have considered a small open
economy model in order to properly model the FDI channel as well as the ex-
ternal sector. However, the purpose of this paper is to mainly establish some
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structural and stylized facts of Pakistani economy and evaluate the perfor-
mance of simplest of closed economy RBC models in replicating the relevant
moments of Pakistani economy. The idea is to see how far can one get in terms
of matching the stylized facts of the economy even with these simple models.
Therefore, the foreign component of investment is modelled simply as an
exogenous shock very much like how a typical exogenous technology shock is
incorporated in these models.
ln
(
I∗t+1
)
= ρI∗ln (I∗t ) + I∗,t (3.7)
where ρI∗ is the persistence of the exogenous fdi shock and I∗,t is the standard
error associated with the shock.
Finally, technology shock is the same as before,
ln (At+1) = ρAln (At) + A,t (3.8)
where ρA and A,t are the persistence and standard error of the technology
shock respectively.
3.4 Calibration & Results
In this section, I first discuss the calibration of different parameters of the
model. It is important to have a good understanding of rationale behind
picking different parameter values in order to properly evaluate the fit of the
model. After calibration, I compare second order moments obtained from
simulations of our two models and their empirical counterpart. Finally, I
take a brief look at the impulse response functions from both the simple and
augmented RBC model for both exogenous shocks to technology and FDI.
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3.4.1 Calibration
Due to data limitations all parameters in our model are calibrated for an-
nual frequency. There are 10 parameters in total with 6 structural and 4
shock related parameters. Structural parameters can be categorized into util-
ity and production function related parameters. We have generally adopted
two approaches in terms of calibrating parameters for our models. Some of the
parameters, for which estimation remained an issue due to lack of reliable and
detailed data, are picked from existing RBC/DSGE literature for developing
and developed countries. Some of the parameters with available data, have
been calibrated using partial estimation/computation approach.
First of all, we discuss parameters related to household utility. The value
of discount factor β used in the existing literature ranges from 0.925 to 0.99
for annual frequency for developing countries. We decided to use a value of
0.95 as it falls in the middle of that range as well as being the widely accepted
value for RBC/DSGE models of annual frequency for developed countries like
the US. Furthermore, this calibrated value of β is also consistent with long
run behavior of Pakistani economy.
Ψ reflects household’s preference for leisure and a value of 2.80 for this
parameter is taken from DiCecio and Nelson (2007). Coefficient of labour
supply in utility function φ is fixed at 1.5 following Fagan and Messina (2009).
This value is consistent with the posterior mean reported by Smets and Wouter
(2007).
α and δ are the main parameters related to production. To calibrate the
share of capital in production α, we took a value of 0.50 which is quite close
to the average of capital shares of other developing countries as reported by
Liu (2008). Depreciation rate δ has been set at 0.10 which is within the range
of values used in the literature for annual DSGE models for developed and
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developing countries such as δ = 0.1255 as used by Garcia, et al. (2010). In
addition, balance sheet analysis of joint stock companies listed at the Karachi
Stock exchange reveals that the overall depreciation rate has been close to 10
percent. Therefore, in order to be consistent with both the existing literature
and empirical evidence from Pakistani firms we use the value of 0.10.
The two exogenous shock processes for technology and FDI are estimated
using the method of King and Rebelo (2000). Following our estimation we
set persistence ρA and standard deviation of technology shock σA to 0.90 and
0.02 respectively. Similarly ρI∗ and σI∗ are fixed at 0.59 and 0.34 respectively.
The data for these estimations of shock related parameters has been acquired
from Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).
The details of estimation of shock parameters are discussed in the Appendix
C at the end of the paper.
3.4.2 Results
In order to evaluate the performance of the two models discussed in this pa-
per. I will compare steady-state ratios from the models with their empirical
counterpart. Furthermore, the relevant second order moments such as stan-
dard deviation, contemporaneous correlation with output and autocorrelation
of different variables will also be evaluated from the models and their fit with
the empirical evidence presented earlier.
In the closed economy models, the two relevant long-run ratios are pri-
vate consumption to output ratio and aggregate investment to output ratio.
Furthermore, output in this case is defined as the combination of private con-
sumption and aggregate investment. The Table 7 in the Appendix A shows
that our model respectively give values of 0.67 and 0.33 for private consump-
tion to output and aggregate investment to output ratio. The values obtained
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from our models are similar to the values obtained from the data. However,
our models overshoots the value of investment to output ratio and undershoots
the private consumption to output ratio.
The Table 7 also shows different second order moments from the two models
as well as their empirical counterpart for the period from 1981-2010 and the
last decade respectively. We had earlier reported the second order moments for
output, aggregate investment, private consumption, government consumption,
exports, imports and FDI from annual data. However, since our models are
closed economy models we will only compare the second order moments for
output, private consumption, aggregate investment and FDI from our models
and their empirical counterparts.
The basic RBC model with only technology shock underestimates the abso-
lute and relative volatility of both private consumption and aggregate invest-
ment. In particular, the relative volatility of aggregate investment and private
consumption are 2.28 and 0.45 respectively according to the RBC model. How-
ever, according to Pakistani annual economic data these should be around in
the range of 4.50 to 6.32 for aggregate investment and between 0.89 and 1.31
for private consumption.
On the other hand, the augmented RBC model does relatively better for
both private consumption and aggregate investment in terms of their relative
volatility. The relative volatility of private consumption with respect to output
is 1.04 and relative volatility of aggregate investment is 2.80. The augmented
model still underestimates the relative volatility of aggregate investment but it
is higher than the simple RBC model. The improvement in relative volatility
is significant for private consumption as it more than doubles from the simple
model version and also lies within the reported empirical range.
In terms of contemporaneous correlation of macro variables with output,
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simple RBC model overshoots the correlation for both aggregate investment
as well as private consumption. The Table 7 in Appendix A shows that aug-
mented model does a better job of matching the correlations of both aggregate
investment with output and private consumption with output. In particular,
correlation of aggregate investment and output for the period 1981-2010 was
0.72 from the data. According to the RBC model this correlation was 0.98 and
0.74 according to the augmented model. Therefore, augmented RBC model
outperforms the basic RBC model in terms of matching correlation moments
as well.
Finally, in terms of autocorrelation moments both models perform equally
well. Both models do a good job of matching the autocorrelation coefficient of
output. However, both models underestimate the autocorrelation of aggregate
investment and overestimate the persistence of private consumption. This
can be due to the continually changing dynamics of private consumption and
aggregate investment and possibly due to the residual nature of computing
private consumption in Pakistan.
Overall, the augmented RBC model with technology and FDI shocks out-
performs the simple RBC model with only technology shock in terms of match-
ing the empirical second order moments such as volatility, contemporaneous
correlation and autocorrelation.
3.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
After considering the steady state ratios and second order moments for both
models and their empirical counterparts, next we analyze the impulse response
functions generated in response to the respective exogenous shocks for the two
models. The simple RBC model has the typical exogenous technology shock.
On the other hand, augmented RBC model also has an exogenous FDI shock
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in addition to the exogenous technology shock.
Figure 7 shows that, in a simple RBC model a positive technology shock
leads to a rise in investment, output and consumption. As a result of a positive
technology shock investment rises the most followed by output and consump-
tion. These impulse responses are in line with impulse response functions of a
typical RBC model.
The Figure 8 shows the impulse response functions in response to both
technology and FDI shocks for the augmented RBC model. The impulse re-
sponse functions for investment, consumption and output in response to a
technology shock for the augmented model are almost identical to the IRFs
from the simple RBC model.
Interestingly, in response to a positive FDI shock in the augmented RBC
model investment, consumption and output all rise immediately. The magni-
tude of the rise is largest for investment as expected as FDI shock operates
directly on investment. After a few periods, investment falls below the steady
state level before reverting back to original pre-shock levels. The impulse re-
sponse of aggregate investment tapers off after few periods, in line with the
smaller persistence of the exogenous FDI shock. The behaviour of impulse re-
sponse functions for consumption and output is very similar to their response
to an exogenous technology shock. The only difference is their magnitude and
persistence is adjusted according to the parameters of the FDI shock. Also,
the FDI shocks gets propagated to output indirectly through aggregate in-
vestment. This is different from the case of technology shock as technology
directly impacts the output. The IRF of consumption displays a hump shape
as is already well documented in the literature.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I establish some basic empirical facts of ’documented’ Pakistani
economy over the last few decades. In addition, I also conduct detailed anal-
ysis using contemporaneous and dynamic correlations to identify the relevant
macroeconomic linkages that can explain short term fluctuations in output.
This paper also discovers some stylized facts regarding business cycle fluctua-
tions of Pakistani economy in particular over the last few decades.
Furthermore, I evaluate the performance of a typical RBC and an aug-
mented RBC model with an exogenous FDI shock in explaining cyclical fluc-
tuations experienced by the Pakistani economy. I find that augmented RBC
model performs better compared to the simple RBC model in terms of match-
ing long-run ratios as well as second order moments of Pakistani economy.
To conclude, although I have discussed in detail the evolution of the econ-
omy and where it stands now, it strikes me that the only ‘stable’ stylized fact
is the instability that exists in key economic ratios and relationships. This is
especially true for the last three decades. What is more of a concern is that
this instability has increased over the last decade. This paper is a first step in
understanding and modelling the economic fluctuations of a small open econ-
omy like Pakistan. However, this paper shows that even a simple model with
an exogenous external sector shock can go far in explaining business cycles of
the country for the last 30 years and in particular for the last decade.
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3.A Chapter 3 Estimation of Shock processes
(ρA,ρI∗,σA,σI∗)
TFP series is obtained by using residuals of estimated neo-classical production
function thorough following regression:
ln Yt = α lnKt + (1− α) lnLt + lnAt
To estimate ρA, I estimate the following equation:
lnAt = c+ ρA lnAt−1 + uAt
σA is calculated using residuals of above equation.
Owing to the unavailability of actual data, capital stock series has to be
calculated using interpolation methods. There are different ways to calculate
capital stock series and parameters of technology shock process are sensitive
to variations in capital stock series. Using different series, we get a range of
estimates for ρA 0.85-0.95 and σA 0.0095-0.025. From these ranges, we choose
values of 0.9 and 0.02 for ρA and σA respectively.
To obtain ρI∗ and σI∗ , we estimate the following equation:
ln I∗t = c+ ρI∗ ln I∗t−1 + µI
∗
t
Using log of real per capita FDI, estimation yields values of 0.59 for ρI∗ .
Standard deviation of residuals from above regression yields estimate of σI∗
that is 0.34.
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Figure 2A (i)
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
9
 
Share of Private & Public Investment in  
Total Investment : 1964-2010 
Priv GFCF/GFCF Public GFCF*/GFCF 
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
9
 
Share of Private & Public Investment in  
Total Investment : 1981-2010 
Priv GFCF/GFCF Public GFCF*/GFCF 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.22 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
5
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
1
0
 
Ratio of Real Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
to Real Output : 1960-2010 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.22 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
9
 
Ratio of Real Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation to 
Real Output : 1981-2010 
183
Figure 2A (ii)
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Figure 2A (iii)
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Figure 2B (i)
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Figure 2B (ii)
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Figure 2B (iii)
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
5
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
1
0
 
Ratio of Real Exports to Real Output : 1960-2010 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
9
 
Ratio of Real Exports to Real Output : 1981-2010 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.22 
0.24 
0.26 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
5
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
1
0
 
Ratio of Real Imports to Real Output : 1960-2010 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.16 
0.18 
0.20 
0.22 
0.24 
0.26 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
9
 
Ratio of Real Imports to Real Output : 1981-2010 
188
Figure 3 (i)
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Dynamic Correlation of GR Real GDP with 
 GR Real Investment  
1980's 1990's 2000's All Years 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Dynamic Correlation of GR Real GDP with 
 GR Real Private Investment  
1980's 1990's 2000's All Years 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Dynamic Correlation of HP 100 Real GDP with   
HP 100 Real Investment  
1980's 1990's 2000's All Years 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Dynamic Correlation of HP 100 Real GDP with  
HP 100 Real Private Investment  
1980's 1990's 2000's All Years 
189
Figure 3 (ii)
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Figure 3 (iii)
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Figure 3 (iv)
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Figure 4 (i)
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Figure 4 (ii)
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Figure 5 (i)
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Figure 5 (ii)
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Figure 5 (iii)
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Figure 5 (iv)
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Figure 5 (v)
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Figure 5 (vi)
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Figure 6 (i)
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Figure 6 (ii)
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Figure 6 (iii)
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Figure 6 (iv)
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Figure 6 (v)
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Figure 6 (vi)
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Figure 7
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Figure 8 (i)
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Figure 8 (ii)
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Decade Agriculture Non-Agricultural Decade GDP Share Employment Share
1950's 48.0 52.0 1950's 48.0
1960's 40.4 59.6 1960's 40.4 56.3
1970's 33.7 66.3 1970's 33.7 56.2
1980's 27.6 72.4 1980's 27.6 51.5
1990's 25.4 74.6 1990's 25.4 47.5
2000's 22.6 77.8 2000's 22.6 43.8
Decade Agriculture Non-Agricultural
1960's 56.3 43.7
1970's 56.2 43.8
1980's 51.5 48.5
1990's 47.5 52.8
2000's 43.8 56.2
Table 1
Average Share of Agriculture SectorAverage GDP Share
Average Employment Share
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PC/Y GC/Y GDFCF/Y FDI/Y EXP/Y IMP/Y
Min 0.68 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.09
Max 0.84 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.17 0.24
Average 0.77 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.12 0.18
Std.dev 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04
Median 0.76 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.18
Std.dev/Average 5.2% 17.9% 14.4% 119.5% 28.9% 21.8%
Std.dev/Median 5.2% 18.3% 14.2% 156.0% 27.4% 21.0%
PC/Y GC/Y GDFCF/Y FDI/Y EXP/Y IMP/Y
Min 0.72 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.09
Max 0.84 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.15 0.23
Average 0.79 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.15
Std.dev 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
Median 0.79 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.14
Std.dev/Average 4.1% 9.7% 18.3% 132.6% 28.2% 26.2%
Std.dev/Median 4.1% 9.9% 18.5% 267.2% 32.5% 27.6%
Table 2
LONG RUN RATIOS
1960-2010
1960-1980
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PC/Y GC/Y GDFCF/Y FDI/Y EXP/Y IMP/Y
Min 0.68 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.15
Max 0.83 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.17 0.24
Average 0.75 0.11 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.20
Std.dev 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Median 0.75 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.20
Std.dev/Average 5.1% 21.6% 10.2% 92.3% 13.5% 13.0%
Std.dev/Median 5.1% 21.1% 10.2% 133.9% 13.3% 12.7%
PC/Y GC/Y GDFCF/Y FDI/Y EXP/Y IMP/Y
Min -4.9% -19.7% 30.7% -275.9% 63.9% 69.2%
Max -1.6% 14.4% -2.6% 231.9% 17.0% 2.5%
Average -4.6% 4.1% 10.1% 309.9% 62.6% 29.4%
Std.dev 18.4% 133.4% -38.3% 185.3% -21.9% -35.7%
Median -5.2% 9.8% 11.8% 469.5% 90.7% 40.2%
Std.dev/Average 24.0% 124.1% -44.0% -30.4% -52.0% -50.3%
Std.dev/Median 24.9% 112.5% -44.8% -49.9% -59.0% -54.2%
% Change between (1960-1980) and (1981-2010)
Table 2
LONG RUN RATIOS
1981-2010
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Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.54*** 1.00
Private Investment 0.27 0.85*** 1.00
All Public Investment 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.12 1.00
Public Investment 0.36* 0.52*** 0.09 0.88*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.64*** 0.45** 0.15 0.58*** 0.16 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment 0.10 0.68*** 0.92*** -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.36* 0.43** 0.30 0.31 0.16 0.47*** -0.01 1.00
Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment -0.10 1.00
Private Investment -0.41 0.37 1.00
All Public Investment 0.20 0.79** -0.27 1.00
Public Investment 0.06 0.91*** 0.13 0.87*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.27 -0.10 -0.81*** 0.40 -0.10 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment -0.33 0.36 0.94*** -0.24 0.19 -0.85*** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.07 -0.11 -0.58* 0.25 -0.12 0.74** -0.81*** 1.00
Table 3A
GROWTH RATE
1982-2010
1982-1990
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Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.46 1.00
Private Investment 0.03 0.76** 1.00
All Public Investment 0.61* 0.42 -0.27 1.00
Public Investment 0.46 0.40 -0.24 0.94*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.60* 0.18 -0.21 0.52 0.20 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment -0.17 0.58* 0.92*** -0.42 -0.34 -0.40 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.41 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.22 0.30 -0.25 1.00
Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.70** 1.00
Private Investment 0.60* 0.94*** 1.00
All Public Investment 0.61* 0.70** 0.41 1.00
Public Investment 0.37 0.57* 0.30 0.88*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.77*** 0.69** 0.57* 0.69** 0.31 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment 0.58* 0.86*** 0.96*** 0.28 0.25 0.39 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.49 0.82*** 0.87*** 0.39 0.25 0.63* 0.73** 1.00
1991-2000
2001-2010
Table 3A
GROWTH RATE
214
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.54*** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.36* 0.43** 1.00
Private Consumption 0.54** 0.08 0.08 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.34* 0.47** 0.38** -0.12 1.00
Exports 0.32* 0.10 -0.15 -0.19 0.13 1.00
Imports 0.47*** 0.60*** 0.28 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.16 1.00
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment -0.10 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.07 -0.11 1.00
Private Consumption 0.46 -0.52 0.08 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.56 -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 1.00
Exports -0.06 0.44 -0.63* -0.63* 0.22 1.00
Imports 0.41 -0.04 -0.51 0.61* 0.29 0.04 1.00
Table 3B
GROWTH RATE
1982-2010
1982-1990
215
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.46 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.41 0.31 1.00
Private Consumption 0.67** 0.27 0.25 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.42 -0.05 0.71** 0.39 1.00
Exports 0.68** 0.07 0.38 0.15 0.52 1.00
Imports 0.52 0.41 0.53 0.80*** 0.67** 0.27 1.00
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.70** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.49 0.82*** 1.00
Private Consumption 0.57* 0.10 -0.11 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.27 0.62* 0.55 -0.39 1.00
Exports 0.14 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.14 1.00
Imports 0.44 0.80*** 0.55* 0.15 0.60* 0.16 1.00
1991-2000
2001-2010
Table 3B
GROWTH RATE
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Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.72*** 1.00
Private Investment 0.53*** 0.92*** 1.00
All Public Investment 0.71*** 0.76*** 0.45** 1.00
Public Investment 0.41** 0.52*** 0.23 0.86*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.81*** 0.76*** 0.59*** 0.73*** 0.29 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment 0.30 0.76*** 0.93*** 0.23 0.08 0.37** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.71*** 0.68*** 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.25 0.73*** 0.28 1.00
Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment -0.06 1.00
Private Investment -0.58* 0.30 1.00
All Public Investment 0.43 0.68** -0.49 1.00
Public Investment 0.27 0.79*** -0.18 0.88*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.44 0.15 -0.72** 0.67** 0.23 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment -0.55 0.23 0.95*** 0.51 -0.15 -0.82*** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.07 0.15 -0.20 0.26 -0.03 0.60* -0.49 1.00
1981-2010
1981-1990
Table 4A
HP FILTER DATA
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Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.53 1.00
Private Investment 0.05 0.72** 1.00
All Public Investment 0.70** 0.69** 0.00 1.00
Public Investment 0.61* 0.69** 0.04 0.97*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.66** 0.39 -0.14 0.69** 0.48 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment -0.28 0.48 0.89*** -0.23 -0.16 -0.37 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.73** 0.37 0.09 0.44 0.37 0.47 -0.37 1.00
Output Investment
Private 
Investment
All Public 
Investment
Public 
Investment
Government 
Investment
Priavte Domestic 
Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Output 1.00
Investment 0.87*** 1.00
Private Investment 0.84*** 0.97*** 1.00
All Public investment 0.52 0.73** 0.61* 1.00
Public Investment 0.46 0.60* 0.40 0.89*** 1.00
Government Investment 0.34 0.54 0.62* 0.64** 0.22 1.00
Priavte Domestic Investment 0.86*** 0.92*** 0.98*** 0.52 0.32 0.59* 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.73** 0.92*** 0.96*** 0.57* 0.33 0.66** 0.89*** 1.00
1991-2000
2001-2010
Table 4A
HP FILTER DATA
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Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.72*** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.71*** 0.68*** 1.00
Private Consumption 0.60*** 0.23 0.31* 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.61*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.12 1.00
Exports 0.43** 0.29 0.21 -0.11 0.24 1.00
Imports 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.67*** 0.30 1.00
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment -0.06 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.07 0.15 1.00
Private Consumption 0.15 -0.68** -0.11 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.66** -0.03 -0.18 -0.19 1.00
Exports 0.00 0.56* -0.35 -0.78*** 0.26 1.00
Imports 0.01 -0.40 -0.52 0.68** 0.11 -0.27 1.00
Table 4B
HP FILTER DATA
1981-2010
1981-1990
219
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.53 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.73** 0.37 1.00
Private Consumption 0.85*** 0.56* 0.60* 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.58* 0.02 0.86*** 0.53 1.00
Exports 0.78*** 0.08 0.80*** 0.60* 0.84*** 1.00
Imports 0.67** 0.53 0.76** 0.83*** 0.75** 0.66** 1.00
Output Investment
Foreign Direct 
Investment
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumptions
Exports Imports
Output 1.00
Investment 0.87*** 1.00
Foreign Direct Investment 0.73** 0.92*** 1.00
Private Consumption 0.54 0.28 -0.01 1.00
Government Consumptions 0.50 0.76** 0.74** -0.22 1.00
Exports 0.41 0.16 0.28 0.06 0.02 1.00
Imports 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.78*** 0.40 0.73** 0.17 1.00
2001-2010
Table 4B
HP FILTER DATA
1991-2000
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1982-2010 1982-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 0.0218 0.0105 0.0274 0.0232
Real Investment 0.0878 0.0301 0.0795 0.1289
Real FDI 0.5445 0.6685 0.5128 0.4784
Real Private Consumption 0.0343 0.0320 0.0417 0.0282
Real Government Consumption 0.1486 0.0738 0.0753 0.2269
Real Exports 0.0942 0.1275 0.0896 0.0663
Real Imports 0.1155 0.0608 0.1196 0.1461
1982-2010 1982-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 4.04 2.86 2.90 5.56
Real FDI 25.01 63.43 18.70 20.64
Real Private Consumption 1.57 3.03 1.52 1.22
Real Government Consumption 6.83 7.01 2.75 9.79
Real Exports 4.33 12.10 3.27 2.86
Real Imports 5.31 5.77 4.36 6.30
Table 5
Relevant Moments of GR of Macroeconomic Variables (IFS)
Volatility of Macro Variables
Relative Volatility of Macro Variables
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1982-2010 1982-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 0.54*** -0.10 0.46 0.70**
Real FDI 0.36* 0.07 0.41 0.49
Real Private Consumption 0.54** 0.46 0.67** 0.57*
Real Government Consumption 0.34* 0.56 0.42 0.27
Real Exports 0.32* -0.06 0.68** 0.14
Real Imports 0.47*** 0.41 0.52 0.44
1982-2010 1982-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 0.23 -0.29 0.01 0.47
Real Investment 0.42 -0.55 0.08 0.62
Real FDI -0.09 -0.49 -0.19 0.39
Real Private Consumption -0.13 -0.20 -0.41 0.10
Real Government Consumption -0.24 -0.06 0.15 -0.52
Real Exports -0.09 -0.50 0.26 0.24
Real Imports -0.02 -0.28 -0.05 -0.03
Contemparaneous  Correlation of Macro Variables with Output
Autocorrelation of Macro Variables
Table 5
Relevant Moments of GR of Macroeconomic Variables (IFS)
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1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 0.0219 0.0070 0.0222 0.0233
Real Investment 0.0983 0.0185 0.0635 0.1475
Real FDI 0.3849 0.3091 0.3151 0.4353
Real Private Consumption 0.0287 0.0242 0.0291 0.0208
Real Government Consumption 0.1203 0.0509 0.0715 0.1560
Real Exports 0.0776 0.0835 0.0617 0.0621
Real Imports 0.1110 0.0431 0.1019 0.1329
1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 4.50 2.63 2.85 6.32
Real FDI 17.61 44.05 14.17 18.66
Real Private Consumption 1.31 3.44 1.31 0.89
Real Government Consumption 5.50 7.26 3.22 6.69
Real Exports 3.55 11.90 2.78 2.66
Real Imports 5.08 6.14 4.58 5.69
Relative Volatility of Macro Variables
Table 6
Relevant Moments of HP Filtered Macroeconomic Variables (IFS)
Volatility of Macro Variables
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1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 0.72*** -0.06 0.53 0.87***
Real FDI 0.71*** 0.07 0.73** 0.73**
Real Private Consumption 0.60*** 0.15 0.85*** 0.54
Real Government Consumption 0.61*** 0.66** 0.58* 0.50
Real Exports 0.43** 0.00 0.78*** 0.41
Real Imports 0.76*** 0.01 0.67** 0.79***
1981-2010 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Real Output 0.58 -0.23 0.23 0.59
Real Investment 0.62 -0.22 0.09 0.61
Real FDI 0.40 -0.26 0.25 0.55
Real Private Consumption 0.37 0.17 0.00 0.10
Real Government Consumption 0.33 -0.13 0.37 -0.09
Real Exports 0.30 -0.24 0.20 0.48
Real Imports 0.51 0.11 0.21 0.36
Autocorrelation of Macro Variables
Contemparaneous  Correlation of Macro Variables with Output
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1981-2010 2001-2010 RBC Model Augmented RBC Model
Real Output 0.0219 0.0233 0.0142 0.0305
Real Investment 0.0983 0.1475 0.0324 0.0853
Real Private Consumption 0.0287 0.0208 0.0063 0.0317
Real FDI 0.3849 0.4353 0.3161
1981-2010 2001-2010 RBC Model Augmented RBC Model
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 4.50 6.32 2.28 2.80
Real Private Consumption 1.31 0.89 0.44 1.04
Real FDI 17.61 18.66 10.36
1981-2010 2001-2010 RBC Model Augmented RBC Model
Real Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Real Investment 0.72*** 0.87*** 0.98 0.74
Real Private Consumption 0.60*** 0.54 0.88 0.47
Real FDI 0.71*** 0.73** 0.73
1981-2010 2001-2010 RBC Model Augmented RBC Model
Real Output 0.58 0.59 0.50 0.54
Real Investment 0.62 0.61 0.45 0.31
Real Private Consumption 0.37 0.10 0.69 0.76
Real FDI 0.40 0.55 0.30
Table 7
Autocorrelation of Macro Variables
Comparison of Relevant Moments of HP Filtered Macroeconomic Variables 
Volatility of Macro Variables
Relative Volatility of Macro Variables
Contemparaneous  Correlation of Macro Variables with Output
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